Creating a Diplomatic Security Force: The need to go beyond cosmetic exercises

If media reports are to be believed, a Diplomatic Security Force (DSF) and a Parliament Duty Group (PDG) are in the offing. The Ministry of Home Affairs is said to be in the process of fast-tracking a Delhi Police proposal to set up a dedicated force to protect foreign missions and envoys. Israel is rumoured to have expressed its willingness to train the Force. It has also been stated that the specialized force may be deputed to protect India’s diplomatic missions abroad subsequently. The PDG, it is understood, would draw its personnel from the best trained men and women of the CRPF with commando and tactical training besides expertise in dealing with biological and nuclear emergencies.

Security methodologies do not change with individuals

Professionally speaking, the methodologies for providing security to an individual, a group or to structures do not change based on who the protected is. The level of security to be provided would be based on intelligence inputs and assessment. The location and the circumstances too will have a say in the matter. If protection is the criteria, the state police providing security to the Chief Minister could not be any different from the Special Protection Group (SPG) providing security to the Prime Minister. The degree of protection is based on the threat and not on whose life is more important.

Rationalization vs. empire building

A number of organizations including the SPG, National Security Guard (NSG), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), various state police and other agencies provide security to an assortment of people of different risk categories. Each of these organizations adopts its own method based on training, competence and perception. In a number of cases more than one agency is drawn in and the responsibility is shared. Should so many agencies adopting different methodologies be involved in providing security, a job that requires almost similar competencies? The needs of financial prudence, efficiency, professionalism and accountability suggest rationalization of the entire system.

Creating a concoction by milking personnel from State Police Forces and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), each with a different culture and ethos, would be nothing more than adding one more to the already existing alphabet soup of security forces. An IPS officer, who is more of a manager than a leader, to head the organisation would be a further disaster. Training a few officers and men by specialists from some foreign country or the other would be a mere publicity stunt. Turnover, promotions and wastages would further nullify the anticipated dividends. The creation of DSF or PDG, in the manner as has been suggested, would be a mere empire building exercise without any tangible upgrade to professionalism, which is missing in all the existing security establishments.

Create a system and not physical numbers

If the Government is indeed serious about creating an institution with a difference and break from the present work culture and ethos of the Police Forces in the country, this is an opportunity that should not be wasted.

The aim should be to create a single Security Group (SG) consisting of a training establishment specializing in security issues and a number of units to meet different areas of security as per the requirement. The organisation should be capable of handling all envisaged security situations of the protected throughout the country in an unobtrusive manner. It should have an inbuilt bomb detection, disposal and electronic surveillance capability.

Personnel may be transferred from one unit to the other to avoid them becoming stale. The establishment needs to take into account the need for regular training to maintain the standards of physical fitness and professional skills. The best of the lot could be picked and posted to the DSF and PDG. As and when more numbers are trained, they could be utilized to replace the existing arrangements manned by the other agencies of the centre. If need be our diplomatic establishments abroad could be staffed by these personnel subsequently. As and when this force is made operational, corresponding numbers could be offset from the other establishments. If ego is not an issue, the best of the lot could also replace the SPG. States could make use of the central selection and training facilities for bringing their apparatus at par with the central agency.

As a first step, it may be prudent to put a training infrastructure in place as a feeder organisation for the SG as against creating the DSF or PDG from personnel milked from various organisations. A pool of instructors for the training establishment could be trained in selected foreign countries. The instructors need to be trained to meet our specific requirements and the course content specifically designed to meet our needs and demands. The training would be at two levels; one for the officers and the other for the rest.

Designing and creating the organisation

Two to three selected experts with practical experience and knowledge in the field should be entrusted with the task of designing and creating this organisation. This selected team of consultants could visit training establishments in selected countries and have extensive discussions on the possible course content and organizational models. They may also witness their training, view training facilities, infrastructure, weapons and equipment in use. It would be in the interest of the organisation to exclude personnel from the existing security establishments or police personnel in this mission. This organisation should under no circumstances be allowed to acquire the Police culture or ethos.

Back home, the consultants should be able to contour the organizational structure of these establishments. The infrastructure, training facilities, weapons, equipment and other needs of the organisations would be a logical output. Incidentally, the training establishment need not necessarily be situated in or around Delhi.

The Manpower

Fresh graduates should be recruited on an all-India basis for manning the organisations. Besides others, the criteria would include social adaptability and attitudinal suitability. The initial lot could be put under a selected team of Army instructors for preliminary training preferably at the Infantry school. The syllabus could include physical fitness, marksman training, field craft and minor tactics besides a few academic subjects including law. The emphasis should be on creating the right kind of ethos, culture and soft skills. At the end of the training, based on the instructional capabilities exhibited by the trainees, a team of potential instructors could be sent abroad for specialized training as a prelude to being employed as instructors at the Training Establishment. The balance could be part of the SG.

