Showing posts with label Army. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Army. Show all posts

Friday, 6 June 2014

Amarnath Yatra Inspector General of Police takes stock of preparedness

JAMMU, June 5:  Inspector General of Police Jammu Zone, Jammu, Rajesh Kumar, today chaired a meeting of officers of intelligence agencies,  CRPF, BSF, Army, Police, Armed/IRP, Traffic, Security, SDRF and civil administration in Zonal Police Hqrs here to take stock of the preparedness  for smooth and peaceful conduct of Shri Amarnath Ji Yatra-2014.

Intelligence agencies briefed the chair about their assessment on security and law & order situation and also highlighted the areas of concern based on available inputs as well as based on past experiences that need more focus for enhancing the security and law and order measures during the forthcoming Shri Amarnath Yatra.

DIG Traffic, concerned District SPs, SP Security and CO SDRF also briefed the chair about their preparedness and highlighted areas of concerns which need to be taken care by all the concerned stake-holders at ground level for better management of yatra.

IGP exhorted concerned officers to take note of the highlighted areas of concerns and make concerted efforts to improve upon these areas. He emphasised on enhanced vigil and security in coordinated manner besides the need for proper regulation of Yatra convoys on NHW, provision of basic amenities at Lodgement Centre and wide publicity through print and electronic media educating people to undertake their pilgrimage only on the dates as per their registration to avoid inconvenience. He asked all the District SPs and officers from CRPF and Armed  Police to sensitize their officers and men being deployed on Yatra duty that they should be courteous and polite while dealing with Yatris and serve as a guide also.

The officers who attended the meeting include   Narinder Singh, DIG CRPF Jammu (N);    Parveen Kumar Sharma, DIG CRPF Jammu; S.A.Watali, DIG Traffic Jammu; Surinder Kumar Gupta, DIG CID Jammu;   S.A.Beig, DIG JSK Range;   A.K.Atri, DIG Rajouri-Poonch Range;   A.Wani, DIG DKR Range; K.L.Bhagat, DIG AP Jammu; K.S.Parihar, Addl. Deputy Commissioner Jammu;   Soujanya Sharma, Director Tourism Jammu; Jt. Director Information Jammu, A.K.Wangoo, Dy Director Fire Services Jammu. Atul Goel,  SSP Jammu;   Sham Sunder Sharma, SSP APCR Jammu;   S.D.P.Singh, SSP Telecom Jammu, M.Suleman Choudhary, SP Udhampur;   Anil Mangotra, SP Samba;   Virender Sharma,  SP CID SB Jammu; S.J.S.Johar, SP PCR Jammu;   Javed Mattoo, SP Ramban;   Mubassir Latifi, SP Rajouri;   Vivek Gupta, SP Reasi;   Ramesh Angral, SP Security Jammu;    Shailender Singh, SP CID CI Jammu;      Mohan  Lal, SP Kathua;  Shri Shamsheer Hussain, SP Poonch; Shri M.S.Chouhan, SP Doda;  Pawan Parihar, SP Traffic Rural Jammu; Shri Rakesh Sharma, I/C SO to DIG CRPF;   Stanzin Norboo, CO SP SDRF Jammu,   Ravikant Sharma,   Chander Jeet Singh, SDPO Railway Jammu and Avleen Kour, Information Department.


Source: http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/igp-takes-stock-preparedness-amarnath-yatra/

Tuesday, 3 June 2014

Haryana will provide jobs to the kin of Martyrs on Compassionate Grounds

The Haryana Government has decided to grant compassionate assistance through appointment on compassionate grounds in Class III and IV posts to one eligible living spouse or dependent children of martyr of armed forces personnel or para military forces personnel, informed Chief Secretary, SC Choudhary.

A martyr means “a person serving in Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air Force) or in para-military forces (BSF, CRPF, CISF, ITBP, Assam Rifles, Rapid Action Force etc.) under the Home Ministry on permanent basis and is killed in action in border skirmishes, terrorist attacks or riots and is declared a martyr by Ministry of Defence, Government of India and Ministry of Home Affairs, respectively”.

The eligible family member means dependent son or daughter or wife who is not earning and is fully dependent upon the martyr.

The appointment shall be confined to feeder posts in group C and D category. Such appointments shall be made only on regular basis and against regular sanctioned post. Also, they shall be exempt from the observance of the recruitment through Recruiting Agencies notified by the State.

There shall be no relaxation of any provision of these instructions. However, as a special case, these instructions shall be relaxed only in the cases of children who have become orphan upon the demise of the martyr. The claim of appointment of such orphans shall remain alive till one child of the deceased has attained majority/minimum eligible age for entry into Government service.

These instructions will be come into force with effect from January 1, 2014.


Source: http://www.dailypioneer.com/state-editions/chandigarh/haryana-to-provide-jobs-to-kin-of-martyrs-on-compassionate-grounds.html

Monday, 2 June 2014

ABSS offers scholarship to wards of armed security forces

Excelsior Correspondent
JAMMU, June 1: ABSS Institute of Technology, Meerut announced scholarship for the wards of J&K Police, Air Force, Army, BSF, CRPF, ITBP and other central paramilitary forces.

