CISF prepares to become NSG substitute for VIP security

In an apparent indication of the thinking within the ministry of home affairs (MHA) that VIP security should be gradually moved away from NSG, the country's elite counterterror force, CISF is strengthening its VIP protection unit to become the premier agency in the sector in near future. There are already efforts being made to increase manpower in the unit with MHA considering a proposal for the same.

CISF DG Arvind Ranjan said he has asked MHA to sanction more number of personnel in the unit. At the same time, rigorous training is being provided to personnel in the unit with help from NSG and armed forces trainers. CISF is regularly holding joint exercises with NSG to adopt best practices in VIP security from the force.

Ranjan said, "We are aiming to make CISF the best force for VIP security. We want to create a sense of security in the minds of VIPs so that they have no hesitation taking CISF security."

 Importantly, VIPs are known to demand NSG security, also known as Black Cat commandoes, as VIP cover as it is the best trained force in the country. However, NSG was not created for VIP security but to counter terror attacks. There have been various voices raised from within the force and the security establishment that NSG must be divested of VIP security duties and focus on its core competence.

Incidentally, Ranjan headed NSG before he was made CISF chief. Speaking to TOI, he said, "We have also asked for a periodic review of strength in our VIP security unit so that the force has optimum strength at any given to provide VIP security."

Sources said the force was also being given unarmed combat training so that when VIPs interact with public and there is sudden unarmed attack, the VIP can be protected without the use of weapons. "Not all times you need to use weapons. Certain situations are best diffused with bare hands," said an officer with the force.

Source: http://defence.pk/threads/cisf-prepares-to-become-nsg-substitute-for-vip-security.319272/

NSG Team Assesses Security Ahead Of Shree Jagannath Rath Yatra

An eight-member team of the National Security Guard (NSG) led by IG (Operations), Odisha Soumendra Priyadarshi took stock of the security measures at the Shree Jagannath Temple and also the security arrangements for the ensuing Rath Yatra here.

During the visit to the temple, the team reviewed the stepped-up security measures at the four gates, the Koili Baikuntha, the sanctum sanctorum and all the shrines around the main temple.The team also examined the close-circuit cameras installed at several points and found some of these not working. The NSG officials also suggested for installation of additional CC cameras at certain crucial points inside the temple.

Later, the officials went to the CCTV control room and watched the visuals. They also took note of the shortcomings of the system in the control room. The team inspected the watchtowers erected along the four sides of the temple boundary wall (Meghanad Pacheri) and noted down their suggestions for a better strategic surveillance.

The team, which spent 90 minutes inside the temple from 11 am to 12.30 pm, did not share the details of their Puri visit with the media for ‘security reasons’.However, sources said the NSG officials, in association with the local police, had a mock drill inside Hotel Mayfair here in the late night hours. The mock exercise in the seaside hotel was basically a rehearsal of an anti-terrorist operation, sources said.

Source: http://www.dailypioneer.com/state-editions/bhubaneswar/nsg-team-assesses-security-ahead-of-rath-yatra.html

NSG security drills in Bhubaneswar

BHUBANESWAR: In the wake of recent visit of two Indian Mujahideen operatives to the state capital and Puri, the National Security Guard (NSG) has decided to conduct security drills at these places on Wednesday.

While police are tight-lipped about the 'mock' operation, sources said some NSG officers reached here on Tuesday. "It is their (NSG) secret drill. We cannot disclose anything," special DGP (headquarters) Sanjeev Marik told TOI.

This is for the second time the elite central armed police force chose Bhubaneswar for the exercise. On January 2, NSG officers carried out drills at a star hotel and a private university here.

Though police refused to divulge the locations identified by the NSG, sources said the agency would conduct mock drills at a hotel near Bhubaneswar railway station and another hotel in Puri.

Police said the objective of the mock drill was to sensitize police and hoteliers about precautions to avoid any untoward incident.

"The NSG officers will assess the threat perception and advice hotels on upgrading their security system," a police officer said.

The NSG authorities are likely to meet DGP and other senior government officers on Thursday and discuss security measures at Jagannath Temple in Puri.

Odisha police recently said they would take the advice of central armed police forces to upgrade security at the 12th century shrine, which is one of the high-risk category temples in the country. With mega Nabakalebar scheduled for 2015, they want to plug the loopholes in their security mechanism.

"We do not want to leave anything to chance. Since IM operatives claimed to have planned attacks during this year's Rath Yatra, we will seek recommendations from NSG authorities to improve security arrangements ahead of the festival," the police officer added.

Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/bhubaneswar/NSG-security-drills-in-Bhubaneswar-today/articleshow/35670250.cms

Unprecedented security for Modi's swearing-in ceremony

In what is being labelled as an extra-ordinary security set-up, more than 6000 security personnel from Delhi Police, para-military, national security guards (NSG) and armed forces will stand guard on May 26 when PM-designate Narendra Modi will take the oath in presence of around 3000 dignitaries.

Visiting heads of government will be guarded as per their individual threat assessment with the highest security cover to be thrown around Nawaj Sharif, Hamid Karzai and Mahindra Rajpaksa.

The security establishment is leaving no stone upturned as the threat assessment for this ceremony is far more than even a summit where such dignitaries usually assemble. There were initial apprehensions among the intelligence agencies about an open-air ceremony. As invitees include foreign dignitaries and diplomats, the arrangements have been tailored to take care of all related security concerns.

Central intelligence agencies have informed Delhi Police about possible attempts by the terrorist groups to disrupt the ceremony and security agencies of respective countries are working in tandem with the Indian intelligence to provide adept security cover to the guests. The security personnel of eight visiting countries - Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Bhutan and Afghanistan - would also coordinate with Delhi Police the personal security of their dignitaries.

The security unit of Delhi Police and the prime minister's security unit have drawn out a multi-layer security plan and sources said a policeman will be deployed every twenty meters on Monday.

Roads by which the foreign dignitaries' carcade will move to the Rashtrapati Bhavan and back will be closed 10 minutes in advance. Raisina Hill will be cordoned off Vijay Path onwards. North Block and South Block offices will be shut at 1 pm and secured by Central para-military troops.

Metro stations at Central Secretariat and Udyog Bhavan, however, will not be closed to prevent crowds from building up.

The area in two-kilometer radius around Rashtrapati Bhawan will be secured from ground to air by an air defense system. Apart from para-military and special cell's commandos, mobile Quick Response Teams, anti-aircraft weapons and NSG commandos will be stationed at strategic locations. The anti-aircraft guns will also be in position at Rashtrapati Bhavan, even as the airspace above will be closed and secured by IAF. Sources say that anti-sabotage checks at RP Bhawan, five hotels in Lutyens Zone - Maurya Sheraton, Taj Mansingh, Taj Palace, Leela Palace and Oberoi have already been put in place, which will be repeated four-five times till Monday evening. Most of the guests out of 3000 invites including Head of States (HOSs) and their representatives would be staying at these hotels.

While 5 best sniffer dogs have been asked form Delhi Police, the other forces have also chipped in their best canines. The bomb disposal squads of NSG and other units have been readied with the Delhi police's squads being in reserve.

The special branch has also scanned the identity of people who have stayed in these hotels in May and identity cards of hotels staff, people used for catering, security and logistical RP Bhawan would be prepared by Delhi Police after proper verification.

The area around these hotels and the road leading from there to Rashtrapati Bhawan will be sanitized on Sunday. Enhanced security checks and extra police pickets and barricades will be enforced from Saturday night, sources said.