As for officers, it would be most appropriate to select the required number of officers from the cadets passing out of the Indian Military Academy (IMA) for permanent absorption to SG. Those selected should be allowed to do the Young Officers (YO) course and preferably a six month attachment with an infantry unit. Those found suitable as instructors could be sent abroad for training. This lot would be physically fit, motivated and with basic military training capable of absorbing specialized training abroad.

It may be preferable to have a serving or a retired Lieutenant General to head the organisation with a mandate to develop the right ethos, work culture and attitude in the Force.

Other issues for consideration

While creating such an agency, its specific role as well as division of responsibility between the state police and the SG need clear definition. Directions regarding briefing and assistance by local police and intelligence agencies including at outstations need to be spelt out. Logistic arrangements for out station duties need to be formalized with a one point contact for efficient functioning. The aspect of investigations also need clarity as unlike the US Bureau of Diplomatic Security, our Security agency may not have the wherewithal and resources to carry out investigations. Instructions for the protected should be scripted and communicated to the users for better utilization of the force.

Conclusion

A lot has been said about the politicization, inefficiency and corruption in the ranks of our Police Forces. These issues have affected their public image and ability to discharge duties efficiently. It is time we find a way to cleanse the system. The creation of a SG without any streak of the Police in it would be a step in that direction. A single agency to take care of all the security needs within the country would instil accountability, professionalism and continuity.

By V. Mahalingam in http://idsa.in/idsacomments/CreatingaDiplomaticSecurityForce_vmahalingam_180213

Consolidation of paramilitary forces makes sense

One of the immediate fallouts of the September 7 explosion at the Delhi High Court was a change in guard. A decision was taken to replace the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC), which was guarding the premises until the blast, with the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), thus adding yet again to the plethora of responsibilities assigned to this force. This is also an example of the country’s policy on the bourgeoning population of paramilitary forces, who have been pushed from one area of responsibility to the other, without much thought.

The narrative on the paramilitary forces (now called the Central Armed Police Forces, CAPFs) is indeed one of rapid numerical growth as well as of enormously expanded responsibilities. The CAPFs, with a strength of 780,000 personnel, now resemble a second army for the country. And this number is projected to grow, probably to overcome the Indian Army numbering about 1.1 million, in few years. The CAPF organisations will remain the largest government employers for many years to come.

While such astounding growth is a necessity for the country in some measure, what is baffling is the blurring of the functional distinctiveness among the forces. Traditional responsibilities of these forces organised under seven different names range from acting as border guarding forces to protecting law and order by fighting rioters, insurgents and terrorists. While none of these original duties have lost their relevance, today to distinguish the forces on the basis of their responsibilities is indeed a difficult task.

Post-Kargil war, the CRPF was recommended to be the primary counter-insurgency (COIN) force. However, almost after a decade of such recommendation, it continues to be the Chalte Raho Pyare Force (translating into Carry on Marching Force), a loose reference to its assumption of mind-boggling array of duties. The same fate has befallen on the rest of the CAPFs as well. The Border Security Force (BSF), whose role is “security of India’s border and matters connected therewith”, operates on election duties, riot control in states that are far removed from the Indo-Pak and Indo-Bangladesh borders.

The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) personnel, supposed to be guarding the Indo-Tibetan border, are deployed to protect Indian mission in Afghanistan that gives the personnel about five times their normal salary. Post-1998 Mumbai attack, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel are available for deployment to protect private installations, in return for a payment. This is in addition to their deployments for VIP security, disaster management and also as a Formed Police Unit of the UN at Haiti. Personnel of the National Security Guards, an elite counter-terrorism commando force, are also deployed in VIP protection. The list goes on.

The internal security challenges and the perennial demand for forces for routine law and order duties has led the home ministry to gloss over the specific duties for which these forces were raised. The 80 battalions of Central forces deployed in the Naxal theatres include the BSF, the ITBP, the CISF, the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) apart from the CRPF.

Whereas such deployment can be justified on the ground of shortages of forces required to assist the state police forces, what remain inexcusable are the political decisions to misuse even the CAPFs, passing out after advanced COIN training. And both the Central and state governments have been guilty of this. Earlier this year, New Delhi deployed the personnel of the Combat Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA), a 10-battalion-strong force within the CRPF raised specifically for carrying out anti-Naxal duties, in poll-bound and Congress-ruled Assam. Almost in the same vein, a large number of CRPF personnel, after being trained by counter-insurgency and jungle warfare schools, are deployed for VIP protection duties, constituting a complete waste of their talent and training.