This was stated by Vice Chairman of ABSS Institute of Technology, Meerut, Atul Bhardwaj during a press conference.

He said that the scholarship will be sponsored by Government of India to the students of SC, ST, OBC and minority communities are also being provided by the college.

“Scholarship scheme for Kashmiri migrants, tuition free seats for meritorious students and two tuition free seats for the girls belonging to the martyr families are also being provided by our college”, he maintained.

Bhardwaj further stated that the college was founded in 2007 by the sole motto of imparting quality based technical courses including MTech, BTech, MBA, Bachelor of Management, dual degree courses, integrated technical courses and polytechnic courses. The college is approved by AICTE Ministry of HRD, Government of India and affiliated to UP Technical University, Lucknow, he added.

“We provide 100 per cent job placement assistance to the passed out students. To provide facilities to the J&K students our admission-cum-counselling office functions throughout the year in Rehari, where in depth counselling to the desirous students are being provided on various career courses”, he stated.


Source:  http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/abss-offers-scholarship-wards-security-forces/

Monday, 26 May 2014

JKP & BSF personnel awarded by Northern Army Commander

Srinagar, May 25, (Scoop News) - Northern Army Commander Lt Gen Sanjiv Chachra left for Udhampur after concluding his visit to Kashmir valley. He visited forward areas and discussed security related issues with Hon'ble Governor, Hon,ble Chief Minister J&K and high ranking officials.

During his visit Army Commander reviewed overall security situation in valley particularly on Line of Control. On 23 May and 24 May 14 he visited many forward posts in Kupwara and Baramulla divisions and interacted with officers and troops deployed there. He was briefed about the security situation on Line of Control and measures in place to check infiltration.

He called on NN Vohra, the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir wherein he discussed the security situation in the state. On the first day of the visit, the Army Commander had met the Honourable Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and discussed the prevailing security situation in the State.

Today, before departing to his Udhampur based Northern Command Headquarters the Northern Army Commander paid rich tributes to the Martyrs by laying wreath at the Badami Bagh War Memorial in a solemn ceremony. In a separate award ceremony organised at Badami Bagh, Army Commander awarded commendation cards to the persons of Army, JKP and BSF for their exemplary performances in Counter Terrorist operations and commitment to their duties.


Army commander expressed his satisfaction over his visit and lauded Chinar Corps in environmental security and sustaining peace in the valley. He also extended his good wishes to the Awaam in general and youth in particular and wished for great future ahead. He hoped that that the security forces will continue to get love and support from them.

Sunday, 25 May 2014

CRPF to deploy 65 companies for Amarnath Yatra

The CRPF is expected to deploy about 6,500 men for this year’s annual Amarnath pilgrimage.

The 44-day pilgrimage to the Amarnath cave shrine nestled in the south Kashmir Himalayas at a height of 14,500 feet is scheduled to begin from June 28 and conclude on August 10.

Apart from the CRPF, the pilgrimage is protected and facilitated by the Jammu and Kashmir Police, BSF and the Army. All these forces form part of the multi-tier security grid. “This year there is a proposal to deploy around 65 companies of the CRPF from Jammu to the cave shrine, including the twin routes of Baltal and Pahalgam,” said a senior CRPF officer.

He said that last year the CRPF had deployed 60 companies. “However, this year the figure is likely to be increased from 60 companies to 65 companies,” he said.

The officer said 12 companies, including a couple of women companies, are likely to be deployed in the Jammu region while 53 companies, including two companies of women constables, are likely to be deployed in Kashmir, including the twin routes that lead to the cave shrine and the shrine area.

One company on an average has 80 to 100 personnel.

The officer said the cave shrine area again was likely to be guarded by the highly motivated and well trained team of 10 CRPF commandos equipped with Israeli X-95 guns.

“The upper reaches of the cave area is guarded by the Army while our commandos remain in the cave area to have a fool proof security grid,” he said.

The Yatri Niwas base camp here on the banks of the Tawi would be guarded by 500 CRPF personnel.


Source: http://u4uvoice.com/jammu-kashmir-news/crpf-deploy-65-companies-amarnath-yatra/

Thursday, 15 May 2014

CRPF to get bulletproof helmets in Shinde's final move as Home Minister

Paramilitary forces will finally have adequate bulletproof helmets as the Home Ministry, which was sitting on the proposal, has acted at last.

Before demitting office, Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde has given his nod to expedite the purchase.

The ministry has given its sanction to the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to purchase 47,000 bulletproof helmets through a tender.

Mail Today was the first to report that the CRPF has only 800 such helmets, against the sanctioned 50,000 for a force of 2.9 lakh. The CRPF has the highest presence in Maoist-hit states, with nearly 85,000-90,000 personnel serving in the Red Zone.

Despite bullet injuries on the head being one of the most common causes of death, red tape in the ministry ensured that jawans go into combat zones without even the most basic requirements like bulletproof helmets.

"Earlier, it was decided that the ministry will purchase them and then hand it over to the forces," said a senior officer. The ministry instead sat over the proposal.

"Now we have been permitted to go for a tender and buy them on our own. It's good we don't have to depend on the ministry for something as basic as this," said the officer.

