China: LAC impasse and Army-ITBP spat

First the facts

- Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has five battalions deployed in Eastern Ladakh including those on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

-The DIG Headquarter controlling these forces is located at Srinagar, 258 air km and 418 road km from Leh. Zoji La, on the Himalayan Range, and located on the main highway from Srinagar to Leh, is closed to road traffic from November to end May.

- Considering the separation of the Headquarter from the units, an adhoc Headquarter is functional under the Deputy at Leh – a compromise solution at best, considering the division of resources.

- ITBP communications are based, primarily, on High Frequency radio, which is most vulnerable to interception and being jammed when required particularly in an operational situation.

- The role of ITBP amplifies the tasks of the Force as – to guard the Northern borders and prevent violations and encroachments, prevent smuggling, unauthorized movement of goods, weapons, personnel and such like non-traditional threats in the border areas.

- ITBP does not have its own integral intelligence setup so essential in an operational situation.

- Thus the orientation of the force is essentially towards “policing” tasks.

The Ground Realties.

- The Army has Infantry and Mechanized forces suitably located with robust combat support and controlling headquarters well forward and within easy reach of the LAC.

- India’s perception of the LAC is undemarcated on ground but has been identified along suitable geographical and relief features.

- India and China have unilaterally delineated the LAC on their respective maps but have not shared the same with each other. As a result, each assumes the others perception from the activities that both carry out to dominate up to their respective perceptions.

- Consequently, common areas claimed by both arise, and are contested for by the militaries. Often termed, inappropriately, as “no-man’s land”.  India generally terms it as “no-man’s land” which is not paid heed to by China, thus putting India at a disadvantage. India should modify term to “Both-man’s Land”, so that India does not restrain its troops from operating in that area.

- Very evidently, the LAC is a “LIVE” boundary, and should be manned accordingly. The PLA platoon strength that camped in Depsang was no group of local herdsmen or Yak smugglers or in any way could be construed as non-traditional threat. Therefore if required more than a “Police “force response.

- The Chinese Border Defence Units deployed and garrisoned along the entire LAC are directly under the PLA, which is surely not mere “policing” duties.

- The Army has a comprehensive (in as much there is) intelligence setup and has wherewithal for intelligence gathering and substantial surveillance resources.

- The Army has a secure radio and static line communication network with adequate redundancies built-in for exercising optimal operational command and control.

- The Army has a well-structured tiered establishment for force build up and undertakes an emergent or graduated operational response at the place of its own choosing right across the entire LAC. Provided the field commanders are not constrained at the tactical level, due to a politically cautious stance.

Operational Milieu.

- Army and ITBP posts are often co-located but operating independently. Command and control is exercised along two parallel verticals with informal personality based lateral inter-action.

- Domination of LAC by patrolling by both Army and ITBP, is a wasteful duplication of effort.

- Inter-communication between Army and ITBP is adhoc and is mainly provided from Army resources. ITBP’s integral radio equipment is incompatible with equipment currently in use by the Army. Consequently the ITBP personnel are required to be trained on it. Given the nature of the high altitude of the region there is frequent movement of such personnel making the whole exercise temporary and fragmented. 

- New raisings in ITBP units a unilateral undertaking by MHA and ITBP without heed to the overall security fallout along the LAC by this augmentation.

Consequences.

- With a Police force deployed on the LAC, the Chinese will interpret it as a tacit acceptance of the Indian Government that the LAC is not a “LIVE” border that needs to be guarded by military forces. A benign approach to the whole India-China Boundary question.

- To accept ITBP as the first responder to a conventional tactical situation without requisite integral support with heavier weapons and combat support in the form of dedicated artillery or air support is wilfully making them “cannon fodder” by powers that be.

- Constraining the tactical initiative of tactical field commanders by a policy of restraint and reticence will always allow the PLA to wrest the initiative in battle.

- Any form of pre-emption or “cold start” by the Army is not feasible in these circumstances. Indian Army will only be fire fighting to save its glorious image.

- The Army is the Nations “punch”. It should be asserting its strength through fire power and guts not “military diplomacy”. The Nation has to speak from a position of strength. The Army gives it this strength. It needs to be recognized.

The Revamping Necessary.

- Place all ITBP forces deployed along the LAC under the Army for operational control.

- Induction of new equipment into the Force, should as a policy, be cleared by the Army from the technical and logistic compatibility point of view.

Conclusion.

- MHA’s reluctance to place the ITBP under the Army is indicative of the underlying resistance of the IPS lobby to serve under any commander from the Army. IPS as seen from the factual ground realities considers itself as an “administrative cadre” akin to IAS. They loathe the notion of leading from the front as field commanders. The direct entry ITBP young officers endorse the requirement of operating under the Army.