As the home ministry’s decades-long modernisation programme for the CAPFs focuses on augmenting the capacity of the forces, won’t it be a better idea to simply merge the CAPF organisations under one head? Why maintain seven different organisations if the CAPFs, irrespective of the colour of their badges, are to carry out similar duties? If need be, there can be only two different divisions among the CAPFs—one, for COIN duties, and the other for the rest. It will take care of the competition for resources among the different CAPF organisations; address the problem of coordination among them; allow better rotation of forces between stressful and not so stressful duties; and consolidate seven modernisation plans into one. If we accept that the Indian Army is doing well under just one supreme command, why not bring the CAPFs under a similar arrangement?

By Bibhu Prasad Routray in www.claws.in

The writer, currently Visiting Research Fellow at RSIS, Singapore, served as a Deputy Director in the National Security Council Secretariat

Call for reshuffling of force deployment

The pattern of India’s internal security challenges has undergone a significant makeover in recent years. Chronic conflicts have either subsided or have hit a low patch and new conflict areas have emerged, necessitating a rationalisation in the way the Government deploys its security forces. But it would appear that our security policy-makers are stuck in time, steadfastly refusing to respond to the unfolding conflict dynamics. This explains, in a way, why the country, with a bourgeoning security force establishment, still struggles to find adequate forces to fight its internal wars.

There is a clear shift of violence from the age-old conflict theatres in Kashmir and the north-east, to the states affected by Left-wing extremism. Deployment of reshuffling of force Central Armed Police Forces or CAPFs (previously called Central para-military forces) has gone up from 37 to 81 battalions in the Maoist theatres. It is a substantial increase, yet remains insufficient. It is unlikely that even with a war time raising of CAPF battalions, the Centre will be able to meet the unending demands from the states. This calls for a fresh approach on the deployment of forces.

Not many would agree that the current Indo-Pakistan peace talks would ever reach a situation as to allow New Delhi to pull out some of its troops from Kashmir. Hypothetically speaking, such an eventuality would come as a boon for the force-starved Maoist theatres. Kashmir today engages close to 80 battalions of Central police forces and 65 battalions of Rashtriya Rifles (RR) of the Indian Army. 50 per cent of the RR is sourced from the army’s infantry wing and the rest from other units, making it almost an ideal force against the Maoists.

Opposition from the Indian Army and the counter-terrorism experts notwithstanding, army’s role in dealing with Left-wing extremism has grown over the years. According to a recent white paper prepared by the Indian Army, 65,000 of its personnel would be required if it is to be involved against the Maoists. It is even willing to consider the relocation of the RR battalions for the purpose. This, however, is conditioned by sufficient progress in the Indo-Pak peace process and a total halt to the cross-border infiltration and militancy. Not many would see this happening in the near future, even when the Pakistan state is undergoing a life-threatening crisis.

From where a realistic relocation of forces is possible, is the north-east. Although this restive region of the country has not exactly become a peace den, over the past years insurgency movements have constantly lost their wherewithal, popular appeal and hence, have struggled to survive. Cooperation from Bangladesh has forced the once powerful Assam-based Ulfa to start a process of dialogue with the government. Even in Manipur, where insurgency movements appeared almost intractable a few years back, over a dozen outfits are under Suspension of Operations agreement with the government. The most lethal UNLF has suffered a serious blow in the form of the arrest of its top leader R K Meghen. Since 2008, the entire north-eastern region has seen a gradual but consistent improvement in the security situation, demonstrated in the declining capacity of the militant formations. Compared to over 1,000 fatalities recorded in 2008, insurgency related deaths fell to 322 in 2010 and further to 177 in the first eight months of 2011.

If rising violence was the raison d’etre for induction of Central forces into the north-east, it is necessary that the drop in violence allows their return from the area. It not only helps remove the tag of ‘militarisation of the north-east’, allowing the state police forces to take a lead  role in dealing with the remnants of insurgency, but also makes those withdrawn forces, at least the CAPFs, available for the Maoist-affected areas. There is no reason why a state like Manipur should continue to consume over 45 to 50 battalions of the army and the CAPFs, when it records barely 10 deaths per month for the past two years. Civilian life in Manipur continues to be affected by recurrent political blockades, but these are not exactly the problems that Central forces should be dealing with. Home Minister P Chidambaram’s recent justification that a large presence of security forces in the north-eastern states is “a necessity to deal with the threat of violence and the cases of extortion” isn't a really a valid rationale.

The reality of conflict transformation needs to figure prominently in MHA’s policies as far as force deployment is concerned and stubbornness not to accept it is not going to help.

By Bibhu Prasad Routray in www.claws.in

Deploy central police, don’t keep them as reserve: EC

JAIPUR: Amid concerns over security arrangements, the Election Commission has again asked chief electoral officers to use central armed police forces optimally and lay fool-proof blanket of security during the voting.

Observing the state government's tendency to keep central police as 'reserves', EC asked chief electoral officer (CEO) to deploy all central police personnel in election duty. In its orders, it maintained that actually not deploying central police personnel in election related duties defeats the very purpose of augmenting the local forces resulting in sub-optimal benefits.