While the standard operating procedures in the Army clearly state that every soldier in insurgency-hit areas must have a bulletproof helmet, these rules did not apply to paramilitary forces due to bureaucratic lethargy.

Sources said the CRPF has been made the nodal agency for carrying out a tender and purchase helmets for all other paramilitary forces.

Bulletproof helmets are also needed by BSF, ITBP, SSB and Assam Rifles for their troops serving in combat zones.

The Ministry woke up from its slumber to fast-track the process for acquiring helmets in March after an attack in Chhattisgarh killed 15 security personnel, including 11 from the CRPF.


Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2628575/CRPF-bulletproof-helmets-Shindes-final-Home-Minister.html#ixzz31kP6GxEa 

Sunday, 11 May 2014

Defence ministry allows BSF to guard India-Myanmar border, but with rider

NEW DELHI: The defence ministry (MoD) may have finally agreed to the long-standing demand of the home ministry (MHA) to hand over the India-Myanmar border to the BSF but has made it clear the Army will retain operational control over the Assam Rifles.

The long-running bitter turf war over whether the Assam Rifles or BSF should guard the 1,643km thickly-forested border with Myanmar — infested with insurgents, smugglers, drug traffickers and the like — even went up to the Cabinet committee on security but could not be "fully resolved" with a "practical" solution till now.

But the MoD has now given the green signal for BSF to replace the Assam Rifles - which administratively comes under MHA as a central paramilitary force but is under the Army's operational control — in guarding the border if the MHA so wants it.

"The MoD, however, held there is no question of turning the Assam Rifles into a border-guarding force. It has a clear-cut role in the overall Army plan against China in the eastern sector, which cannot be diluted," said an official.

BSF will, of course, not find it easy to take over the "border management" with Myanmar, both in terms of manpower and infrastructure. "Huge funds will be required for fencing, border outposts, roads, tracks and helipads as well as the raising of 41 new BSF battalions," said another official.

But the MHA contends the Assam Rifles, with its deployment pattern of operating from bases away from the border, has proved ineffective in making the region secure against infiltration attempts by insurgent outfits like NSCN, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK and the like.

Conversely, the MoD-Army combine felt the Assam Rifles, with 30% of its troops from the North-East and largely officered by the Army, was specially geared for the task of both border management as well as counter-insurgency in the region. While 15 of its battalions are currently deployed along the border, the other 31 are engaged in anti-militancy operations in the hinterland.

Turf battles and lack of synergy among different forces have long been the problem along Indian borders, especially the long unresolved ones with Pakistan and China. The Army, for instance, has for long been demanding operational control over the ITBP, another of the seven central police forces under the MHA, for better management of the Line of Actual Control with China in eastern Ladakh, as reported by TOI earlier.

Incidentally, both the Border Management Task Force and the high-powered Group of Ministers' report on "reforming the national security system" after the 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan had stressed the "One Border-One Force" principle. "Multiplicity of forces on the same borders has inevitably led to the lack of accountability as well as problems of command and control," held the GoM report.


Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Defence-ministry-allows-BSF-to-guard-India-Myanmar-border-but-with-rider/articleshow/34944260.cms

Sunday, 27 April 2014

China: LAC impasse and Army-ITBP spat


First the facts
- Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has five battalions deployed in Eastern Ladakh including those on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

-The DIG Headquarter controlling these forces is located at Srinagar, 258 air km and 418 road km from Leh. Zoji La, on the Himalayan Range, and located on the main highway from Srinagar to Leh, is closed to road traffic from November to end May.

- Considering the separation of the Headquarter from the units, an adhoc Headquarter is functional under the Deputy at Leh – a compromise solution at best, considering the division of resources.

- ITBP communications are based, primarily, on High Frequency radio, which is most vulnerable to interception and being jammed when required particularly in an operational situation.

- The role of ITBP amplifies the tasks of the Force as – to guard the Northern borders and prevent violations and encroachments, prevent smuggling, unauthorized movement of goods, weapons, personnel and such like non-traditional threats in the border areas.

- ITBP does not have its own integral intelligence setup so essential in an operational situation.

- Thus the orientation of the force is essentially towards “policing” tasks.

The Ground Realties.
- The Army has Infantry and Mechanized forces suitably located with robust combat support and controlling headquarters well forward and within easy reach of the LAC.

- India’s perception of the LAC is undemarcated on ground but has been identified along suitable geographical and relief features.

- India and China have unilaterally delineated the LAC on their respective maps but have not shared the same with each other. As a result, each assumes the others perception from the activities that both carry out to dominate up to their respective perceptions.

- Consequently, common areas claimed by both arise, and are contested for by the militaries. Often termed, inappropriately, as “no-man’s land”.  India generally terms it as “no-man’s land” which is not paid heed to by China, thus putting India at a disadvantage. India should modify term to “Both-man’s Land”, so that India does not restrain its troops from operating in that area.

- Very evidently, the LAC is a “LIVE” boundary, and should be manned accordingly. The PLA platoon strength that camped in Depsang was no group of local herdsmen or Yak smugglers or in any way could be construed as non-traditional threat. Therefore if required more than a “Police “force response.