SWAT teams of the special cell have also been asked to be ready to combat any situation while their spotters have been deployed at secret locations which are high-rises like hotels and buildings in central Delhi.

From Gujarat Bhawan, where Narendra Modi is staying, to Rashtrapati Bhawan, special arrangements for security on the route have also been made. Modi may reach President House surrounded with a contingent of cars.

Source:http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/lok-sabha-elections-2014/news/Unprecedented-security-for-Modis-swearing-in-ceremony/articleshow/35530401.cms

Intel wing for the CRPF: Not the Right Move

“In today's changed circumstances, CRPF needs to have its own intelligence wing.”

“We are in the process of forming an intelligence wing. The work is going on.”

Unless stated otherwise, the above two innocuous statements would appear to be parts of the same speech. However, while the first is a quote from a December 2005 media interview by Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)’s the then Director General (DG) J K Sinha, the second is an extract from the organisation’s DG K Vijay Kumar’ statement in April 2011. CRPF DGs apart from Mr. Sinha and Mr. Kumar, each of them, during their tenure, making similar statements regarding the ‘necessity’ of and ‘progress’ towards achieving the goal of setting up a ‘home-grown’ intelligence wing. However, such protracted yearning notwithstanding, the formation of such a wing is unlikely to augment the CRPF capacities in any significant manner, will merely add to the multiple agencies that roughly do similar work and more importantly, militate against the spirit of an efficient national security architecture.

Even prior to being designated as the country’s lead counter-insurgency (COIN) force, following the 1998 Kargil war, the CRPF, India’s largest Central Armed Police Force (CAPF), performed COIN duties in Jammu & Kashmir and the Northeast. The intensification of left-wing extremism, which took CRPF’s 60 battalions to unknown territories, positioned them against barely identifiable enemies and called for a drastic modification in its war fighting approach, made the task even harder. CRPF were soon to discover that the flow and quality of ground level intelligence provided by the existing agencies are clearly short of its operational requirements.

This assessment prodded the CRPF to make the first ever proposal to the MHA for an internal intelligence wing in 2005. The then Home Minister Shivraj Patil’s approval notwithstanding, the Finance Ministry shut down the proposal citing financial crunch. It further questioned the rationale of such an effort when each of the states of the country has its own intelligence wing. The CRPF, however, went on to select about 10 personnel from each of its battalions to gather intelligence locally. This wing, without official designation, consisted of about 1250 personnel. Speaking in September 2006, the then DG J K Sinha even hinted that the wing will be made operational the same month. Fresh opposition kicked in and the plan never took off.

However, the CRPF did not dismantle its unofficial intelligence wing and continued to deploy these personnel in conflict theatres. At least on one reported occasion, two such CRPF personnel gathering ground level intelligence were killed by the militants in Kashmir in May 2008. The existing wing appeared to have undergone a minor expansion in the following years. According to an August 2010 media report the CRPF further trained 30-40 of its men for eight months in intensive intelligence gathering and deployed them in the Naxal-hit areas and other theatres of operation.

The ongoing demand for an intelligence wing by the CRPF, thus, amounts to institutionalising and expanding the existing wing within the organisation. An official recognition would translate into dedicated money and resources for the existing motley wing, in addition to and not a subtraction from the CRPF’s annual budget (2010-11) of Rs. 7827.32 crore.    

   

At one level, it is difficult to disagree with the CRPF’s assessment of the ground level intelligence gathering institutions, especially in the Naxal hit states. The expansion of the Naxal influence in India rides heavily on a highly successful effort on part of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) to disrupt the existing intelligence gathering set up. Not just that an enveloping atmosphere of fear has drastically confined the police personnel to the relative safety of the police stations and limited their intelligence gathering capacities, the Maoist systematic campaign against the ‘police informers’ has further discouraged the voluntary submission of information by previously willing civilian population. Of the 190 civilians killed by the Naxals this year (till 14 June), 72 were branded as police informers. Such killings, mostly following a process in conviction in Kangaroo courts, is a mere continuation of the trend, which saw the death of 211 and 323 such ‘police informers’ in 2009 and 2010 respectively. In addition, the CPI-Maoist continues to destroy telephone exchanges and towers disrupting security force communication. As a result, intelligence flow from the ground to the security forces has either become non-existent, or at best, sketchy and unreliable.

Of late, fatalities among the CRPF personnel have risen steadily. The organisation lost 67 personnel in 2008 and 70 personnel in 2009 during its country-wide deployments. The figure almost skyrocketed in 2010, when over 150 of its personnel got killed in the Naxal theatres alone. The ill-informed media narratives notwithstanding, not all killed personnel could have been saved with good intelligence.

The pressure to limit the body bags has mounted on the CRPF authorities and in turn, it is ending up in accentuating its yearning for an exclusive intelligence wing. The spats certain CRPF officials have had with state police officials in Chhattisgarh over availability (or the lack of it) of precise intelligence inputs, has further pushed the organisation to be self-reliant in matters of collecting ground level intelligence.

However, setting up this new wing may not be a solution at all to the organisation’s woes.

Firstly, it is difficult to understand how exactly the new wing will create a new set or subset of data and information, which is qualitatively better than those generated by the existing agencies. Although the senior CRPF officials locate their failure thus far to set up the intelligence wing in the objections raised by the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is described to be antagonistic to its creation, one is not sure if the CRPF’s Intel wing, with its limited manpower and resources, will be able to compete with the IB at all.  

Secondly, the new wing, like any other intelligence gathering agencies, cannot be for the exclusive use of the CRPF and the organisation will have to share the data and information it generates with others. As a result, it will merely end up in being a parallel entity- the third agency in most states where the IB and the Police collect intelligence, fourth agency in some where the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) too is present and the fifth agency in few of the rest where the Military Intelligence (MI) too operates. The ongoing task of establishing synergy among the different agencies and facilitating seamless integration of intelligence, under the evolving counter-terrorism architecture, will certainly not get any easier by adding one more entity to the already crowded scene.

Thirdly, going by the logic of making the security agencies self-reliant, the IB and the RAW should have their armed wings, the National Security Guard (NSG) commandos should have their intelligence wing and perhaps the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) also should seek an armed wing for itself. The problem of augmenting the quality of intelligence generated and ensuring their flow to the forces who need them can be achieved by investing more on infrastructure generating technical intelligence (TECHINT) and also the Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Towards that direction, the IB’s budget needs to be raised and the huge vacancies in its field level personnel needs to be filled up rather than allocating fresh resources for the CRPF’s proposed intelligence wing.

Fourthly, answer to operational woes in the conflict theatres including the states affected by Naxal activities is police modernisation, of which improving intelligence gathering is a critical component. The COIN mechanism centred on grand war designs promotes a culture of centralisation at the cost of weakening the police stations and making them irrelevant. This trend needs to be reversed. Policies to revive policing and intelligence gathering need to factor in the critical need of improving the quality of police personnel at the lowest level of the system.

In short, remedy to the problem of inadequately performing institutions cannot be creation of new institutions, but enabling the existing organisations to perform.