Central police are made available by the ministry of home affairs to the state government depending on the sensitivity of polling station in the state. EC has also asked the CEOs to prepare a complete state deployment plan taking into account the available forces with them. Based on these plans, a quantum of forces will be deployed in different constituencies.

"State deployment plans will be based on district plans, which will be prepared by the district collector and SPs. Each district has different requirements depending on the number of sensitive polling stations in the constituency," said an official in the Election Commission. "Our plans are almost ready as the final draft is to be shared with Election Commission a week before the polling day," added the official.

For the district level plans, EC has asked all states to ensure that polling stations are covered with adequate static duty forces reinforced by necessary mobile patrolling at the level of zones and sectors. For the identified sensitive and trouble-prone booths other forces like state police and home guards should be deployed in adequate numbers.

Meanwhile, EC has asked that one central police jawan should be stationed at the entrance of the polling station so that he can keep a watch on the proceedings that are going on inside the station. They will be mandated to ensure that no unauthorized person enters the polling station and no irregularity is being committed by the polling staff. The jawan will also ensure that voters are not being bullied or threatened.

Huge security as LS polls loom

Based on the guidelines issued by EC, chief electoral officer, Ashok Jain, has ordered for full proof arrangements of security in the state. He said that to win over the confidence of electors and ensuring free and fair elections, it is necessary to maintain law and order during polls. Along with the security he asked poll officials to check all the EVMs and minimize last moment technical glitches.

Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/lok-sabha-elections-2014/news/Deploy-central-police-dont-keep-them-as-reserve-EC/articleshow/33467213.cms

National Security Guard: Are we destroying its elitism?

The Times of India reported that the National Security Guard (NSG) has pulled out around 900 of its commandos from VIP guarding duties and sent them for training in counter – terror operations as part of their original charter. The news would have cheered the Indian public on two counts. Firstly, guarding of VIPs by trained commandos is a monumental waste, such tasks being within the ambit of local police forces. Personnel from the NSG are specially selected and trained at great expense for a specialised counter terrorism role and using them for mundane security duties was counter-productive. The second count would pertain to the belief that this step would increase the counter terrorism capability and enhance the security of the environment. The latter hope is however misplaced.

Reinventing a role for the Special Rangers Group

The original charter of NSG visualised an organisation consisting of five major units each with approximately 900 personnel besides other minor units. Of these, two were the strike elements designated as the Special Action Groups (SAG), one for counter terrorism and the other on a counter hijack role. These units are capable of interchanging their roles if the situation so warrants. Both these units were to be manned by handpicked army personnel with on ground soldiering experience from the combat arms of the Army. The other three major units titled the Special Ranger Group (SRG) were to be manned by personnel selected from the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). These units were meant to provide combat support to the SAGs by establishing cordon or a firm base as deemed necessary

.

The hidden aim of inducting the CAPF in the NSG stems from a desire of the bureaucracy and the political class to maintain a balance between the Army and the Police Forces in the elite force. The fabrication of the outfit in the present form was at the cost of the tax payers’ money without any tangible benefit in terms of counter terrorism capability. The absurdity and impracticality of the idea were too overwhelming to be missed or ignored.

NSG is a federal contingency force meant for employment anywhere in the country. Every time an operation is planned, a huge SRG contingent, at least four to five times the strength of the strike elements will be required to be airlifted for establishing the cordon. In certain situations, a cordon may have to precede the surgical strike. Their actions may require police powers and local expertise in terms of knowledge of the area and the local language, all of which the SRGs lack. NSG is dependent on local police for logistic support, follow up investigations, legal actions in terms of filing FIRs, as well as producing witnesses and evidences. The security implications of mobilising such a huge force for a Special Forces operation are manifold. These issues have all along been an impediment in employing SRGs in counter terrorism operations. It is precisely for these reasons, that the assistance of the local Army formation was sought to establish a cordon during the Hazratbal crisis in 1993. They were also not employed during the 26/11 terror strike in Mumbai.

Consequently, at one point in time the SRGs were jobless and the VIP security duties were invented to keep them going as a part of the NSG, a turf requirement. The fact that VIP security duties and Special Forces operations had nothing in common was of no consequence. Now that some of the VIP security duties have been withdrawn, an effort is being made to re-reinvent a role for the SRGs by putting them through the counter terrorism training.

Need for restructuring NSG

NSG’s strength at present is very nearly ten thousand troops with four hubs spread around the country. Two regional centres are also proposed to be raised. Additional squadrons each have already been added to the SAGs and SRGs. Can we equip them with state of the art weapons and equipment? The efforts required to train and maintain the skills of such a large force are colossal.