- The Chinese Border Defence Units deployed and garrisoned along the entire LAC are directly under the PLA, which is surely not mere “policing” duties.

- The Army has a comprehensive (in as much there is) intelligence setup and has wherewithal for intelligence gathering and substantial surveillance resources.

- The Army has a secure radio and static line communication network with adequate redundancies built-in for exercising optimal operational command and control.

- The Army has a well-structured tiered establishment for force build up and undertakes an emergent or graduated operational response at the place of its own choosing right across the entire LAC. Provided the field commanders are not constrained at the tactical level, due to a politically cautious stance.

Operational Milieu.
- Army and ITBP posts are often co-located but operating independently. Command and control is exercised along two parallel verticals with informal personality based lateral inter-action.

- Domination of LAC by patrolling by both Army and ITBP, is a wasteful duplication of effort.

- Inter-communication between Army and ITBP is adhoc and is mainly provided from Army resources. ITBP’s integral radio equipment is incompatible with equipment currently in use by the Army. Consequently the ITBP personnel are required to be trained on it. Given the nature of the high altitude of the region there is frequent movement of such personnel making the whole exercise temporary and fragmented. 

- New raisings in ITBP units a unilateral undertaking by MHA and ITBP without heed to the overall security fallout along the LAC by this augmentation.

Consequences.
- With a Police force deployed on the LAC, the Chinese will interpret it as a tacit acceptance of the Indian Government that the LAC is not a “LIVE” border that needs to be guarded by military forces. A benign approach to the whole India-China Boundary question.

- To accept ITBP as the first responder to a conventional tactical situation without requisite integral support with heavier weapons and combat support in the form of dedicated artillery or air support is wilfully making them “cannon fodder” by powers that be.

- Constraining the tactical initiative of tactical field commanders by a policy of restraint and reticence will always allow the PLA to wrest the initiative in battle.

- Any form of pre-emption or “cold start” by the Army is not feasible in these circumstances. Indian Army will only be fire fighting to save its glorious image.

- The Army is the Nations “punch”. It should be asserting its strength through fire power and guts not “military diplomacy”. The Nation has to speak from a position of strength. The Army gives it this strength. It needs to be recognized.

The Revamping Necessary.
- Place all ITBP forces deployed along the LAC under the Army for operational control.

- Induction of new equipment into the Force, should as a policy, be cleared by the Army from the technical and logistic compatibility point of view.

Conclusion.
- MHA’s reluctance to place the ITBP under the Army is indicative of the underlying resistance of the IPS lobby to serve under any commander from the Army. IPS as seen from the factual ground realities considers itself as an “administrative cadre” akin to IAS. They loathe the notion of leading from the front as field commanders. The direct entry ITBP young officers endorse the requirement of operating under the Army.

- What is of paramount importance is National Security Interests. This cannot be hijacked by some blatant parochial group interest. The matter is too serious to be left to the whims or fancy of the bureaucracy. If the MHA cannot decide then let the people decide whose security is the Government of India’s responsibility.


By Lt Gen JS Bajwa in Indian Defence Review

Monday, 21 April 2014

BSF, Army IAF personnel unable to vote

JAISALMER: Thousands of BSF, Army and Air Force jawans and officers deployed in borders will not be able to vote during the Lok sabha elections. In many states, the polling has already taken place and in few states, voting will take place in the next three to four days. Till now none of these jawans and officers have received their service ballots and the government has not done any arrangement on the issue.

In the state, the personnel did not get postal ballots and could not vote in the polls conducted in 20 Lok Sabha polls on April 17.

There is an air of disappointment among the security forces because of not being able to take part in the country's biggest democratic festival.

After the last date of withdrawing names by candidates, district election officers gave orders to print voting papers but as very few service voters were registered and could be sent only to them.

The Supreme Court in its ruling had ordered to send the service ballots to jawans of the Armed Forces and paramilitary personnel deployed in the country few days before the polling but no action has been taken in this direction.

An Army officer said some time ago, an inquiry was made from his headquarters in regard to sending service voters but till date he has not received any service voters.

District election officer N L Meena said as per the information provided by the headquarters of security and other Central employees, the service ballot voters' lists were prepared. In Jaisalmer district, a total of 847 service voters are listed out of which Jaisalmer assembly segment has 363 and Pokaran assembly segment has 484 voters. They had already sent for service voters’ registration.

In Barmer barmer district, there are 1,103 service voters. They had also sent for service ballots through registered post with their addresses, an official said.

Defence spokesperson Col S D Goswami said, "Taking part in the electoral process, including voting, is considered a very personal and confidential matter. As such Army, as an organisation, does not keep a close watch on such activities of its personnel nor does it keep the details of exact number of personnel taking part in the process. It merely facilitates their participation in the election process in coordination with the local election officials."


Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/lok-sabha-elections-2014/news/BSF-Army-IAF-personnel-unable-to-vote/articleshow/34015990.cms

Monday, 7 April 2014

National Security Guard: Are we destroying its elitism?