By Bibhu Prasad Routray in www.claws.in

Creating a Diplomatic Security Force: The need to go beyond cosmetic exercises

If media reports are to be believed, a Diplomatic Security Force (DSF) and a Parliament Duty Group (PDG) are in the offing. The Ministry of Home Affairs is said to be in the process of fast-tracking a Delhi Police proposal to set up a dedicated force to protect foreign missions and envoys. Israel is rumoured to have expressed its willingness to train the Force. It has also been stated that the specialized force may be deputed to protect India’s diplomatic missions abroad subsequently. The PDG, it is understood, would draw its personnel from the best trained men and women of the CRPF with commando and tactical training besides expertise in dealing with biological and nuclear emergencies.

Security methodologies do not change with individuals

Professionally speaking, the methodologies for providing security to an individual, a group or to structures do not change based on who the protected is. The level of security to be provided would be based on intelligence inputs and assessment. The location and the circumstances too will have a say in the matter. If protection is the criteria, the state police providing security to the Chief Minister could not be any different from the Special Protection Group (SPG) providing security to the Prime Minister. The degree of protection is based on the threat and not on whose life is more important.

Rationalization vs. empire building

A number of organizations including the SPG, National Security Guard (NSG), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), various state police and other agencies provide security to an assortment of people of different risk categories. Each of these organizations adopts its own method based on training, competence and perception. In a number of cases more than one agency is drawn in and the responsibility is shared. Should so many agencies adopting different methodologies be involved in providing security, a job that requires almost similar competencies? The needs of financial prudence, efficiency, professionalism and accountability suggest rationalization of the entire system.

Creating a concoction by milking personnel from State Police Forces and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), each with a different culture and ethos, would be nothing more than adding one more to the already existing alphabet soup of security forces. An IPS officer, who is more of a manager than a leader, to head the organisation would be a further disaster. Training a few officers and men by specialists from some foreign country or the other would be a mere publicity stunt. Turnover, promotions and wastages would further nullify the anticipated dividends. The creation of DSF or PDG, in the manner as has been suggested, would be a mere empire building exercise without any tangible upgrade to professionalism, which is missing in all the existing security establishments.

Create a system and not physical numbers

If the Government is indeed serious about creating an institution with a difference and break from the present work culture and ethos of the Police Forces in the country, this is an opportunity that should not be wasted.

The aim should be to create a single Security Group (SG) consisting of a training establishment specializing in security issues and a number of units to meet different areas of security as per the requirement. The organisation should be capable of handling all envisaged security situations of the protected throughout the country in an unobtrusive manner. It should have an inbuilt bomb detection, disposal and electronic surveillance capability.

Personnel may be transferred from one unit to the other to avoid them becoming stale. The establishment needs to take into account the need for regular training to maintain the standards of physical fitness and professional skills. The best of the lot could be picked and posted to the DSF and PDG. As and when more numbers are trained, they could be utilized to replace the existing arrangements manned by the other agencies of the centre. If need be our diplomatic establishments abroad could be staffed by these personnel subsequently. As and when this force is made operational, corresponding numbers could be offset from the other establishments. If ego is not an issue, the best of the lot could also replace the SPG. States could make use of the central selection and training facilities for bringing their apparatus at par with the central agency.

As a first step, it may be prudent to put a training infrastructure in place as a feeder organisation for the SG as against creating the DSF or PDG from personnel milked from various organisations. A pool of instructors for the training establishment could be trained in selected foreign countries. The instructors need to be trained to meet our specific requirements and the course content specifically designed to meet our needs and demands. The training would be at two levels; one for the officers and the other for the rest.

Designing and creating the organisation

Two to three selected experts with practical experience and knowledge in the field should be entrusted with the task of designing and creating this organisation. This selected team of consultants could visit training establishments in selected countries and have extensive discussions on the possible course content and organizational models. They may also witness their training, view training facilities, infrastructure, weapons and equipment in use. It would be in the interest of the organisation to exclude personnel from the existing security establishments or police personnel in this mission. This organisation should under no circumstances be allowed to acquire the Police culture or ethos.

Back home, the consultants should be able to contour the organizational structure of these establishments. The infrastructure, training facilities, weapons, equipment and other needs of the organisations would be a logical output. Incidentally, the training establishment need not necessarily be situated in or around Delhi.

The Manpower

Fresh graduates should be recruited on an all-India basis for manning the organisations. Besides others, the criteria would include social adaptability and attitudinal suitability. The initial lot could be put under a selected team of Army instructors for preliminary training preferably at the Infantry school. The syllabus could include physical fitness, marksman training, field craft and minor tactics besides a few academic subjects including law. The emphasis should be on creating the right kind of ethos, culture and soft skills. At the end of the training, based on the instructional capabilities exhibited by the trainees, a team of potential instructors could be sent abroad for specialized training as a prelude to being employed as instructors at the Training Establishment. The balance could be part of the SG.

As for officers, it would be most appropriate to select the required number of officers from the cadets passing out of the Indian Military Academy (IMA) for permanent absorption to SG. Those selected should be allowed to do the Young Officers (YO) course and preferably a six month attachment with an infantry unit. Those found suitable as instructors could be sent abroad for training. This lot would be physically fit, motivated and with basic military training capable of absorbing specialized training abroad.

It may be preferable to have a serving or a retired Lieutenant General to head the organisation with a mandate to develop the right ethos, work culture and attitude in the Force.

Other issues for consideration

While creating such an agency, its specific role as well as division of responsibility between the state police and the SG need clear definition. Directions regarding briefing and assistance by local police and intelligence agencies including at outstations need to be spelt out. Logistic arrangements for out station duties need to be formalized with a one point contact for efficient functioning. The aspect of investigations also need clarity as unlike the US Bureau of Diplomatic Security, our Security agency may not have the wherewithal and resources to carry out investigations. Instructions for the protected should be scripted and communicated to the users for better utilization of the force.

Conclusion

A lot has been said about the politicization, inefficiency and corruption in the ranks of our Police Forces. These issues have affected their public image and ability to discharge duties efficiently. It is time we find a way to cleanse the system. The creation of a SG without any streak of the Police in it would be a step in that direction. A single agency to take care of all the security needs within the country would instil accountability, professionalism and continuity.

By V. Mahalingam in http://idsa.in/idsacomments/CreatingaDiplomaticSecurityForce_vmahalingam_180213

Internal Security- What Election Manifestos of Cong, BJP Promise To Do

With manifestos of both BJP and Congress out in the open, it would be interesting to take stock of where the major parties stand so far as key national issues go. As part of a series of articles on election manifesto, this one would concentrate on the issues of internal security. Incidentally internal security today has become one of the biggest challenges for India.

What Congress Manifesto Says

The Congress Manifesto states, ‘Left Wing Extremism will be dealt with a firm hand. We will strengthen our security forces deployed in LWE affected areas by augmenting equipment, infrastructure and manpower, while also pursuing a development agenda to empower locals.'

Sadly, even when this article was being written, a CRPF Deputy Commandant bled to death in Bihar after getting severely injured in an explosion, conducted by Maoists. For six hours, the CRPF officer did not get any medical help in spite of profusely bleeding and eventually died.

This incident is just one of several such instances which keep on happening day in and day out in the Maoist prone areas. Almost every year over the last one decade, there have been several major instances of ambushes and sabotage leading to death of thousands of civilians and police personnel. This includes the gruesome massacre of 76 CRPF personnel in Chhattisgarh in 2010 and derailing of Gyaneshwari Express by Maoists in Bengal in which more than 150 people had died.

The UPA have for most of the period remained completely clueless as to how to deal with the menace of Maoist. Lack of cohesive national policy on the issue of dealing with Maoist menace has also been a major problem.

