The massive attack by armed Naxalites on a road opening
contingent of the CRPF in the Maoist belt of Sukma district in Chhattisgarh,
resulting in the death of fifteen of the paramilitary personnel and looting of
over a dozen automatic rifles, draws attention to the fact that for nearly two
decades now, the handling of this prime challenge to national security had not
yielded lasting results.
Serious Challenge
An intelligence alert about the organised movement of Maoist
cadres from Odisha to this area also did not help. The event raises questions
on the strategy and policy response that the Centre and state governments had
adopted in dealing with the escalating threat of Naxalism in a vast area spread
across Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha.
It is instructive to recall that it was in the mid- Nineties
that the Indian intelligence had unearthed the plan of the then underground
Naxalite leadership to operationally unite the Maoist Communist Centre(MCC)of
Bihar and the People's War Group (PWG) of Andhra Pradesh by utilising the
intervening Dandakaranya forest belt as the corridor. The ambitious plan even
envisaged the spread of the movement to the North- East where it would seek linkage
with left-of-the-centre insurgent groups active in the region. In spite of the
initial success of the Andhra Pradesh police in combating the movement
militarily, Naxalism steadily traversed the map of India and became a
trans-national threat. Today, Naxals are posing a serious challenge to our
paramilitary forces in the forest and hilly terrain of thousands of kilometres
in the hinterland of India.
Originating in West Bengal in the late Sixties, Naxalism
went through an uncertain period of advocacy of the Maoist doctrine of 'power
coming through the barrel of the gun' before it gained ascendancy in the
Nineties and rapidly spread to new areas on the strength of its underground
organisational planning, rising number of trained cadres, and acquisition of
arms and explosives.
Built on the combination of an ideological pull, the
atmospherics of disgruntlement prevailing in the remote interiors of India
particularly in the tribal belts and the unfortunate "withdrawal" of
local administration in the affected areas on the first appearance of the
gunmen, the Maoist movement has succeeded in establishing a "parallel
government" in certain pockets of the country.
Joint Strategy
What has come in the way of a sustainable strategy being
developed against "the biggest threat to national security" - as the
Prime Minister described it more than once - is the unwillingness of the
political leadership to accept that while police and law and order are in the
domain of the state, dealing with issues of national security requires a joint
strategy between the Centre and the states. In handling cross border terrorism,
the Centre has to be the lead player but the fight against Naxalism - still a
largely indigenous challenge - has to be led by the states. Unlike terrorism,
the Maoist threat requires an "area" domination and the emphasis on
"intelligence from below." The Centre's role is to make paramilitary
forces in adequate strength available to the state in conducting area- specific
operations, share such intelligence about the plans and movement of the armed
Naxalites, as the national agencies are able to lay their hands on, and not let
any politically motivated blame game overshadow the lessons that must be drawn
from an incident of the kind that occurred in Sukma district.
For far too long has the threat of Naxalism been looked upon
as a mere police problem. The present dimension of Maoist insurgency has called
for an effective "combat" strategy in which any contingent in the
lead will be backed by stronger formations covering the flanks and the entire
operation would be directed by a designated senior officer in the field.
Sending out a 'road opening patrol' of a dozen of men -who were left on a limb,
was repeated in Sukma as no lessons were apparently drawn from what had happened
earlier in this area.
External Threat
The Maoist cadres use a 'war' strategy under the guidance of
the Central Military Commission of the organisation in planning their offensive
based on their own information. The counterinsurgency response, on the other
hand, hardly has a blueprint defining the area of operation, the command
structure and the plan of securing area domination. Our counterinsurgency drive
should have the benefit of aerial surveillance to locate the moving formations
of Naxalites. The police leadership of the state must lead from the front as
otherwise there will be a demoralising loss of personnel or a wild resort to
force of the kind that will cause avoidable collateral damage. The strategy
should be to create an effective island of peace so that development activity
can be conducted there without hindrance.
In a welcome correction of policy, the Centre has accepted
the view that Naxalism required handling of the security development interface
and is not merely a police response. Funding for development is being enhanced
in the affected areas through the Planning Commission. In the security-
development paradigm, security comes first sequentially and it can be achieved
through time- bound and area specific 'combat' operations. In the cleaned up
territory, peace must be held long enough to complete the development
objectives. The entire energy of the state government will have to be devoted
to this large mission. This is a tall order considering the current state of
Centre- state relationships in our country but there is no short cut to this.
The challenge will multiply if our adversaries decide to provide an external
input to what is still by and large an internal danger.
(The writer is a former Director Intelligence Bureau)
Source: indiatoday.intoday.in 22 March, 2014