The Times of India reported that the National Security Guard (NSG) has pulled out around 900 of its commandos from VIP guarding duties and sent them for training in counter – terror operations as part of their original charter. The news would have cheered the Indian public on two counts. Firstly, guarding of VIPs by trained commandos is a monumental waste, such tasks being within the ambit of local police forces. Personnel from the NSG are specially selected and trained at great expense for a specialised counter terrorism role and using them for mundane security duties was counter-productive. The second count would pertain to the belief that this step would increase the counter terrorism capability and enhance the security of the environment. The latter hope is however misplaced.

Reinventing a role for the Special Rangers Group
The original charter of NSG visualised an organisation consisting of five major units each with approximately 900 personnel besides other minor units. Of these, two were the strike elements designated as the Special Action Groups (SAG), one for counter terrorism and the other on a counter hijack role. These units are capable of interchanging their roles if the situation so warrants. Both these units were to be manned by handpicked army personnel with on ground soldiering experience from the combat arms of the Army. The other three major units titled the Special Ranger Group (SRG) were to be manned by personnel selected from the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). These units were meant to provide combat support to the SAGs by establishing cordon or a firm base as deemed necessary
.
The hidden aim of inducting the CAPF in the NSG stems from a desire of the bureaucracy and the political class to maintain a balance between the Army and the Police Forces in the elite force. The fabrication of the outfit in the present form was at the cost of the tax payers’ money without any tangible benefit in terms of counter terrorism capability. The absurdity and impracticality of the idea were too overwhelming to be missed or ignored.

NSG is a federal contingency force meant for employment anywhere in the country. Every time an operation is planned, a huge SRG contingent, at least four to five times the strength of the strike elements will be required to be airlifted for establishing the cordon. In certain situations, a cordon may have to precede the surgical strike. Their actions may require police powers and local expertise in terms of knowledge of the area and the local language, all of which the SRGs lack. NSG is dependent on local police for logistic support, follow up investigations, legal actions in terms of filing FIRs, as well as producing witnesses and evidences. The security implications of mobilising such a huge force for a Special Forces operation are manifold. These issues have all along been an impediment in employing SRGs in counter terrorism operations. It is precisely for these reasons, that the assistance of the local Army formation was sought to establish a cordon during the Hazratbal crisis in 1993. They were also not employed during the 26/11 terror strike in Mumbai.

Consequently, at one point in time the SRGs were jobless and the VIP security duties were invented to keep them going as a part of the NSG, a turf requirement. The fact that VIP security duties and Special Forces operations had nothing in common was of no consequence. Now that some of the VIP security duties have been withdrawn, an effort is being made to re-reinvent a role for the SRGs by putting them through the counter terrorism training.

Need for restructuring NSG
NSG’s strength at present is very nearly ten thousand troops with four hubs spread around the country. Two regional centres are also proposed to be raised. Additional squadrons each have already been added to the SAGs and SRGs. Can we equip them with state of the art weapons and equipment? The efforts required to train and maintain the skills of such a large force are colossal.

We still do not appear to have grasped the essence of structuring or employing Special Forces. Strength of these forces does not lie in numbers as the powers that be seem to think. They are not meant to be employed on routine law and order or insurgency situations. It is not meant for neutralising common tactical targets like a militant, a criminal or capture weapons in an insurgency area and that too without any intelligence back up. They are the instruments meant to carry out surgical strike to neutralise or secure strategic objectives and undertake missions of national importance. One of the reasons why this force is losing sight of its raison d'êtrefor creation is its CAPF status as part of the Home Ministry. Their demands for weapons and equipment get diluted when viewed collectively with the other forces. It is time this force is shifted under the Cabinet Secretariat preferably under a body created to coordinate Special Operations.

Hubs and Numerical Strength
Considering the number of operations launched by the NSG since its raising, troops employed in each of them and their time plot, do we really need such a huge force, the hubs and the regional centres? Are they meant to handle both counter hijack and counter terrorist situations? Is it practicable? Will the time gained by positioning the hubs in various parts of the country make any difference in the launching of a major terrorist operation of the type envisaged for Special Forces? Will they improve the counter terrorism capability in the country? Delivering the NSG raising day lecture, MK Narayanan the erstwhile National Security Advisor felt that creating four NSG hubs were redundant and unnecessary.

Time Frame for Launching Special Operations
When a mission is conceived, tremendous amount of effort and time is required to gather process and produce the intelligence inputs needed to launch an operation. Forces require time to study the information, carryout reconnaissance, understand the objective, plan the operation, choose the weapon systems for the envisaged task, carry out rehearsals where necessary, deploy their strike elements and protective elements at selected places and be sure of certain critical issues before carrying out the strike. The strike will always be at a time of their choosing for tactical reasons.  Operations cannot be rushed or pressure brought on the Force to act instantaneously. There are battle procedures and other means available to gain time in situations like the 26/11 which needs to be applied scientifically and diligently. Operation “Neptune Spear” conducted by the DEVGRU of the US SEAL to get Bin Laden took over five years to mature and execute. We can take a few lessons from the operation.

Need for Coordination and Support
However talented a special force may be, it needs the support and the backup of the state government, local police and the intelligence community besides the other security forces and agencies within the country.  All these elements need to be trained alongside to achieve synergy. An apex body like the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the US with necessary authority is needed to requisition and coordinate all the necessary efforts. The confusion that prevailed outside the Taj Hotel in Mumbai during Operation Black Tornado cannot be allowed in the future.