The Congress Manifesto likewise, remains silent on the issue of escalation of terror attacks in J&K as well instances of cross border ambushes on Indian outposts by Pakistani Army personnel. It is also silent on how it plans to prevent the recurrence of 26/11 kind of terror attacks.

Further, the manifesto does not mention anything about how it plans to stop the rise of indigenous radical extremist groups including the likes of Indian Mujahideen and SIMI. The issue of too many acquittals in terror related cases, communalising terrorism cases and confusing statements by ministers have not helped the cause of fight against terrorism.

The Reality Check

While Congress promises to augment the equipment and manpower of Central Police Forces deployed in Maoist areas, the shocking fact is that over the last one year or so, there has been drastic reduction in the allocations made to Central Police Forces for purchase of weapons and equipment. Reports state that during the financial year 2013-14, while the Central Police Forces like ITBP, CRPF, CISF, BSF and NSG had sought Rs 2,360 crores from the Home Ministry for purchase of critical equipment, they were actually provided a pittance for the same.

While CRPF had sought Rs 873 crore for purchase of critical equipment, it was provided a mere Rs 20 crore. Likewise, BSF, which had sought Rs 694 crore for purchase of critical weapons, it too got a mere Rs 20 crore. The same is the case with Assam Rifles which had sought Rs 309 crore but got a mere Rs 28 crore. Further, NSG, which plays such a critical role in safeguarding the nation from major terror attacks, had asked for Rs 118 crore for purchase of modern weapons but was allocated a mere Rs 86 lakhs.

Against this backdrop, the Congress pledge to equip India's Central Police Forces with modern weapons, actually is hard to believe. The manifesto also remains silent on what Congress plans to do with the issue of a large number of Central Police Personnel quitting jobs because of pathetic work condition, indifference of senior officers, lack of timely leave and lack of even basic amenities. More than 60,000 Central Police personnel have taken voluntary retirement from Central Police Forces in the last six years.

The Congress manifesto also remains silent on the issue of cross border illegal infiltrations from Bangladesh and how it plans to contain it.

What BJP Manifesto States

The BJP manifesto on the other hand makes promises of reviving ‘the anti-terror mechanism that has been dismantled by the Congress, strengthen the role of NIA and put a system in place for swift and fair trial of terror related cases.' This is a clear indication that BJP, if voted to power would bring into place a POTA (Prevention of Terrorist Acts) kind of strong anti-terror law and change the architecture for speedy trial in terror related cases.

The BJP manifesto also pledges to insulate the intelligence agencies from political interference. This is perhaps one of the most important things that is needed to be done, given the rampant and most blatant misuse of intelligence agencies, especially the Central Intelligence Bureau, has happened in India.

The Ishrat Jahan case has been striking example where CBI and IB came at loggerheads with each other and eventually IB Director Asif Ibrahim even went to extent of stating that charge sheeting IB officers in the Ishrat Jahan case would have severe impact on the morale of IB officers and can severely impact counter-terror operations.

However, how BJP plans to insulate IB from political interference and witch-hunting, would be interesting to see. The best way forward would be to make it a constitutional body though a statutory act of parliament much on the lines of CAG and Election Commission. It would be even better if NIA, NSG, IB and a few other agencies are integrated into one cohesive counter-terror, intelligence gathering and national security agency.

A special mention as also been mentioned in the manifesto for protecting migrant workers as well as for introduction of NCC at universities and strengthen Civil Defence for community defence, civil defence and disaster management. For a country which is so much prone to natural disasters and terrorism, development of community defence and disaster management skills is a much needed programme.

On the issue of Border Management, the BJP manifesto pledges to introduce punitive measures to check illegal migrations, which today has become one of the most critical internal security issues. It also pledges to deal with cross border terrorism with a firm hand.

However, on the issue of addressing grievances of the Central Police Forces, nothing specific has been mentioned in the BJP manifesto as well. Ideally, if BJP comes to power, it has to solve the systemic issues of the Central Police Forces on a war footing without which the war against Maoists and cross border terrorism as well as illegal infiltrations, cannot be fought.

Source: http://news.oneindia.in/feature/internal-security-what-election-manifestos-of-cong-bjp-promise-to-do-lse-1427205.html

National Security Guard: Are we destroying its elitism?

The Times of India reported that the National Security Guard (NSG) has pulled out around 900 of its commandos from VIP guarding duties and sent them for training in counter – terror operations as part of their original charter. The news would have cheered the Indian public on two counts. Firstly, guarding of VIPs by trained commandos is a monumental waste, such tasks being within the ambit of local police forces. Personnel from the NSG are specially selected and trained at great expense for a specialised counter terrorism role and using them for mundane security duties was counter-productive. The second count would pertain to the belief that this step would increase the counter terrorism capability and enhance the security of the environment. The latter hope is however misplaced.

Reinventing a role for the Special Rangers Group

The original charter of NSG visualised an organisation consisting of five major units each with approximately 900 personnel besides other minor units. Of these, two were the strike elements designated as the Special Action Groups (SAG), one for counter terrorism and the other on a counter hijack role. These units are capable of interchanging their roles if the situation so warrants. Both these units were to be manned by handpicked army personnel with on ground soldiering experience from the combat arms of the Army. The other three major units titled the Special Ranger Group (SRG) were to be manned by personnel selected from the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). These units were meant to provide combat support to the SAGs by establishing cordon or a firm base as deemed necessary

.

The hidden aim of inducting the CAPF in the NSG stems from a desire of the bureaucracy and the political class to maintain a balance between the Army and the Police Forces in the elite force. The fabrication of the outfit in the present form was at the cost of the tax payers’ money without any tangible benefit in terms of counter terrorism capability. The absurdity and impracticality of the idea were too overwhelming to be missed or ignored.

NSG is a federal contingency force meant for employment anywhere in the country. Every time an operation is planned, a huge SRG contingent, at least four to five times the strength of the strike elements will be required to be airlifted for establishing the cordon. In certain situations, a cordon may have to precede the surgical strike. Their actions may require police powers and local expertise in terms of knowledge of the area and the local language, all of which the SRGs lack. NSG is dependent on local police for logistic support, follow up investigations, legal actions in terms of filing FIRs, as well as producing witnesses and evidences. The security implications of mobilising such a huge force for a Special Forces operation are manifold. These issues have all along been an impediment in employing SRGs in counter terrorism operations. It is precisely for these reasons, that the assistance of the local Army formation was sought to establish a cordon during the Hazratbal crisis in 1993. They were also not employed during the 26/11 terror strike in Mumbai.

Consequently, at one point in time the SRGs were jobless and the VIP security duties were invented to keep them going as a part of the NSG, a turf requirement. The fact that VIP security duties and Special Forces operations had nothing in common was of no consequence. Now that some of the VIP security duties have been withdrawn, an effort is being made to re-reinvent a role for the SRGs by putting them through the counter terrorism training.

Need for restructuring NSG

NSG’s strength at present is very nearly ten thousand troops with four hubs spread around the country. Two regional centres are also proposed to be raised. Additional squadrons each have already been added to the SAGs and SRGs. Can we equip them with state of the art weapons and equipment? The efforts required to train and maintain the skills of such a large force are colossal.