- What is of paramount importance is National Security Interests. This cannot be hijacked by some blatant parochial group interest. The matter is too serious to be left to the whims or fancy of the bureaucracy. If the MHA cannot decide then let the people decide whose security is the Government of India’s responsibility.

By Lt Gen JS Bajwa in Indian Defence Review

PARAMILITARY CHIEFS SEEK TO BREAK MHA BONDS

With “weak” leadership at the helm of affairs, the Director Generals of paramilitary forces, all from the Indian Police Service, have sought to unshackle themselves from the Union Home Ministry.

In a sign of a brewing revolt, the DGs complained that the mechanism of reviewing the functioning of paramilitary forces by the Home Secretary was “not working properly” and decided to seek a meeting with him to discuss new and pending issues. Technically, the Ministry Of Home Affairs (MHA) is not only the administrative Ministry of the paramilitary forces but also the cadre- controlling authority for IPS officers.

According to the minutes of a recently-held meeting of the DGs of the forces at the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) Directorate here, the paramilitary bosses have objected to the standard operating procedure (SOP) of MHA that stipulates attachment of personnel by the Ministry. Arguing for a review of the SOP, the DGs agreed that they “should not be routinely asked by the MHA to submit the number of personnel attached etc, as the DGs and the Supreme Commander of the Force are well aware of the requirement of the Force.” According to Constitutional provisions, the President of India is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Union.

“The responsibility of equipping the force within the sanctioned budget should be that of the DG and “no unnecessary approvals, like in case of modernisation plan, may be taken from the MHA. The DG should have total powers to utilise the allocated budget without extraneous requirement of approvals and sanctions,” says one of the agenda points discussed at the meeting and agreed by top paramilitary brass.

The meeting was chaired by ITBP DG Subhash Goswami and attended by the chief of Sashastra Seema Bal Arun Chaudhary and Arvind Ranjan who once headed the elite National Security Guards and is the chief of the Central Industrial Security Force now.  

The DGs also contended that the modernisation plan of the paramilitary forces was “not taking off the way it should, for want of finalisation of qualitative requirements by the MHA and lack of understanding of the requirements of the Force.” The chiefs have sought appointment of an IPS officer (as against the present IAS official) as Joint Secretary (Police Modernisation) in the Union Home Ministry.

The paramilitary bosses have also resolved to raise the issue of postings and transfers of specialist doctors with post-graduate qualifications at the Composite Hospitals by the Union Home Ministry. The DG of ITBP has already sent a DO letter to the Union Home Secretary seeking review of the Ministry’s order (dated December 7, 2011) claiming posting and transfer of specialist doctors by the MHA “would lead to depriving personnel in far flung areas of specialist treatment, dilution of command and unnecessary strengthening of Composite Hospitals at locations where superior medical assistance is already available.” The Ministry subsequently turned down the request.

The forces are now collecting information relating to mobility/organisation, personnel, provisioning/police modernisation/medical, Welfare and Rehabilitation Board (WARB), welfare and morale of the troops for collation before taking these issues up with the Union Home Secretary. The IPS officials at the top, however, did not deliberate on pressing concerns of the paramilitary forces, including significant attrition of the officers and men on account of premature retirement due to spiraling number of cases relating to voluntary retirement and resignations, a senior paramilitary official said.

The cadre officials are also enraged over the proposal for creation of the post of Joint Secretary (Police Modernisation) to be headed by an IPS officer and not an Inspector-General rank officer. Serving cadre officers of three paramilitary forces have already petitioned the Delhi High Court seeking grant of “organized service” status and non-functional financial upgradation, lack of which is considered to be the key reasons for wastage of trained personnel.

A senior paramilitary official who did not wish to be identified said it is high time the aggrandizing aspirations of IPS officials were suitably curtailed and appointment of cadre officials as DGs should be made at least on a rotational basis. At present, only IPS officials on deputation are entitled to become DG.

Paramilitary insiders said the Ministry is sitting over files of crucial proposals for over two years including the arming policy of the Forces. The Ministry, sources said, returns files of the paramilitary forces on “flimsy” grounds and approvals are not granted to proposals for years together.

Source:http://www.dailypioneer.com/todays-newspaper/paramilitary-chiefs-seek-to-break-mha-bonds.html

IPS Officers vs Army Officers

Some believe that army and IPS cannot be compared. We should not forget the fact that IPS is modeled based on Army. In fact, pre-independence, many Army officers worked as IGs and SPs in provinces and districts. Even today, due to historical reasons, shoulder epaulets of both these services are same.