Leadership
Another important aspect pertains to the leadership of this Force. While junior leaders will have to have adequate operational experience besides professional training, the head of this organisation will have to have practical on ground experience of leading troops and conducting operations at the formation level. Police officers undoubtedly have very good knowledge of law and order and security issues, but lack practical experience in conducting military operations which an Army Officer especially from the Infantry gain right through their service starting from the platoon level. There can be no compromise on experience in a Special Force.

Conclusion
Special Forces cannot be allowed to multiply or bloat the way CAPF have expanded in our country. Turf issues and aspirations of empire building cannot be allowed to determine their role or the structure. Elitism, superior skills, state of the art weapons and equipment and not numbers will dictate the outcome of their operations. These Forces are of no value if they are not supported by every single organ of the country. That will require the creation of an authority to demand, coordinate and employ such resources.

The strike elements in the NSG are as good as, if not better than some of the world’s best Special Forces. Failure to keep politics out in the matter of structuring, training, employing and providing resources to the elite Special Force will cost the nation very dearly at a crucial moment.

By Brig. V. Mahalingam in www.claws.in
Brig V Mahalingam (Retd) is a Defence Analyst based in New Delhi


Views expressed are personal

Sunday, 6 April 2014

BSF needs to plug security gaps at vulnerable areas: Omar

In a series of tweets, Omar complimented the police, CRPF and the Army for a swift and coordinated response as militants had come heavily armed with clear plans to cause massive havoc.
   
"However, the ease with which militants exploited gaps in the fence to cross the international border is a matter of grave concern. The BSF needs to take a look at vulnerable areas & plug these gaps because these militants haven't given up & we can't let them succeed," Omar said.
   
The Chief Minister appreciated the response of the army and the police in containing the fallout to the initial casualties defeating the evil designs.

"The swift and coordinated response of army, police and CRPF has been markedly better compared to the Samba/Hiranagar attack some months ago," he said and added militants had come very heavily armed and clearly planned to cause massive havoc, "plans that they were unable to carry out at all," he said.    


Police and Army had come under sharp criticism when militants carried out twin attacks on September 26 last year at Hira Nagar police station and an army camp in which 12 people, including Lt Col Bikramjeet Singh, were killed.

Source: http://post.jagran.com/BSF-needs-to-plug-security-gaps-at-vulnerable-areas-Omar-1396061453

Tuesday, 1 April 2014

IPS Officers vs Army Officers

Some believe that army and IPS cannot be compared. We should not forget the fact that IPS is modeled based on Army. In fact, pre-independence, many Army officers worked as IGs and SPs in provinces and districts. Even today, due to historical reasons, shoulder epaulets of both these services are same.

1. Recruitment:
While IPS officers are recruited along with 15+ other civil services through a common entrance exam, Army officers are recruited through separate Army SSB. It is a sad fact that very few people give first preference to IPS. IAS/IFS and now even IRS, IA&AS etc. are preferred when compared to IPS, which they consider as a dirty job. They have their own reasons for not preferring IPS. Frequent transfers, political pressure, threat to life, irregular working hours, no/less holidays, work-life balance etc. are some reasons commonly quoted. People who apply for Army SSB are sure about joining army, whereas, in IPS around 20 probationers leave during training or within first 2 years of service after clearing civil service exam and getting IAS/IFS/IRS. In army SSB no. of intake is less against the sanctioned seats. Quality of candidates is the commonly cited reason for not filling up the seats, so there are lot of vacancies in Army. Advertisements like "Do you have it in you? An extraordinary life. A life full of adventure, honour and glory. Where you are one among a million, and one in a million" etc. are needed to attract youth into Indian Army. But in IPS all seats get filled, but many children come to SVPNPA to study for their next attempt in civil service exams. Vacancies in IPS are due to attritions during initial probation days. But there are few candidates give IPS as their first preference in CSE due to genuine interest and love for the profession and their countrymen. We should not generalise these issues.

 2. Probation:
Medical tests for joining army are tougher than IPS because IPS is considered a civil service, so most of them get selected. Because of the fact that the children have cleared a tough exam, there is a sympathy among trainers in SVPNPA and the result is that no one will get rejected at the end of IPS probation. But in Army, many unfit probationers get weeded out. Training is almost same for both but is somewhat liberal in IPS when compared to army. IPS officers' training period of 2 years is counted into service as no. of years in experience and they start earning salary from the starting month from their respective states. Where as in Army, a probationer is not confirmed until the end of the training of 1-1.5 years and receives only a stipend. Physically fit and bright IPS probationers do exist, but as I already said, these issues cannot be generalised.

