The pattern of India’s internal security challenges has
undergone a significant makeover in recent years. Chronic conflicts have either
subsided or have hit a low patch and new conflict areas have emerged,
necessitating a rationalisation in the way the Government deploys its security
forces. But it would appear that our security policy-makers are stuck in time,
steadfastly refusing to respond to the unfolding conflict dynamics. This
explains, in a way, why the country, with a bourgeoning security force
establishment, still struggles to find adequate forces to fight its internal
wars.
There is a clear shift of violence from the age-old conflict
theatres in Kashmir and the north-east, to the states affected by Left-wing
extremism. Deployment of reshuffling of force Central Armed Police Forces or CAPFs (previously
called Central para-military forces) has gone up from 37 to 81 battalions in
the Maoist theatres. It is a substantial increase, yet remains insufficient. It
is unlikely that even with a war time raising of CAPF battalions, the Centre
will be able to meet the unending demands from the states. This calls for a
fresh approach on the deployment of forces.
Not many would agree that the current Indo-Pakistan peace
talks would ever reach a situation as to allow New Delhi to pull out some of
its troops from Kashmir. Hypothetically speaking, such an eventuality would
come as a boon for the force-starved Maoist theatres. Kashmir today engages
close to 80 battalions of Central police forces and 65 battalions of Rashtriya
Rifles (RR) of the Indian Army. 50 per cent of the RR is sourced from the
army’s infantry wing and the rest from other units, making it almost an ideal
force against the Maoists.
Opposition from the Indian Army and the counter-terrorism
experts notwithstanding, army’s role in dealing with Left-wing extremism has
grown over the years. According to a recent white paper prepared by the Indian
Army, 65,000 of its personnel would be required if it is to be involved against
the Maoists. It is even willing to consider the relocation of the RR battalions
for the purpose. This, however, is conditioned by sufficient progress in the
Indo-Pak peace process and a total halt to the cross-border infiltration and
militancy. Not many would see this happening in the near future, even when the
Pakistan state is undergoing a life-threatening crisis.
From where a realistic relocation of forces is possible, is
the north-east. Although this restive region of the country has not exactly
become a peace den, over the past years insurgency movements have constantly
lost their wherewithal, popular appeal and hence, have struggled to survive.
Cooperation from Bangladesh has forced the once powerful Assam-based Ulfa to
start a process of dialogue with the government. Even in Manipur, where
insurgency movements appeared almost intractable a few years back, over a dozen
outfits are under Suspension of Operations agreement with the government. The
most lethal UNLF has suffered a serious blow in the form of the arrest of its
top leader R K Meghen. Since 2008, the entire north-eastern region has seen a
gradual but consistent improvement in the security situation, demonstrated in
the declining capacity of the militant formations. Compared to over 1,000
fatalities recorded in 2008, insurgency related deaths fell to 322 in 2010 and
further to 177 in the first eight months of 2011.
If rising violence was the raison d’etre for induction of
Central forces into the north-east, it is necessary that the drop in violence
allows their return from the area. It not only helps remove the tag of ‘militarisation
of the north-east’, allowing the state police forces to take a lead role in dealing with the remnants of
insurgency, but also makes those withdrawn forces, at least the CAPFs,
available for the Maoist-affected areas. There is no reason why a state like
Manipur should continue to consume over 45 to 50 battalions of the army and the
CAPFs, when it records barely 10 deaths per month for the past two years.
Civilian life in Manipur continues to be affected by recurrent political
blockades, but these are not exactly the problems that Central forces should be
dealing with. Home Minister P Chidambaram’s recent justification that a large
presence of security forces in the north-eastern states is “a necessity to deal
with the threat of violence and the cases of extortion” isn't a really a valid
rationale.
The reality of conflict transformation needs to figure
prominently in MHA’s policies as far as force deployment is concerned and
stubbornness not to accept it is not going to help.
By Bibhu Prasad Routray in www.claws.in