We still do not appear to have grasped the essence of structuring or employing Special Forces. Strength of these forces does not lie in numbers as the powers that be seem to think. They are not meant to be employed on routine law and order or insurgency situations. It is not meant for neutralising common tactical targets like a militant, a criminal or capture weapons in an insurgency area and that too without any intelligence back up. They are the instruments meant to carry out surgical strike to neutralise or secure strategic objectives and undertake missions of national importance. One of the reasons why this force is losing sight of its raison d'êtrefor creation is its CAPF status as part of the Home Ministry. Their demands for weapons and equipment get diluted when viewed collectively with the other forces. It is time this force is shifted under the Cabinet Secretariat preferably under a body created to coordinate Special Operations.

Hubs and Numerical Strength

Considering the number of operations launched by the NSG since its raising, troops employed in each of them and their time plot, do we really need such a huge force, the hubs and the regional centres? Are they meant to handle both counter hijack and counter terrorist situations? Is it practicable? Will the time gained by positioning the hubs in various parts of the country make any difference in the launching of a major terrorist operation of the type envisaged for Special Forces? Will they improve the counter terrorism capability in the country? Delivering the NSG raising day lecture, MK Narayanan the erstwhile National Security Advisor felt that creating four NSG hubs were redundant and unnecessary.

Time Frame for Launching Special Operations

When a mission is conceived, tremendous amount of effort and time is required to gather process and produce the intelligence inputs needed to launch an operation. Forces require time to study the information, carryout reconnaissance, understand the objective, plan the operation, choose the weapon systems for the envisaged task, carry out rehearsals where necessary, deploy their strike elements and protective elements at selected places and be sure of certain critical issues before carrying out the strike. The strike will always be at a time of their choosing for tactical reasons.  Operations cannot be rushed or pressure brought on the Force to act instantaneously. There are battle procedures and other means available to gain time in situations like the 26/11 which needs to be applied scientifically and diligently. Operation “Neptune Spear” conducted by the DEVGRU of the US SEAL to get Bin Laden took over five years to mature and execute. We can take a few lessons from the operation.

Need for Coordination and Support

However talented a special force may be, it needs the support and the backup of the state government, local police and the intelligence community besides the other security forces and agencies within the country.  All these elements need to be trained alongside to achieve synergy. An apex body like the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) in the US with necessary authority is needed to requisition and coordinate all the necessary efforts. The confusion that prevailed outside the Taj Hotel in Mumbai during Operation Black Tornado cannot be allowed in the future.

Leadership

Another important aspect pertains to the leadership of this Force. While junior leaders will have to have adequate operational experience besides professional training, the head of this organisation will have to have practical on ground experience of leading troops and conducting operations at the formation level. Police officers undoubtedly have very good knowledge of law and order and security issues, but lack practical experience in conducting military operations which an Army Officer especially from the Infantry gain right through their service starting from the platoon level. There can be no compromise on experience in a Special Force.

Conclusion

Special Forces cannot be allowed to multiply or bloat the way CAPF have expanded in our country. Turf issues and aspirations of empire building cannot be allowed to determine their role or the structure. Elitism, superior skills, state of the art weapons and equipment and not numbers will dictate the outcome of their operations. These Forces are of no value if they are not supported by every single organ of the country. That will require the creation of an authority to demand, coordinate and employ such resources.

The strike elements in the NSG are as good as, if not better than some of the world’s best Special Forces. Failure to keep politics out in the matter of structuring, training, employing and providing resources to the elite Special Force will cost the nation very dearly at a crucial moment.

By Brig. V. Mahalingam in www.claws.in

Brig V Mahalingam (Retd) is a Defence Analyst based in New Delhi

Views expressed are personal

IPS Officers vs Army Officers

Some believe that army and IPS cannot be compared. We should not forget the fact that IPS is modeled based on Army. In fact, pre-independence, many Army officers worked as IGs and SPs in provinces and districts. Even today, due to historical reasons, shoulder epaulets of both these services are same.

1. Recruitment:

While IPS officers are recruited along with 15+ other civil services through a common entrance exam, Army officers are recruited through separate Army SSB. It is a sad fact that very few people give first preference to IPS. IAS/IFS and now even IRS, IA&AS etc. are preferred when compared to IPS, which they consider as a dirty job. They have their own reasons for not preferring IPS. Frequent transfers, political pressure, threat to life, irregular working hours, no/less holidays, work-life balance etc. are some reasons commonly quoted. People who apply for Army SSB are sure about joining army, whereas, in IPS around 20 probationers leave during training or within first 2 years of service after clearing civil service exam and getting IAS/IFS/IRS. In army SSB no. of intake is less against the sanctioned seats. Quality of candidates is the commonly cited reason for not filling up the seats, so there are lot of vacancies in Army. Advertisements like "Do you have it in you? An extraordinary life. A life full of adventure, honour and glory. Where you are one among a million, and one in a million" etc. are needed to attract youth into Indian Army. But in IPS all seats get filled, but many children come to SVPNPA to study for their next attempt in civil service exams. Vacancies in IPS are due to attritions during initial probation days. But there are few candidates give IPS as their first preference in CSE due to genuine interest and love for the profession and their countrymen. We should not generalise these issues.

 2. Probation:

Medical tests for joining army are tougher than IPS because IPS is considered a civil service, so most of them get selected. Because of the fact that the children have cleared a tough exam, there is a sympathy among trainers in SVPNPA and the result is that no one will get rejected at the end of IPS probation. But in Army, many unfit probationers get weeded out. Training is almost same for both but is somewhat liberal in IPS when compared to army. IPS officers' training period of 2 years is counted into service as no. of years in experience and they start earning salary from the starting month from their respective states. Where as in Army, a probationer is not confirmed until the end of the training of 1-1.5 years and receives only a stipend. Physically fit and bright IPS probationers do exist, but as I already said, these issues cannot be generalised.

3. Service:

After probation an IPS officer will become an Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) responsible of a subdivision. After 2 years he will automatically become a Superintendent of Police (SP) in charge of a district. After 18 years of service he will become a DIG, then after 5 years he will become an IG and then ADGP and finally DGP. All young IPS probationers are potential DGPs!!! In army an officer's promotion is not time-bound. He should attend interviews, write exams, should have good remarks in Annual Confidential Reports in order to climb the ladder of Lt-Capt.-Maj-Lt.Col-Col.-Brig.-Maj.Gen.-Lt.Gen.-Gen. There are sincere officers in IPS who prove their mettle by doing the given duty to them, but there are stories of IPS officers jockeying to create a new post for them only because of the fact that they have completed a no. of years of service and it’s time for their promotion.

4. Leadership:

Army officers should be in the forefront, leading the men they command. Statistics of war casualties show that many commissioned officers are martyred. There is a general perception that IPS officers are good at sitting in AC room and planning only on papers. This might be true, but there are many officers in IPS (like Dr. NC Asthana, K.Vijay Kumar, C. Sylendra Babu etc. to name a few) who do the dirty job of leading from the front. But in most cases dangerous jobs are left to directly recruited Assistant Commandants or Deputy Superintendents.

5. Reputation:

Army officers have a good image and respect among public when compared to their IPS counterparts. We should understand that Army officers do not get the same respect (that they get in India's heartland) in NE states and J&K, where AFSPA is implemented. We should understand that external aggressors are the main enemy for army, whereas police is acting against internal aggressors (who are their countrymen), so police cannot use the same force as that of the army, while dealing with the crimes. Checking suspicious vehicles/persons/places is a normal preventive work, but this is seen as an infringement of privacy. Normal day-to-day policing work itself damages the image of police. Army man shoots to kill, whereas a Police man shoots only to deter. Even though police has done terrible mistakes here and there, our country is still intact and stable, and the credit for this should be given to police leadership. We should also be proud of our Army for upholding the territorial integrity of our country.

