The Maoists in Chhattisgarh have added yet another number to their list of killings. This time, the toll is 16. In 2005, they had killed 55 cops in Bijapur, 76 CRPF jawans in 2010 and 30 people including senior Congress leaders of the state on 25 May, 2013.
How many more innocent people and security personnel need to die for the government to wake up from its deep slumber and put an end to the red terror? What is the number that will finally force the government to do something about this?
The writing on the wall had become clear on the very day when the first phase of assembly polls in Chhattisgarh had got over on 11 November, 2013, registering a record turnout of 75 percent.
When will the government finally crack down on Maoist terror? AFP Ignoring the threats from the Maoists to boycott the polls, the voters in south Bastar – a Maoist stronghold – had come out in large numbers to exercise their right to vote for a change. It was then that the intelligence agencies had warned the state government of possible attacks by the Maoist cadre as an act of revenge, both on the security forces and the tribal villagers.
A month before the country goes to the Lok Sabha polls, the Left-Wing Extremists again unleashed a reign of terror on 11 March – the deadliest strike Chhattisgarh has witnessed since the rebels wiped out almost the entire top Congress leadership at Darbha Ghati in May last year. The recent dastardly act again underscored the government’s failure in learning any lesson from previous attacks. The Centre’s strategy to scale up operations against the Maoists ahead of the Lok Sabha elections has faced a major setback. Post the attack, lip service is in full swing.
The union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde and the Chhattisgarh chief minister Raman Singh have both reiterated, “Naxal movement has to be dealt with ruthlessly and we’ll do it...Our battle against the Maoists will continue”. Why do we repeatedly fail to respond to an intelligence alert? Why does the State continue to remain helpless in front of some thousand-odd rebels? What goes wrong every time, allowing the Maoists to wipe out so many young lives, leaving the government with no option but to pay tributes to the coffins of the deceased?
There are many Naxal sympathisers, who question an encounter, but why doesn’t any activist come forward to question the government on the rampant killing of security personnel and poor tribals? “Everything is wrong in tackling the Naxal menace. From policy formulation to its implementation, nothing is right,” says former director general, Border Security Force, and member National Security Advisory Board, Prakash Singh. Immediately after the massacre of Congress leaders by the Maoists in 2013, prime minister Manmohan Singh had called for a two-pronged strategy to deal with Left Wing Extremism.
To strengthen counter-terrorism efforts and address development issues simultaneously. But Prakash Singh adds, “Nothing is clear on the strategy front. There are differences in perception between the Centre and the Naxal-hit states.” Internal security experts believe that the need of the hour is to bring greater focus on improving the capability of state police rather than mindlessly raising the central armed police forces to combat Maoist violence. But, in a large number of cases, local police have been found to be ill-equipped to deal with insurgent operations. “Local police is the best, both for combating and gathering intelligence, but the state government needs to ensure its standard,” says Singh. As the dead don’t respond to allegations, Shinde was quick to say that there were lapses on part of the security forces while following standard operating procedures (SoP), after visiting Chhattisgarh to pay tribute to the killed security personnel.
The security forces have even been blamed of failing to take note of the intelligence inputs from both the central and state agencies regarding the movement of Maoists in the area. If that really has been the case, then why have the state and police leaderships never been questioned, one wonders. The dead are always left with the additional burden of taking the blame for their own killings. “Rampant corruption in the state government as well as in the police administration and lack of commitment lead to failures in dealing with such grave situations in a war zone,” observes Singh.
The state’s counter terrorism policies have been based principally on political posturing and not on objective, or considerations of strategy and response. “Though there is deployment of security forces in the Maoist hotbed, giving a sense of safety and security, the fact is that their hands are tied,” says a former top cop of Chhattisgarh on condition of anonymity. Within the police administration there is severe discontent among the field staff stationed at insurgency-hit locations, which has arisen due to apathy of senior officials. That’s the case in other insurgency-hit states as well. “After all, who cares if the jawans live or die? This is often the attitude of top officials,” laments Singh. Clearly, nobody seems to be bothered.