1. Recruitment:

While IPS officers are recruited along with 15+ other civil services through a common entrance exam, Army officers are recruited through separate Army SSB. It is a sad fact that very few people give first preference to IPS. IAS/IFS and now even IRS, IA&AS etc. are preferred when compared to IPS, which they consider as a dirty job. They have their own reasons for not preferring IPS. Frequent transfers, political pressure, threat to life, irregular working hours, no/less holidays, work-life balance etc. are some reasons commonly quoted. People who apply for Army SSB are sure about joining army, whereas, in IPS around 20 probationers leave during training or within first 2 years of service after clearing civil service exam and getting IAS/IFS/IRS. In army SSB no. of intake is less against the sanctioned seats. Quality of candidates is the commonly cited reason for not filling up the seats, so there are lot of vacancies in Army. Advertisements like "Do you have it in you? An extraordinary life. A life full of adventure, honour and glory. Where you are one among a million, and one in a million" etc. are needed to attract youth into Indian Army. But in IPS all seats get filled, but many children come to SVPNPA to study for their next attempt in civil service exams. Vacancies in IPS are due to attritions during initial probation days. But there are few candidates give IPS as their first preference in CSE due to genuine interest and love for the profession and their countrymen. We should not generalise these issues.

 2. Probation:

Medical tests for joining army are tougher than IPS because IPS is considered a civil service, so most of them get selected. Because of the fact that the children have cleared a tough exam, there is a sympathy among trainers in SVPNPA and the result is that no one will get rejected at the end of IPS probation. But in Army, many unfit probationers get weeded out. Training is almost same for both but is somewhat liberal in IPS when compared to army. IPS officers' training period of 2 years is counted into service as no. of years in experience and they start earning salary from the starting month from their respective states. Where as in Army, a probationer is not confirmed until the end of the training of 1-1.5 years and receives only a stipend. Physically fit and bright IPS probationers do exist, but as I already said, these issues cannot be generalised.

3. Service:

After probation an IPS officer will become an Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) responsible of a subdivision. After 2 years he will automatically become a Superintendent of Police (SP) in charge of a district. After 18 years of service he will become a DIG, then after 5 years he will become an IG and then ADGP and finally DGP. All young IPS probationers are potential DGPs!!! In army an officer's promotion is not time-bound. He should attend interviews, write exams, should have good remarks in Annual Confidential Reports in order to climb the ladder of Lt-Capt.-Maj-Lt.Col-Col.-Brig.-Maj.Gen.-Lt.Gen.-Gen. There are sincere officers in IPS who prove their mettle by doing the given duty to them, but there are stories of IPS officers jockeying to create a new post for them only because of the fact that they have completed a no. of years of service and it’s time for their promotion.

4. Leadership:

Army officers should be in the forefront, leading the men they command. Statistics of war casualties show that many commissioned officers are martyred. There is a general perception that IPS officers are good at sitting in AC room and planning only on papers. This might be true, but there are many officers in IPS (like Dr. NC Asthana, K.Vijay Kumar, C. Sylendra Babu etc. to name a few) who do the dirty job of leading from the front. But in most cases dangerous jobs are left to directly recruited Assistant Commandants or Deputy Superintendents.

5. Reputation:

Army officers have a good image and respect among public when compared to their IPS counterparts. We should understand that Army officers do not get the same respect (that they get in India's heartland) in NE states and J&K, where AFSPA is implemented. We should understand that external aggressors are the main enemy for army, whereas police is acting against internal aggressors (who are their countrymen), so police cannot use the same force as that of the army, while dealing with the crimes. Checking suspicious vehicles/persons/places is a normal preventive work, but this is seen as an infringement of privacy. Normal day-to-day policing work itself damages the image of police. Army man shoots to kill, whereas a Police man shoots only to deter. Even though police has done terrible mistakes here and there, our country is still intact and stable, and the credit for this should be given to police leadership. We should also be proud of our Army for upholding the territorial integrity of our country.

6. Corruption:

In this area also Army wins over IPS. In army, recruitment and procurement/provisioning are the only possible areas where army officers can even think of making some quick buck. Whereas in IPS, all kind of work involves dealing with the public, and officers might be offered bribe right from the first day of joining the duty. Both IPS and army officers, are born and brought up in the same society/environment, but the organisation they join makes the difference. Generalization will surely demoralize the honest officers in both Olive green and Khaki uniforms.

7. Patriotism:

Patriotism, discipline, sacrifice, camaraderie are very good attributes that are present in Indian Army and it is worth emulating these qualities in other organisations too. But there is a general perception among armed forces that they are more patriotic and they love their country a lot than others, because they have joined military and they are ready to do supreme sacrifices in the line of duty. Recently an army officer wrote in an online forum that at least 5 years of military service should be made compulsory for IPS officers (who claim that they also want to serve their country) before taking CSE, because a lot of vacancy exists in armed forces. We should understand that vacancies exist in other organisations also. Engineers, scientists, teachers, lawyers, agriculturists, business men, bankers and even politicians are very important for a nation’s development.