6. Corruption:

In this area also Army wins over IPS. In army, recruitment and procurement/provisioning are the only possible areas where army officers can even think of making some quick buck. Whereas in IPS, all kind of work involves dealing with the public, and officers might be offered bribe right from the first day of joining the duty. Both IPS and army officers, are born and brought up in the same society/environment, but the organisation they join makes the difference. Generalization will surely demoralize the honest officers in both Olive green and Khaki uniforms.

7. Patriotism:

Patriotism, discipline, sacrifice, camaraderie are very good attributes that are present in Indian Army and it is worth emulating these qualities in other organisations too. But there is a general perception among armed forces that they are more patriotic and they love their country a lot than others, because they have joined military and they are ready to do supreme sacrifices in the line of duty. Recently an army officer wrote in an online forum that at least 5 years of military service should be made compulsory for IPS officers (who claim that they also want to serve their country) before taking CSE, because a lot of vacancy exists in armed forces. We should understand that vacancies exist in other organisations also. Engineers, scientists, teachers, lawyers, agriculturists, business men, bankers and even politicians are very important for a nation’s development.

8. Other service trivia:

Use of khaki as police uniforms which are traditionally worn by soldiers, use of same shoulder epaulets, ceremonial batons, georgette patches, head bands, star plates and rank flags in official vehicles by both army officers and IPS officers, giving gallantry awards like ashok chakra, kirti chakra etc. (which are traditionally seen by armed forces as theirs) for police officer , use of the word "jawan", "commando" etc. by media to denote CPMFs, use of similar disruptive pattern camouflage uniforms by CPMFs etc. irks armed forces. But we should understand that colour of uniforms show the uniqueness of the organisation to which a person belongs, uniform should connect a person to tradition and history that his organisation inherits. Similarly, most of the decorations in the Indian Army uniforms are adopted from British system, for instance, crown was replaced by state emblem, and other decorations like crossed sword and baton etc. remained unchanged in shoulder epaulets. IPS (formerly Imperial Police) got branched off from Indian Army they also share the same tradition and history. There should not be any problem in using Camouflage/disruptive pattern uniforms (given the fact there are no copyright restrictions) by CPMFs if the working conditions demands, because they also do the same work as armed forces. Terms like jawan etc. cannot be monopolised. Guarding territorial frontiers is a great service. Income tax and customs/central excise officers guard economic frontiers.

ISRO/DRDO/DAE/CSIR/ICAR/ICMR engineers and scientists provide security to this country by using science as a weapon. Energy security and food security are also equally important. In my opinion each and every profession is equally important. Taking pride in one's work is a good thing, but it should not be at the contempt of other work. No service should be belittled, instead we should analyse the issues and think about possible reforms.

Possible Reforms:

For all the aforementioned issues, IPS officers alone cannot be blamed.As many as eight police reforms commissions have been formed and and these commissions had IPS officers as their members and they tried to address some of the issues that are pestering police leadership. None of the reforms were fully implemented. Police being a state subject, we can't expect anything other than this. Central govt. too failed to comply with some of the Supreme Court judgements regarding police reforms.

 I'll list here some of the reforms. While some are my own ideas, others are taken from the internet and Police reforms commission reports.

(i) Separate exams for IPS:

IPS cannot be claimed as a pure civil service. IPS officers have to work in quasi-military settings in CPMFs. Indian Forest Service (IFoS) is doing a good job by having a separate exam for their recruitment. By keeping separate exams, only interested candidates will apply, and this will also to some extent end the problem of flocking of 20+ IPS probationers into various other civil services every year. Recruitment can also be modelled based on Army SSB (a judicious mix of written exams, interviews and physical exams) without diluting the toughness/quality of exams. Sympathy of trainers towards the probationers will also reduce to a great extent. Rejections every year at the end of probation will reduce the complacency effect.

This issue of separate exams was taken up by few IPS officers a few years back, but it was vehemently opposed by retired and senior IPS officers. They are of opinion that this move will reduce the status of IPS over IAS. It is a well-known fact that a turf war is going on b/w IAS and IPS. In no way this move will reduce the status of IPS.

(ii) Merit based promotions:

Right from 1997, almost all police reforms commissions talk about this. These commissions had IPS officers as members and even senior and retired IPS officers are batting for this reform. According to this, at each stage of promotion, if an IPS officer completes certain no. of years of service, he should be sent again to SVPNPA, where he/she will take a course. At the end of the course, written examinations, interviews, physical tests will be conducted and performance of the officers in their states/organisations and annual confidential reports will be reviewed and promotions are given according to the merit. There are also incentives for officers who clear the course in first attempt. For repeated attempts officers will have to pay from their own pocket. There is also a provision that, if an officer fails in 3 consecutive tests, he should be compulsorily retired from the service. Who should be blamed for not implementing this?

(iii) Reforms in Central Deputation:

IPS officers in SP rank are allowed to go to Central organisations like SVPNPA, NEPA, BPR&D, NICFS, CBI, IB, NCRB, DPWC etc. whereas officers of and above DIG rank are allowed to go to CPMFs like BSF, ITBP, CRPF, CISF, AR, SSB, NSG and other organisations like NCB, DRI etc. There is a growing concern among cadre officers of CPMFs that an "outsider" is coming to command them, and also there is a general perception among cadre officers of CPMFs that these IPS officers come to central deputation for having good time and to take rest after tense and busy law and order work in their parent cadre. In my opinion, physically and mentally fit IPS officers in SP rank should also be sent to CPMFs like BSF, ITBP, CRPF, CISF, AR, SSB, NSG as assistant/deputy/joint commandants after some stringent physical and psychological tests. The skills that the IPS officers acquire in these organisations will not only be of great help to them for the rest of their career but will also help in capacity building of the state cadre to which they belong.

Source:http://indiandefence.com/threads/ips-officers-vs-army-officers

With growing homeland security concerns, MHA procurements have become crucial

The growing concerns for the homeland security in the recent times not only foresee the challenges that the country is about to face, but also encourages the government to increase the resources manifold in this sector. The demand for modernisation of the police forces and the security equipment has gone up dramatically in the recent times, especially after the terror attacks in Mumbai and New Delhi. 

Some journals estimate the investments into the private security industry to be around USD 12.3 billion while the total estimate that country is planning to spend stands close to USD 30 billion by the year 2016. The major segment of this investment, however, is set to flow into the modernisation of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) and a part of it flows to the state polices organisations. Various other sectors like airport security, surveillance projects, integrated security systems etc are also rapidly increasing their footprints in the Indian homeland security matrix.

The ministry of home affairs is now planning to buy and wet-lease helicopters to assist its forces as the entire fleet of Dhruv helicopters has been grounded after several mishaps. “We have authorised wet leasing of helicopters. We are also looking to buy some helicopters. This is a long-term project for which money must be made available”, home minister Chidambaram said while presenting the monthly report card in February. Mi-17 helicopters of the Indian Air Force will help the paramilitary and the police forces till the alternative arrangements are made. The new helicopters will be mainly utilised for the anti-Maoist operations, in addition to some non-combatant functions like transporting essential goods, transporting injured personnel, etc. 