We still do not appear to have grasped the essence of structuring or employing Special Forces. Strength of these forces does not lie in numbers as the powers that be seem to think. They are not meant to be employed on routine law and order or insurgency situations. It is not meant for neutralising common tactical targets like a militant, a criminal or capture weapons in an insurgency area and that too without any intelligence back up. They are the instruments meant to carry out surgical strike to neutralise or secure strategic objectives and undertake missions of national importance. One of the reasons why this force is losing sight of its raison d'êtrefor creation is its CAPF status as part of the Home Ministry. Their demands for weapons and equipment get diluted when viewed collectively with the other forces. It is time this force is shifted under the Cabinet Secretariat preferably under a body created to coordinate Special Operations.

Hubs and Numerical Strength

Considering the number of operations launched by the NSG since its raising, troops employed in each of them and their time plot, do we really need such a huge force, the hubs and the regional centres? Are they meant to handle both counter hijack and counter terrorist situations? Is it practicable? Will the time gained by positioning the hubs in various parts of the country make any difference in the launching of a major terrorist operation of the type envisaged for Special Forces? Will they improve the counter terrorism capability in the country? Delivering the NSG raising day lecture, MK Narayanan the erstwhile National Security Advisor felt that creating four NSG hubs were redundant and unnecessary.

Time Frame for Launching Special Operations

When a mission is conceived, tremendous amount of effort and time is required to gather process and produce the intelligence inputs needed to launch an operation. Forces require time to study the information, carryout reconnaissance, understand the objective, plan the operation, choose the weapon systems for the envisaged task, carry out rehearsals where necessary, deploy their strike elements and protective elements at selected places and be sure of certain critical issues before carrying out the strike. The strike will always be at a time of their choosing for tactical reasons.  Operations cannot be rushed or pressure brought on the Force to act instantaneously. There are battle procedures and other means available to gain time in situations like the 26/11 which needs to be applied scientifically and diligently. Operation “Neptune Spear” conducted by the DEVGRU of the US SEAL to get Bin Laden took over five years to mature and execute. We can take a few lessons from the operation.

Need for Coordination and Support

However talented a special force may be, it needs the support and the backup of the state government, local police and the intelligence community besides the other security forces and agencies within the country.  All these elements need to be trained alongside to achieve synergy. An apex body like the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the US with necessary authority is needed to requisition and coordinate all the necessary efforts. The confusion that prevailed outside the Taj Hotel in Mumbai during Operation Black Tornado cannot be allowed in the future.

Leadership

Another important aspect pertains to the leadership of this Force. While junior leaders will have to have adequate operational experience besides professional training, the head of this organisation will have to have practical on ground experience of leading troops and conducting operations at the formation level. Police officers undoubtedly have very good knowledge of law and order and security issues, but lack practical experience in conducting military operations which an Army Officer especially from the Infantry gain right through their service starting from the platoon level. There can be no compromise on experience in a Special Force.

Conclusion

Special Forces cannot be allowed to multiply or bloat the way CAPF have expanded in our country. Turf issues and aspirations of empire building cannot be allowed to determine their role or the structure. Elitism, superior skills, state of the art weapons and equipment and not numbers will dictate the outcome of their operations. These Forces are of no value if they are not supported by every single organ of the country. That will require the creation of an authority to demand, coordinate and employ such resources.

The strike elements in the NSG are as good as, if not better than some of the world’s best Special Forces. Failure to keep politics out in the matter of structuring, training, employing and providing resources to the elite Special Force will cost the nation very dearly at a crucial moment.

By Brig. V. Mahalingam in www.claws.in

Brig V Mahalingam (Retd) is a Defence Analyst based in New Delhi

Views expressed are personal

In poll season, firsts for CRPF

As more than one lakh troops of the CRPF and other Central armed police forces spread themselves thin to successfully make way for the biggest polling exercise in any democracy in the world beginning April 7, this Indian election season has brought winds of change to the toiling life of the average Indian jawan who has quietly trudged every election summer last sixty years little knowing where his next stop would be, from the cold peaks in J&K to the hot and humid climes of Bihar to down south Kerala.

Speaking to this newspaper, CRPF DG Dilip Trivedi tells how this election journey is different for the less talked about jawan on a day when the Central forces complete the mammoth exercise of deployment across 29 states on Wednesday.

From the traditional cooking on logs of wood as they parked their bogies off railway tracks to cook khichdi, the jawans are being served packed food boxes of the IRCTC at the stations where the trains halt. The CRPF boss said the Indian railways is setting a “world record’’ of sorts as nearly six lakh food packets are being provided daily for the troops movement — which will carry on for the nine-phased election between April 7 and May 12, the highest number of phases for a general elections so far.

For the CRPF, this is a small beginning in the many “firsts’’ to the election journey of its troops. This time round a detailed plan has been worked out by the forces in consultation with the EC and home ministry where each company knows its poll schedule allowing the jawans to prepare in advance, stock appropriate clothing, inform families and break free from a life of uncertainty. For the first time, a Unique Identity Number has been provided to each Central Armed Police Forces company, on the move from any part of the country — to help the district administration identify them and prepare for their arrival and subsequent deployment, pointed out Mr Trivedi who made a detailed presentation to the EC which finally put its stamp of approval to the troop deployment plan which was then shared with all state governments.