8. Other service trivia:

Use of khaki as police uniforms which are traditionally worn by soldiers, use of same shoulder epaulets, ceremonial batons, georgette patches, head bands, star plates and rank flags in official vehicles by both army officers and IPS officers, giving gallantry awards like ashok chakra, kirti chakra etc. (which are traditionally seen by armed forces as theirs) for police officer , use of the word "jawan", "commando" etc. by media to denote CPMFs, use of similar disruptive pattern camouflage uniforms by CPMFs etc. irks armed forces. But we should understand that colour of uniforms show the uniqueness of the organisation to which a person belongs, uniform should connect a person to tradition and history that his organisation inherits. Similarly, most of the decorations in the Indian Army uniforms are adopted from British system, for instance, crown was replaced by state emblem, and other decorations like crossed sword and baton etc. remained unchanged in shoulder epaulets. IPS (formerly Imperial Police) got branched off from Indian Army they also share the same tradition and history. There should not be any problem in using Camouflage/disruptive pattern uniforms (given the fact there are no copyright restrictions) by CPMFs if the working conditions demands, because they also do the same work as armed forces. Terms like jawan etc. cannot be monopolised. Guarding territorial frontiers is a great service. Income tax and customs/central excise officers guard economic frontiers.

ISRO/DRDO/DAE/CSIR/ICAR/ICMR engineers and scientists provide security to this country by using science as a weapon. Energy security and food security are also equally important. In my opinion each and every profession is equally important. Taking pride in one's work is a good thing, but it should not be at the contempt of other work. No service should be belittled, instead we should analyse the issues and think about possible reforms.

Possible Reforms:

For all the aforementioned issues, IPS officers alone cannot be blamed.As many as eight police reforms commissions have been formed and and these commissions had IPS officers as their members and they tried to address some of the issues that are pestering police leadership. None of the reforms were fully implemented. Police being a state subject, we can't expect anything other than this. Central govt. too failed to comply with some of the Supreme Court judgements regarding police reforms.

 I'll list here some of the reforms. While some are my own ideas, others are taken from the internet and Police reforms commission reports.

(i) Separate exams for IPS:

IPS cannot be claimed as a pure civil service. IPS officers have to work in quasi-military settings in CPMFs. Indian Forest Service (IFoS) is doing a good job by having a separate exam for their recruitment. By keeping separate exams, only interested candidates will apply, and this will also to some extent end the problem of flocking of 20+ IPS probationers into various other civil services every year. Recruitment can also be modelled based on Army SSB (a judicious mix of written exams, interviews and physical exams) without diluting the toughness/quality of exams. Sympathy of trainers towards the probationers will also reduce to a great extent. Rejections every year at the end of probation will reduce the complacency effect.

This issue of separate exams was taken up by few IPS officers a few years back, but it was vehemently opposed by retired and senior IPS officers. They are of opinion that this move will reduce the status of IPS over IAS. It is a well-known fact that a turf war is going on b/w IAS and IPS. In no way this move will reduce the status of IPS.

(ii) Merit based promotions:

Right from 1997, almost all police reforms commissions talk about this. These commissions had IPS officers as members and even senior and retired IPS officers are batting for this reform. According to this, at each stage of promotion, if an IPS officer completes certain no. of years of service, he should be sent again to SVPNPA, where he/she will take a course. At the end of the course, written examinations, interviews, physical tests will be conducted and performance of the officers in their states/organisations and annual confidential reports will be reviewed and promotions are given according to the merit. There are also incentives for officers who clear the course in first attempt. For repeated attempts officers will have to pay from their own pocket. There is also a provision that, if an officer fails in 3 consecutive tests, he should be compulsorily retired from the service. Who should be blamed for not implementing this?

(iii) Reforms in Central Deputation:

IPS officers in SP rank are allowed to go to Central organisations like SVPNPA, NEPA, BPR&D, NICFS, CBI, IB, NCRB, DPWC etc. whereas officers of and above DIG rank are allowed to go to CPMFs like BSF, ITBP, CRPF, CISF, AR, SSB, NSG and other organisations like NCB, DRI etc. There is a growing concern among cadre officers of CPMFs that an "outsider" is coming to command them, and also there is a general perception among cadre officers of CPMFs that these IPS officers come to central deputation for having good time and to take rest after tense and busy law and order work in their parent cadre. In my opinion, physically and mentally fit IPS officers in SP rank should also be sent to CPMFs like BSF, ITBP, CRPF, CISF, AR, SSB, NSG as assistant/deputy/joint commandants after some stringent physical and psychological tests. The skills that the IPS officers acquire in these organisations will not only be of great help to them for the rest of their career but will also help in capacity building of the state cadre to which they belong.

Source:http://indiandefence.com/threads/ips-officers-vs-army-officers