Funds amounting to Rs 397.42 crore were sanctioned for the purchase of arms and ammunition and equipment for the CAPFs, states the MHA monthly report. Ammunition and the equipment include hand-held laser range finder, different types of vehicles, SUV mounted communication jammer, Passive Night Vision (PSV) weapon sight etc. The report also allocates funds to procure high-end equipment for the comfort of the policemen such as the jungle shoes, helmets, and the uniforms that suits the operations in extreme weather. 

Recent sanctions by the MHA for the force modernisation, proves the fact that the ministry is indeed very focussed on the internal security concerns. Sanction amounting to Rs 61,98 crore has been given to BSF for procurement of 16,791 Digital VHF/UHF handheld radio sets. Besides, sanction amounting to Rs 2,35 crore was accorded to NSG for 30 km tactical optical fiber cable with terminal equipment. Also, sanction worth Rs 5,12 crore was accorded to ITBP for 22 high altitude shelters and Rs 20,67 crore was also accorded to ITBP for implementation of wide area network (WAN). Sanction was given for creation of 468 posts for the Integrated Intelligence Wing in CRPF. 

Procurement Variables
In the current scenario, the requirement for the modern equipment is huge — ranging from the surveillance equipment for the border guarding roles, to the internal security operations in the most difficult terrains. There is a requirement also for the UAV for some aerial surveillance operations. 

The procurement process for the different central police organisations are need based, and varies depending on the size of the contract. Generally, it is done through the ‘rate contracts’ of the DGS&D (Directorate general supplies and disposal) or the direct tenders by the respective forces if it is under the financial competency of the concerned DG of the CPMF.

Prior to December 2006, procurement of all items which were beyond the financial competency of the concerned DG was done centrally by MHA procurement wing based on the requirement projected by the concerned CPMFs. But after 2006, one of the Central Para Military Force (CPMF) has being made nodal agency by MHA which will initiate the action for the procurement of the items listed under them.

For example, the nodal agency for the procurement of weaponry is NSG. CRPF is the nodal agency for the communication equipment and BSF is for the surveillance equipment. Instances like the procurement of the vehicles etc, where the requirement is common to all the CPMFs, the MHA could make one of the force as the nodal agency (generally the force with the largest user of that vehicle or the force with the maximum requirement) and initiate the procurement process through it.

Nodal agencies will make the QRs (Qualitative Requirements)/ specifications of the security related items that are to be procured as per the MHA directives. These QRs made by the nodal agencies are discussed in the standing technical evaluation committee meetings comprising of different technical experts and invariably headed by a senior ranking officer of CPMFs. One member of the BPR&D/ DRDO is also associated to incorporate their technical opinion. The final draft of the QR is then sent to the MHA for the final approval. MHA then vets/ approves the QRs.

During the procurement process, if ballistic or any other trial (such as in the case of BP vehicles/jackets etc) of the subject item is required, then MHA/respective CPMFs may obtain the views of BPR&D/CFSL to sort-out any kind of confusion relating to the trial procedure. The indenting CPMFs may also request the association of technical representatives of BPR&D/CFSL.

By Dilip Kumar Mekala in forceindia.net

Central Armed Police Forces At A Glance

ASSAM RIFLES (AR)

Assam Rifles, India’s oldest paramilitary force of 46 battalions currently, officered by Army and some its cadre officers, though commanded only by Army officers, is under administrative control of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), but under operational control of Army for performing many roles including internal security counter insurgency and border security, aid to the civil power in times of emergency, and the provision of communications, medical assistance and education in remote areas. Since 2002 it has been guarding the India-Myanmar border under the government policy of “one border, one force”.

With Assam Rifles being under operational command of the Army, almost all its arms and equipment are on the lines of those of infantry battalions in plains and mountainous areas. In view of the mountain strike corps to be raised to counter the rising Chinese threat, there may be some more battalions added to its existing strength.

BORDER SECURITY FORCE (BSF)

The Border Security Force came into existence on 01 Dec 1965, under K F Rustamji, its first chief and founding father, with the aim of promoting a sense of security among the people living in border areas, preventing trans-border crimes, unauthorised entry into or exit from the territory of India and to prevent smuggling and any other illegal activity. Subsequently, BSF additionally began to be deployed for counter insurgency and internal security duties. Having participated in the Indo-Pak war of 1971, it has been involved  in fighting insurgency and militancy in Punjab, J & K and North- East, rescue and relief during calamities and since recently, also been deployed in the areas affected by Left Wing Extremism.

BSF has been defending the borders along with the Army and checking infiltration on the borders during the current standoff with Pakistan. From a force of 25 battalions in 1965, it has today 173 Battalions. With its own Air and Water Wings, Artillery Regiments and Training Institutes, BSF is presently the largest Border Guards force of the world.

In addition to the OFB small arms mentioned, BSF has Heckler & Koch MP5, A3 9mmx19 mm Sub Machine Gun and Beretta MX4 Storm submachine guns. To replace its camels in the Thar desert, BSF reportedly conducted trials of Polaris (USA) field vehicle Ranger 800, Ranger RZR 4-800, Ranger RZW SW and sportsman models in May 2013 and found it better than the Chinese Nebula and Indian Maini Group’s products tested earlier.

INDO-TIBETAN BORDER POLICE (ITBP)

Conceived in October 1962 – quite obviously as a result of the Chinese aggression – the Indo -Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) was raised for security along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China. Beginning with four battalions, it now has 57 battalions of 1000 personnel each deployed in all three segments of the LAC from Karakoram Pass in Ladakh till Jachep La in Arunachal Pradesh opposite the Tibet Autonomous Region of China. In view of the additional responsibilities and the task redefined in 1976, the Force was restructured in 1978. It is a specialized mountain force with most of its personnel professionally trained as mountaineers and skiers.

Owing to the very challenging terrain, temperature and weather conditions, under modernisation ITBP needs better sleeping bags, better snow boots, snow scooters, battlefield surveillance radars, satellite-based surveillance systems, real time imagery systems, cameras mounted on towers overlooking heights and ridges, windmills, which the high velocity winds can move to generate electricity and more infrastructure. One weapon ITBP has acquired apart from the OFB list is the UTG Gen 5 Accushot Competition Master Model 700 Pro with Upgraded Bolt FPS-450 Spring Airsoft Sniper Rifle, and US-made UTG brand product.

SASHASTRA SEEMA BAL (SSB)

Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) was raised in early 1963 with the aim of inculcating feelings of national belonging in people living in the border areas like then North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), North Assam, North Bengal, Uttar Pradesh hills, Himachal Pradesh, and Ladakh. The scheme was later extended to Manipur, Tripura, Jammu (1965), Meghalaya (1975), Sikkim (1976), border areas of Rajasthan and Gujarat (1989), Manipur, Mizoram. Some more areas of Rajasthan and Gujarat (1988), South Bengal, Nagaland (1989) and Nubra Valley, Rajouri and Poonch district of Jammu and Kashmir (1991) were added too.  The modus was developing their capabilities for resistance through a continuous process of motivation, training, development, welfare programmes and activities. Following the recommendations of the Group of Ministers on reforming the National Security System, the SSB was declared as a border guarding force and lead intelligence agency for Indo-Nepal border (January, 2001) and Indo-Bhutan border (March, 2004).