The company commanders for the first time have been given exclusive mobile phones with numbers made available to the concerned state authorities for quick liaison, the expenses of which will be borne by the forces.

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In the deep Maoist interiors where the threat is very high, care has been taken to undergo the polling process during the moon-lit fortnight and not the dark fortnight — a lesson learnt after closely observing the challenges faced during Assembly polls in deep interiors of Chattisgarh. The gun-wielding jawan will also cast his vote through postal ballot.

Source:http://www.asianage.com/india/poll-season-firsts-crpf-753 

Central Armed Police Forces CAPF Assistant Commandant Exam - Scheme and Syllabus

CENTRAL ARMED POLICE FORCES (CAPF)

EXAM SYLLABUS

Selection Procedure & Scheme:

(i) Written Examination:

The written examination conducted by the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), and it comprises two papers. Paper I and Paper II.

Paper I: General Ability and Intelligence - 250 Marks

The questions in this paper will be of Objective (Multiple Answers) Type in which the questions will be set in English as well as Hindi.

Paper II: General Studies, Essay and Comprehension - 200 Marks

In this paper candidates will be allowed the option of writing the Essay Component in English or Hindi, but the medium of Precis Writing, Comprehension Components and other communications/language skills will be English only.

NOTE-I: Candidates should ensure that in Paper II they write the answers only in the medium allowed by the Commission for the different Components as mentioned above. No credit will be given for answers written in a medium other than the one allowed in the Paper. Candidates will be required to indicate the medium of Essay Component in the Attendance Lists and on the Answer Book. No credit will be given for the Essay Component if the candidate indicates a medium on the Attendance List and on the Answer Book other than the one in which he/she has written the Essay.

NOTE-II: There will be minimum qualifying marks separately in each Paper as may be fixed by the

Commission in their discretion. Paper-I will be evaluated first and evaluation of Paper-II will be done only of those candidates who obtain the minimum qualifying marks in Paper-I.

(ii) Physical Standards/Physical Efficiency Tests and Medical Standards Tests:

Candidates who are declared qualified in the written examination will be summoned for Physical

Standards/Physical Efficiency Tests and Medical Standards Tests. Those candidates who meet the prescribed Physical Standards, specified in Appendix-VI, will be put through the Physical Efficiency Tests as indicated below:

Physical Efficiency Tests (PET)

 (a) 100 Meters race:

 Males: In 16 seconds

 Females: In 18 Seconds

 (b) 800 Meters race

 Males: In 3 minutes 45 seconds

 Females: In 4 minutes 45 seconds

 (c) Long Jump (3 chances):

 Males: 3.5 Meters

 Females: 3.0 Meters

 (d) Shot Put (7.26 Kgs.) 

 Males: 4.5 Meters

 Females: --

Pregnancy at the time of PET will be a disqualification and pregnant female candidate will be rejected.

Medical Standards Tests, to check the standards specified in Appendix-VI, will be conducted only in respect of candidates who are declared qualified in the Physical Efficiency Test.

The Physical Standards/Physical Efficiency Tests and Medical Standards Tests will be conducted under the supervision of a Nodal Authority to be appointed by the Ministry of Home Affairs. These tests will be conducted at various centres to be notified after the results of the written examination. Appeals will be entertained only against the Medical Standards Tests and will have to be made to the Appellate Authority designated by the Ministry of Home Affairs within a period of 15 days from the date of declaration of the results of these tests.

(iii) Interview/Personality Test:

Candidates who are declared qualified in the Medical Standards Tests, will be called for Interview/Personality Test to be conducted by Union Public Service Commission. Candidates who are declared medically unfit but allowed to appear before the “Review Medical Board” on their appeal by the Appellate Authority will be called for Interview/Personality Tests provisionally. The Interview/Personality Test will carry 150 Marks. Candidates who are short-listed for Interview/Personality Test, including those short-listed for Interview/Personality Test provisionally will be issued a Detailed Application Form (DAF) in which among other things, they will be required to indicate their preference of Forces. As female candidates are eligible for appointment to CRPF, CISF and SSB only, they will be required to indicate their preference for CRPF, CISF and SSB only.

(iv) Final Selection / Merit:

 The merit list will be drawn on the basis of marks obtained by the candidates in the Written Examination and Interview/Personality Test.

Syllabus of the Written Papers:

Paper I: General Ability and Intelligence:

The objective type questions with multiple choices in this paper will broadly cover the following areas:

1. General Mental Ability: The questions will be designed to test the logical reasoning, quantitative aptitude including numerical ability, and data interpretation.