How many more innocent people and security personnel need to die for the government to wake up from its deep slumber and put an end to the red terror? What is the number that will finally force the government to do something about this?
The writing on the wall had become clear on the very day when the first phase of assembly polls in Chhattisgarh had got over on 11 November, 2013, registering a record turnout of 75 percent.
When will the government finally crack down on Maoist terror? AFP Ignoring the threats from the Maoists to boycott the polls, the voters in south Bastar – a Maoist stronghold – had come out in large numbers to exercise their right to vote for a change. It was then that the intelligence agencies had warned the state government of possible attacks by the Maoist cadre as an act of revenge, both on the security forces and the tribal villagers.
A month before the country goes to the Lok Sabha polls, the Left-Wing Extremists again unleashed a reign of terror on 11 March – the deadliest strike Chhattisgarh has witnessed since the rebels wiped out almost the entire top Congress leadership at Darbha Ghati in May last year. The recent dastardly act again underscored the government’s failure in learning any lesson from previous attacks. The Centre’s strategy to scale up operations against the Maoists ahead of the Lok Sabha elections has faced a major setback. Post the attack, lip service is in full swing.
The union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde and the Chhattisgarh chief minister Raman Singh have both reiterated, “Naxal movement has to be dealt with ruthlessly and we’ll do it...Our battle against the Maoists will continue”. Why do we repeatedly fail to respond to an intelligence alert? Why does the State continue to remain helpless in front of some thousand-odd rebels? What goes wrong every time, allowing the Maoists to wipe out so many young lives, leaving the government with no option but to pay tributes to the coffins of the deceased?
There are many Naxal sympathisers, who question an encounter, but why doesn’t any activist come forward to question the government on the rampant killing of security personnel and poor tribals? “Everything is wrong in tackling the Naxal menace. From policy formulation to its implementation, nothing is right,” says former director general, Border Security Force, and member National Security Advisory Board, Prakash Singh. Immediately after the massacre of Congress leaders by the Maoists in 2013, prime minister Manmohan Singh had called for a two-pronged strategy to deal with Left Wing Extremism.
To strengthen counter-terrorism efforts and address development issues simultaneously. But Prakash Singh adds, “Nothing is clear on the strategy front. There are differences in perception between the Centre and the Naxal-hit states.” Internal security experts believe that the need of the hour is to bring greater focus on improving the capability of state police rather than mindlessly raising the central armed police forces to combat Maoist violence. But, in a large number of cases, local police have been found to be ill-equipped to deal with insurgent operations. “Local police is the best, both for combating and gathering intelligence, but the state government needs to ensure its standard,” says Singh. As the dead don’t respond to allegations, Shinde was quick to say that there were lapses on part of the security forces while following standard operating procedures (SoP), after visiting Chhattisgarh to pay tribute to the killed security personnel.
The security forces have even been blamed of failing to take note of the intelligence inputs from both the central and state agencies regarding the movement of Maoists in the area. If that really has been the case, then why have the state and police leaderships never been questioned, one wonders. The dead are always left with the additional burden of taking the blame for their own killings. “Rampant corruption in the state government as well as in the police administration and lack of commitment lead to failures in dealing with such grave situations in a war zone,” observes Singh.
The state’s counter terrorism policies have been based principally on political posturing and not on objective, or considerations of strategy and response. “Though there is deployment of security forces in the Maoist hotbed, giving a sense of safety and security, the fact is that their hands are tied,” says a former top cop of Chhattisgarh on condition of anonymity. Within the police administration there is severe discontent among the field staff stationed at insurgency-hit locations, which has arisen due to apathy of senior officials. That’s the case in other insurgency-hit states as well. “After all, who cares if the jawans live or die? This is often the attitude of top officials,” laments Singh. Clearly, nobody seems to be bothered.
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