Addressing one of the main concerns of the SSB for providing authorised infrastructure, in July 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) approved construction of infrastructure, namely office buildings, residential buildings and Border Out Posts (BOPs), at various establishments of the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) during the 12th Five Year Plan at the cost of Rs. 3,510.07 crore. This includes construction of barracks and non-residential buildings. In addition, the CCEA also approved construction of 2,000 houses and 10 barracks at 12 sites at an estimated cost of Rs. 413.88 crore.

CENTRAL RESERVE POLICE FORCE (CRPF)

The Central Reserve Police Force, which came into existence as Crown Representative’s Police on 27th July 1939, became the Central Reserve Police Force by enactment of the CRPF Act on 28th December 1949. The Force has grown into a big organization with 207 battalions (bns), including 181 executive bns, 2 Mahila (Women) bns, 10 Rapid Action Force (RAF) bns, 6 Cobra bns (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action-special battalions raised mainly for anti-Maoist operations), 2 DM (NDRF) bns, 5 Signal bns and 1 Special Duty Group bn, 37 Group Centres,   11 Training Institutions and 4 composite 100 bed and 17 composite 50 bed hospitals.

CRPF has sent a proposal to MHA for integral helicopters, better quality of anti-landmine vehicles and more unmanned aerial vehicles.

CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE (CISF)

The CISF raised in 1969 with three battalions, to provide integrated security cover to the Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) over  four decades, has grown to reach 1,12,000 personnel, amounting to at least 110 battalions. No longer a PSU-centric organisation, the CISF has become a premier multi-skilled security agency, mandated to provide security to major critical infrastructure installations of the country in diverse areas. CISF is currently providing security cover to nuclear installations, space establishments, airports, seaports, power plants, sensitive Government buildings and even heritage monuments. Among important responsibilities entrusted to the CISF in recent years are the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (for which 4000 more personnel have been recently authorised), VIP Security, Disaster Management and establishment of a Formed Police Unit (FPU) of the UN at Haiti.

With diverse challenges, CISF needs a far wider inventory of equipment as per its tasks mentioned. Delhi airports’ Perimeter Intrusion Detection System has been installed by Israel. The CISF also needs more and improved night vision devices and a separate firefighting wing to better fire- protect 88 PSUs it guards.

NATIONAL SECURITY GUARD (NSG)

The National Security Guard (NSG) was set up in 1984 as a Federal Contingency Deployment Force to tackle all facets of terrorism in the country. Thus the primary role of this Force is to combat terrorism in whatever form it may assume in areas where activity of terrorists assumes serious proportions, and the State Police and other Central Police Forces cannot cope up with the situation. The NSG is a Force specially equipped and trained to deal with specific situations and is therefore, to be used only in exceptional situations. The Force is not designed to undertake the functions of the State Police Forces or other Para Military Forces of the Union of India.

The NSG was modelled on the pattern of the SAS of the UK and GSG-9 of Germany. It is a task-oriented Force and has two complementary elements in the form of the Special Action Group (SAG) comprising Army personnel and the Special Ranger Groups (SRG), comprising personnel drawn from the Central Para Military Forces / State Police Force. All the personnel are on deputation.

Paramilitary forces are now getting state-of-the-art weapons superior to INSAS and AK series

India’s Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) usually follow the choice of weapon selected by the Indian Army, though this has changed recently with sophisticated and high-tech small arms weapons systems purchased by different organisations. With the INSAS rifles not meeting expectations, paramilitary and police forces have begun importing high-end weapons even before the army has procured them. This has resulted in fragmented purchases of expensive state-of-the-art weapons, which not only require extensive retraining of personnel for their effective usage but are also required to be stored carefully. The National Security Guard (NSG), which is the nodal agency for the procurement of weapons among the CAPFs, has now started acquiring various guns that fit the requirements of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF) and Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP). 

According to director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), Maj. Gen. Dhruv Katoch (retd), “Equipping of a force is an expensive proposition. Ideally, at any one time, over a 30-year cycle, one-third of the inventory needs to be of the latest variety, one-third should be current and one-third should be under process of phasing out. It would not be possible to equip our police forces such as BSF, CRPF and the state armed police with the latest weapons till such time as the field army are equipped first.” He further emphasises, “It must be understood that the CRPF and BSF are police forces and not paramilitary. The Assam Rifles on the other hand is a paramilitary force, which must be equipped after the army’s requirement has been met. Generally, police forces should be equipped with the weapons, which the field army sheds in the process of modernisation. They will, thus, have the same weapons as the major portion of the army as only one-third of the army will have the latest weapons in the manufacturing cycle.” 

The induction of substantial numbers of state-of-the-art weapons by the paramilitary forces brings with it the attendant challenges of training and maintenance. The new small arms being inducted are technologically far superior to the INSAS and AK series, and to make the best of these expensive weapons, time and effort needs to be invested in training the force. This is confirmed by Maj. Gen. Dhruv Katoch (retd), who says, “There is no shortcut to training. Police forces must have basic training in weapon use to include firing of weapons at regular intervals. Assam Rifles has no problem on this count as they are trained on the lines of the Indian Army. Police must develop appropriate leadership to rectify weaknesses in training. As of now, they are managers and not leaders of men. Police academies need to stress weapon training more rigorously. Simulators need to be used to good effect.” 

By Atul Chandra and Dilip Kumar Mekala in Force India

RTI Act: How much did you know about the most important act in recent times?

Right To Information or the more commonly used term RTI, we have all heard it from either our Civics textbooks or more recently from a famous prime ministerial candidate. We all understand that we have a basic right to information, but how much do we know about the RTI Act and its actual process? Did you know that RTI is not applicable for Jammu and Kashmir? In the recent episode of Satyamev Jayate, Kings Every Day, Aamir Khan shed some light on the basics of this act with the help of Mr. Shankar Singh, former member of Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan. Here are five things you need to know about RTI!

1. What is RTI

As the name suggests, it is right to information. This was introduced in the parliament to provide a practical regime of the right to information (one of our fundamental rights). Under this act we can question every act of a public authority, central or state government, etc. any information about the government deeds in a certain area can be attained by simply filling out a form.

2. How do we use it?

All you need for filing an RTI is a Rs. 10 court fee stamp, an identity proof (pan card/ passport/ration card/ driver’s license) and of course a typed or written paper. The main aim of this letter is to keep it short and simple. You can ask for any documents you wish to verify or investigate, from the profits or costing of government projects to the nuisance records against any particular government institution.

3. Charges

The basic charges of filing a RTI is Rs 10 for the court fee stamp. Additional fee differ from state to state. The costing of photocopies, providing CDs, etc. of the requested documents will be charged accordingly.

4. Timely Supply

According to the act the information should be provided within 30 days with the exception of certain special circumstances. If the information concerns the life or liberty of a person, it should be provided within 48 hours. If the information is not provided within the timeline, it is then to be given free of charge.

5. Exclusions

While the RTI applies to most of our states and all our union territories, there are certain data which has been excluded for various reasons. The RTI act is not available for Jammu and Kashmir. Central Intelligence and Security agencies specified in the Second Schedule like IB, Directorate General of Income tax(Investigation), RAW, Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, Directorate of Enforcement, Narcotics Control Bureau, Aviation Research Centre, Special Frontier Force, BSF, CRPF, ITBP, CISF, NSG, Assam Rifles, Special Service Bureau, Special Branch (CID), Andaman and Nicobar, The Crime Branch-CID-CB, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Special Branch, Lakshadweep Police. Agencies specified by the State Governments through a Notification will also be excluded. Also, Students cannot attain their exam answer sheets for personal evaluation under this act.