2. General Science: The questions will be set to test general awareness, scientific temper, comprehension and appreciation of scientific phenomena of everyday observation including new areas of importance like Information Technology, Biotechnology, and Environmental Science.

3. Current Events of National and International Importance: The questions will test the candidates’

awareness of current events of national and international importance in the broad areas of culture, music, arts, literature, sports, governance, societal and developmental issues, industry, business, globalisation, and interplay among nations.

4. Indian Polity and Economy: The questions shall aim to test candidates’ knowledge of the Country’s

political system and the Constitution of India, social systems and public administration, economic development in India, regional and international security issues and human rights including its indicators.

5. History of India: The questions will broadly cover the subject in its social, economic and political aspects. This shall also include the areas of growth of nationalism and freedom movement.

6. Indian and World Geography: The questions shall cover the physical, social and economic aspects of geography pertaining to India and the World.

Paper II: General Studies, Essay and Comprehension.

Part-A – Essay questions which are to be answered in long narrative form either in Hindi or English totalling 80 Marks. The indicative topics are modern Indian history especially of the freedom struggle, geography, polity and economy, knowledge of security and human rights issues, and analytical ability.

Part-B – Comprehension, précis writing, other communications/language skills – to be attempted in English only (Marks 120) – The topics are Comprehension passages, précis writing, developing counter arguments, simple grammar and other aspects of language testing

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Central Armed Police Forces At A Glance

ASSAM RIFLES (AR)

Assam Rifles, India’s oldest paramilitary force of 46 battalions currently, officered by Army and some its cadre officers, though commanded only by Army officers, is under administrative control of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), but under operational control of Army for performing many roles including internal security counter insurgency and border security, aid to the civil power in times of emergency, and the provision of communications, medical assistance and education in remote areas. Since 2002 it has been guarding the India-Myanmar border under the government policy of “one border, one force”.

With Assam Rifles being under operational command of the Army, almost all its arms and equipment are on the lines of those of infantry battalions in plains and mountainous areas. In view of the mountain strike corps to be raised to counter the rising Chinese threat, there may be some more battalions added to its existing strength.

BORDER SECURITY FORCE (BSF)

The Border Security Force came into existence on 01 Dec 1965, under K F Rustamji, its first chief and founding father, with the aim of promoting a sense of security among the people living in border areas, preventing trans-border crimes, unauthorised entry into or exit from the territory of India and to prevent smuggling and any other illegal activity. Subsequently, BSF additionally began to be deployed for counter insurgency and internal security duties. Having participated in the Indo-Pak war of 1971, it has been involved  in fighting insurgency and militancy in Punjab, J & K and North- East, rescue and relief during calamities and since recently, also been deployed in the areas affected by Left Wing Extremism.

BSF has been defending the borders along with the Army and checking infiltration on the borders during the current standoff with Pakistan. From a force of 25 battalions in 1965, it has today 173 Battalions. With its own Air and Water Wings, Artillery Regiments and Training Institutes, BSF is presently the largest Border Guards force of the world.

In addition to the OFB small arms mentioned, BSF has Heckler & Koch MP5, A3 9mmx19 mm Sub Machine Gun and Beretta MX4 Storm submachine guns. To replace its camels in the Thar desert, BSF reportedly conducted trials of Polaris (USA) field vehicle Ranger 800, Ranger RZR 4-800, Ranger RZW SW and sportsman models in May 2013 and found it better than the Chinese Nebula and Indian Maini Group’s products tested earlier.

INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE (ITBP)

Conceived in October 1962 – quite obviously as a result of the Chinese aggression – the Indo -Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) was raised for security along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China. Beginning with four battalions, it now has 57 battalions of 1000 personnel each deployed in all three segments of the LAC from Karakoram Pass in Ladakh till Jachep La in Arunachal Pradesh opposite the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. In view of the additional responsibilities and the task redefined in 1976, the Force was restructured in 1978. It is a specialized mountain force with most of its personnel professionally trained as mountaineers and skiers.

Owing to the very challenging terrain, temperature and weather conditions, under modernisation ITBP needs better sleeping bags, better snow boots, snow scooters, battlefield surveillance radars, satellite-based surveillance systems, real time imagery systems, cameras mounted on towers overlooking heights and ridges, windmills, which the high velocity winds can move to generate electricity and more infrastructure. One weapon ITBP has acquired apart from the OFB list is the UTG Gen 5 Accushot Competition Master Model 700 Pro with Upgraded Bolt FPS-450 Spring Airsoft Sniper Rifle, and US-made UTG brand product.