3. Service:
After probation an IPS officer will become an Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) responsible of a subdivision. After 2 years he will automatically become a Superintendent of Police (SP) in charge of a district. After 18 years of service he will become a DIG, then after 5 years he will become an IG and then ADGP and finally DGP. All young IPS probationers are potential DGPs!!! In army an officer's promotion is not time-bound. He should attend interviews, write exams, should have good remarks in Annual Confidential Reports in order to climb the ladder of Lt-Capt.-Maj-Lt.Col-Col.-Brig.-Maj.Gen.-Lt.Gen.-Gen. There are sincere officers in IPS who prove their mettle by doing the given duty to them, but there are stories of IPS officers jockeying to create a new post for them only because of the fact that they have completed a no. of years of service and it’s time for their promotion.

4. Leadership:
Army officers should be in the forefront, leading the men they command. Statistics of war casualties show that many commissioned officers are martyred. There is a general perception that IPS officers are good at sitting in AC room and planning only on papers. This might be true, but there are many officers in IPS (like Dr. NC Asthana, K.Vijay Kumar, C. Sylendra Babu etc. to name a few) who do the dirty job of leading from the front. But in most cases dangerous jobs are left to directly recruited Assistant Commandants or Deputy Superintendents.

5. Reputation:
Army officers have a good image and respect among public when compared to their IPS counterparts. We should understand that Army officers do not get the same respect (that they get in India's heartland) in NE states and J&K, where AFSPA is implemented. We should understand that external aggressors are the main enemy for army, whereas police is acting against internal aggressors (who are their countrymen), so police cannot use the same force as that of the army, while dealing with the crimes. Checking suspicious vehicles/persons/places is a normal preventive work, but this is seen as an infringement of privacy. Normal day-to-day policing work itself damages the image of police. Army man shoots to kill, whereas a Police man shoots only to deter. Even though police has done terrible mistakes here and there, our country is still intact and stable, and the credit for this should be given to police leadership. We should also be proud of our Army for upholding the territorial integrity of our country.

6. Corruption:
In this area also Army wins over IPS. In army, recruitment and procurement/provisioning are the only possible areas where army officers can even think of making some quick buck. Whereas in IPS, all kind of work involves dealing with the public, and officers might be offered bribe right from the first day of joining the duty. Both IPS and army officers, are born and brought up in the same society/environment, but the organisation they join makes the difference. Generalization will surely demoralize the honest officers in both Olive green and Khaki uniforms.

7. Patriotism:
Patriotism, discipline, sacrifice, camaraderie are very good attributes that are present in Indian Army and it is worth emulating these qualities in other organisations too. But there is a general perception among armed forces that they are more patriotic and they love their country a lot than others, because they have joined military and they are ready to do supreme sacrifices in the line of duty. Recently an army officer wrote in an online forum that at least 5 years of military service should be made compulsory for IPS officers (who claim that they also want to serve their country) before taking CSE, because a lot of vacancy exists in armed forces. We should understand that vacancies exist in other organisations also. Engineers, scientists, teachers, lawyers, agriculturists, business men, bankers and even politicians are very important for a nation’s development.


8. Other service trivia:
Use of khaki as police uniforms which are traditionally worn by soldiers, use of same shoulder epaulets, ceremonial batons, georgette patches, head bands, star plates and rank flags in official vehicles by both army officers and IPS officers, giving gallantry awards like ashok chakra, kirti chakra etc. (which are traditionally seen by armed forces as theirs) for police officer , use of the word "jawan", "commando" etc. by media to denote CPMFs, use of similar disruptive pattern camouflage uniforms by CPMFs etc. irks armed forces. But we should understand that colour of uniforms show the uniqueness of the organisation to which a person belongs, uniform should connect a person to tradition and history that his organisation inherits. Similarly, most of the decorations in the Indian Army uniforms are adopted from British system, for instance, crown was replaced by state emblem, and other decorations like crossed sword and baton etc. remained unchanged in shoulder epaulets. IPS (formerly Imperial Police) got branched off from Indian Army they also share the same tradition and history. There should not be any problem in using Camouflage/disruptive pattern uniforms (given the fact there are no copyright restrictions) by CPMFs if the working conditions demands, because they also do the same work as armed forces. Terms like jawan etc. cannot be monopolised. Guarding territorial frontiers is a great service. Income tax and customs/central excise officers guard economic frontiers.

ISRO/DRDO/DAE/CSIR/ICAR/ICMR engineers and scientists provide security to this country by using science as a weapon. Energy security and food security are also equally important. In my opinion each and every profession is equally important. Taking pride in one's work is a good thing, but it should not be at the contempt of other work. No service should be belittled, instead we should analyse the issues and think about possible reforms.

Possible Reforms:
For all the aforementioned issues, IPS officers alone cannot be blamed.As many as eight police reforms commissions have been formed and and these commissions had IPS officers as their members and they tried to address some of the issues that are pestering police leadership. None of the reforms were fully implemented. Police being a state subject, we can't expect anything other than this. Central govt. too failed to comply with some of the Supreme Court judgements regarding police reforms.
 I'll list here some of the reforms. While some are my own ideas, others are taken from the internet and Police reforms commission reports.
(i) Separate exams for IPS:
IPS cannot be claimed as a pure civil service. IPS officers have to work in quasi-military settings in CPMFs. Indian Forest Service (IFoS) is doing a good job by having a separate exam for their recruitment. By keeping separate exams, only interested candidates will apply, and this will also to some extent end the problem of flocking of 20+ IPS probationers into various other civil services every year. Recruitment can also be modelled based on Army SSB (a judicious mix of written exams, interviews and physical exams) without diluting the toughness/quality of exams. Sympathy of trainers towards the probationers will also reduce to a great extent. Rejections every year at the end of probation will reduce the complacency effect.
This issue of separate exams was taken up by few IPS officers a few years back, but it was vehemently opposed by retired and senior IPS officers. They are of opinion that this move will reduce the status of IPS over IAS. It is a well-known fact that a turf war is going on b/w IAS and IPS. In no way this move will reduce the status of IPS.
(ii) Merit based promotions:
Right from 1997, almost all police reforms commissions talk about this. These commissions had IPS officers as members and even senior and retired IPS officers are batting for this reform. According to this, at each stage of promotion, if an IPS officer completes certain no. of years of service, he should be sent again to SVPNPA, where he/she will take a course. At the end of the course, written examinations, interviews, physical tests will be conducted and performance of the officers in their states/organisations and annual confidential reports will be reviewed and promotions are given according to the merit. There are also incentives for officers who clear the course in first attempt. For repeated attempts officers will have to pay from their own pocket. There is also a provision that, if an officer fails in 3 consecutive tests, he should be compulsorily retired from the service. Who should be blamed for not implementing this?
(iii) Reforms in Central Deputation:
IPS officers in SP rank are allowed to go to Central organisations like SVPNPA, NEPA, BPR&D, NICFS, CBI, IB, NCRB, DPWC etc. whereas officers of and above DIG rank are allowed to go to CPMFs like BSF, ITBP, CRPF, CISF, AR, SSB, NSG and other organisations like NCB, DRI etc. There is a growing concern among cadre officers of CPMFs that an "outsider" is coming to command them, and also there is a general perception among cadre officers of CPMFs that these IPS officers come to central deputation for having good time and to take rest after tense and busy law and order work in their parent cadre. In my opinion, physically and mentally fit IPS officers in SP rank should also be sent to CPMFs like BSF, ITBP, CRPF, CISF, AR, SSB, NSG as assistant/deputy/joint commandants after some stringent physical and psychological tests. The skills that the IPS officers acquire in these organisations will not only be of great help to them for the rest of their career but will also help in capacity building of the state cadre to which they belong.



Source:http://indiandefence.com/threads/ips-officers-vs-army-officers


Tuesday, 25 March 2014

Jai Jawan Pension Loan for Armed Forces, Navy, Air Force, CAPFs etc

A new product “Jai Jawan Pension Loan” has been launched for financing Young Defence Pensioners of Defence and Paramilitary Forces who   retire at very young age, sometimes even in the range of 30 to 35 years. As these young pensioners do not have any means of livelihood other than pension, they find it difficult to meet their emergent financial needs or to spend on setting up small ventures to supplement their income.

Name of the scheme
Jai Jawan Pension Loan
Purpose
To meet personal expenses of young Defence pensioners.
Eligibility
Pensioners of Armed Forces, including Army, Navy and Air Force, Paramilitary Forces, Coast Guards, Rashtriya Rifles, CRPF, BSF,ITBP etc.
Age
Upto 50 years.
Loan amount
48 times of net monthly pension. Subject to maximum of Rs.2.00 lakh subject to EMI/NMI not exceeding 40% of net monthly pension.

Margin

NIL
Guarantee
Third Party Guarantee of Spouse eligible for family pension. In the absence of spouse TPG of any other family member or a third party worth the loan amount.
Repayment
Maximum 84 months, payable one month after disbursal of loan from the pension through SI, to debit the pension account for recovery of monthly instalments.
Type of loan
Clean Demand Loan
Processing fee
Same as for Prasanthi Loan
Disbursement
By credit to SB account/Current account of the pensioner.
Additional document required
An undertaking to recover monthly instalments from pension credited to account.
Rate of interest
13.00% (BPLR)
Authorized Branches
All pension disbursing branches.

Source: http://www.statebankoftravancore.com/new/jaijawan.htm

Monday, 24 March 2014

Shinde's announcement to benefit CAPF veterans

Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde’s announcement on that retired Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) personnel will be granted the same privileges given to ex-servicemen of the defence services will benefit the CAPF veterans in large.
It had been a long-standing grievance of the CAPF personnel that they are shown a step-motherly attitude by the government despite serving in some of the toughest, conflict-ridden areas of the country.
“CAPF personnel killed in conflicts are not even being treated as martyrs,’’ P S Nair, a former CRPF man and present general secretary of the AICPMF Ex-Servicemen Welfare Association, said.
The CAPF is made up of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) and the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF).
On November 23, 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs had issued an order giving them the status of ‘ex-CAPF personnel’ and urging the state to provide them the benefits now given to personnel retiring from the Army, Navy and Air Force.
Unlike Army, Navy and IAF veterans, who benefit from a large number of post-retirement State Government schemes, CAPF veterans have to be content with just their pension. The association is also planning to stage sit-ins at CAPF HQs across the country on November 12 raising their demands, according to P S Nair, general secretary of the AICPMF Ex-Servicemen Welfare Association.