SASHASTRA SEEMA BAL (SSB)

Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) was raised in early 1963 with the aim of inculcating feelings of national belonging in people living in the border areas like then North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), North Assam, North Bengal, Uttar Pradesh hills, Himachal Pradesh, and Ladakh. The scheme was later extended to Manipur, Tripura, Jammu (1965), Meghalaya (1975), Sikkim (1976), border areas of Rajasthan and Gujarat (1989), Manipur, Mizoram. Some more areas of Rajasthan and Gujarat (1988), South Bengal, Nagaland (1989) and Nubra Valley, Rajouri and Poonch district of Jammu and Kashmir (1991) were added too.  The modus was developing their capabilities for resistance through a continuous process of motivation, training, development, welfare programmes and activities. Following the recommendations of the Group of Ministers on reforming the National Security System, the SSB was declared as a border guarding force and lead intelligence agency for Indo-Nepal border (January, 2001) and Indo-Bhutan border (March, 2004).

Addressing one of the main concerns of the SSB for providing authorised infrastructure, in July 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) approved construction of infrastructure, namely office buildings, residential buildings and Border Out Posts (BOPs), at various establishments of the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) during the 12th Five Year Plan at the cost of Rs. 3,510.07 crore. This includes construction of barracks and non-residential buildings. In addition, the CCEA also approved construction of 2,000 houses and 10 barracks at 12 sites at an estimated cost of Rs. 413.88 crore.

CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE (CRPF)

The Central Reserve Police Force, which came into existence as Crown Representative’s Police on 27th July 1939, became the Central Reserve Police Force by enactment of the CRPF Act on 28th December 1949. The Force has grown into a big organization with 207 battalions (bns), including 181 executive bns, 2 Mahila (Women) bns, 10 Rapid Action Force (RAF) bns, 6 Cobra bns (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action-special battalions raised mainly for anti-Maoist operations), 2 DM (NDRF) bns, 5 Signal bns and 1 Special Duty Group bn, 37 Group Centres,   11 Training Institutions and 4 composite 100 bed and 17 composite 50 bed hospitals.

CRPF has sent a proposal to MHA for integral helicopters, better quality of anti-landmine vehicles and more unmanned aerial vehicles.

CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE (CISF)

The CISF raised in 1969 with three battalions, to provide integrated security cover to the Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) over  four decades, has grown to reach 1,12,000 personnel, amounting to at least 110 battalions. No longer a PSU-centric organisation, the CISF has become a premier multi-skilled security agency, mandated to provide security to major critical infrastructure installations of the country in diverse areas. CISF is currently providing security cover to nuclear installations, space establishments, airports, seaports, power plants, sensitive Government buildings and even heritage monuments. Among important responsibilities entrusted to the CISF in recent years are the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (for which 4000 more personnel have been recently authorised), VIP Security, Disaster Management and establishment of a Formed Police Unit (FPU) of the UN at Haiti.

With diverse challenges, CISF needs a far wider inventory of equipment as per its tasks mentioned. Delhi airports’ Perimeter Intrusion Detection System has been installed by Israel. The CISF also needs more and improved night vision devices and a separate firefighting wing to better fire- protect 88 PSUs it guards.

NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD (NSG)

The National Security Guard (NSG) was set up in 1984 as a Federal Contingency Deployment Force to tackle all facets of terrorism in the country. Thus the primary role of this Force is to combat terrorism in whatever form it may assume in areas where activity of terrorists assumes serious proportions, and the State Police and other Central Police Forces cannot cope up with the situation. The NSG is a Force specially equipped and trained to deal with specific situations and is therefore, to be used only in exceptional situations. The Force is not designed to undertake the functions of the State Police Forces or other Para Military Forces of the Union of India.

The NSG was modelled on the pattern of the SAS of the UK and GSG-9 of Germany. It is a task-oriented Force and has two complementary elements in the form of the Special Action Group (SAG) comprising Army personnel and the Special Ranger Groups (SRG), comprising personnel drawn from the Central Para Military Forces / State Police Force. All the personnel are on deputation.

Shinde's announcement to benefit CAPF veterans

Union Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde’s announcement on that retired Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) personnel will be granted the same privileges given to ex-servicemen of the defence services will benefit the CAPF veterans in large.

It had been a long-standing grievance of the CAPF personnel that they are shown a step-motherly attitude by the government despite serving in some of the toughest, conflict-ridden areas of the country.

“CAPF personnel killed in conflicts are not even being treated as martyrs,’’ P S Nair, a former CRPF man and present general secretary of the AICPMF Ex-Servicemen Welfare Association, said.

The CAPF is made up of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) and the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF).

On November 23, 2012, the Ministry of Home Affairs had issued an order giving them the status of ‘ex-CAPF personnel’ and urging the state to provide them the benefits now given to personnel retiring from the Army, Navy and Air Force.

Unlike Army, Navy and IAF veterans, who benefit from a large number of post-retirement State Government schemes, CAPF veterans have to be content with just their pension. The association is also planning to stage sit-ins at CAPF HQs across the country on November 12 raising their demands, according to P S Nair, general secretary of the AICPMF Ex-Servicemen Welfare Association.