CISF prepares to become NSG substitute for VIP security

In an apparent indication of the thinking within the ministry of home affairs (MHA) that VIP security should be gradually moved away from NSG, the country's elite counterterror force, CISF is strengthening its VIP protection unit to become the premier agency in the sector in near future. There are already efforts being made to increase manpower in the unit with MHA considering a proposal for the same.

CISF DG Arvind Ranjan said he has asked MHA to sanction more number of personnel in the unit. At the same time, rigorous training is being provided to personnel in the unit with help from NSG and armed forces trainers. CISF is regularly holding joint exercises with NSG to adopt best practices in VIP security from the force.

Ranjan said, "We are aiming to make CISF the best force for VIP security. We want to create a sense of security in the minds of VIPs so that they have no hesitation taking CISF security."

 Importantly, VIPs are known to demand NSG security, also known as Black Cat commandoes, as VIP cover as it is the best trained force in the country. However, NSG was not created for VIP security but to counter terror attacks. There have been various voices raised from within the force and the security establishment that NSG must be divested of VIP security duties and focus on its core competence.

Incidentally, Ranjan headed NSG before he was made CISF chief. Speaking to TOI, he said, "We have also asked for a periodic review of strength in our VIP security unit so that the force has optimum strength at any given to provide VIP security."

Sources said the force was also being given unarmed combat training so that when VIPs interact with public and there is sudden unarmed attack, the VIP can be protected without the use of weapons. "Not all times you need to use weapons. Certain situations are best diffused with bare hands," said an officer with the force.

Source: http://defence.pk/threads/cisf-prepares-to-become-nsg-substitute-for-vip-security.319272/

Defence ministry allows BSF to guard India-Myanmar border, but with rider

NEW DELHI: The defence ministry (MoD) may have finally agreed to the long-standing demand of the home ministry (MHA) to hand over the India-Myanmar border to the BSF but has made it clear the Army will retain operational control over the Assam Rifles.

The long-running bitter turf war over whether the Assam Rifles or BSF should guard the 1,643km thickly-forested border with Myanmar — infested with insurgents, smugglers, drug traffickers and the like — even went up to the Cabinet committee on security but could not be "fully resolved" with a "practical" solution till now.

But the MoD has now given the green signal for BSF to replace the Assam Rifles - which administratively comes under MHA as a central paramilitary force but is under the Army's operational control — in guarding the border if the MHA so wants it.

"The MoD, however, held there is no question of turning the Assam Rifles into a border-guarding force. It has a clear-cut role in the overall Army plan against China in the eastern sector, which cannot be diluted," said an official.

BSF will, of course, not find it easy to take over the "border management" with Myanmar, both in terms of manpower and infrastructure. "Huge funds will be required for fencing, border outposts, roads, tracks and helipads as well as the raising of 41 new BSF battalions," said another official.

But the MHA contends the Assam Rifles, with its deployment pattern of operating from bases away from the border, has proved ineffective in making the region secure against infiltration attempts by insurgent outfits like NSCN, PLA, UNLF, PREPAK and the like.

Conversely, the MoD-Army combine felt the Assam Rifles, with 30% of its troops from the North-East and largely officered by the Army, was specially geared for the task of both border management as well as counter-insurgency in the region. While 15 of its battalions are currently deployed along the border, the other 31 are engaged in anti-militancy operations in the hinterland.

Turf battles and lack of synergy among different forces have long been the problem along Indian borders, especially the long unresolved ones with Pakistan and China. The Army, for instance, has for long been demanding operational control over the ITBP, another of the seven central police forces under the MHA, for better management of the Line of Actual Control with China in eastern Ladakh, as reported by TOI earlier.

Incidentally, both the Border Management Task Force and the high-powered Group of Ministers' report on "reforming the national security system" after the 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan had stressed the "One Border-One Force" principle. "Multiplicity of forces on the same borders has inevitably led to the lack of accountability as well as problems of command and control," held the GoM report.

Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Defence-ministry-allows-BSF-to-guard-India-Myanmar-border-but-with-rider/articleshow/34944260.cms

Intel wing for the CRPF: Not the Right Move

“In today's changed circumstances, CRPF needs to have its own intelligence wing.”

“We are in the process of forming an intelligence wing. The work is going on.”

Unless stated otherwise, the above two innocuous statements would appear to be parts of the same speech. However, while the first is a quote from a December 2005 media interview by Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)’s the then Director General (DG) J K Sinha, the second is an extract from the organisation’s DG K Vijay Kumar’ statement in April 2011. CRPF DGs apart from Mr. Sinha and Mr. Kumar, each of them, during their tenure, making similar statements regarding the ‘necessity’ of and ‘progress’ towards achieving the goal of setting up a ‘home-grown’ intelligence wing. However, such protracted yearning notwithstanding, the formation of such a wing is unlikely to augment the CRPF capacities in any significant manner, will merely add to the multiple agencies that roughly do similar work and more importantly, militate against the spirit of an efficient national security architecture.

Even prior to being designated as the country’s lead counter-insurgency (COIN) force, following the 1998 Kargil war, the CRPF, India’s largest Central Armed Police Force (CAPF), performed COIN duties in Jammu & Kashmir and the Northeast. The intensification of left-wing extremism, which took CRPF’s 60 battalions to unknown territories, positioned them against barely identifiable enemies and called for a drastic modification in its war fighting approach, made the task even harder. CRPF were soon to discover that the flow and quality of ground level intelligence provided by the existing agencies are clearly short of its operational requirements.

This assessment prodded the CRPF to make the first ever proposal to the MHA for an internal intelligence wing in 2005. The then Home Minister Shivraj Patil’s approval notwithstanding, the Finance Ministry shut down the proposal citing financial crunch. It further questioned the rationale of such an effort when each of the states of the country has its own intelligence wing. The CRPF, however, went on to select about 10 personnel from each of its battalions to gather intelligence locally. This wing, without official designation, consisted of about 1250 personnel. Speaking in September 2006, the then DG J K Sinha even hinted that the wing will be made operational the same month. Fresh opposition kicked in and the plan never took off.

However, the CRPF did not dismantle its unofficial intelligence wing and continued to deploy these personnel in conflict theatres. At least on one reported occasion, two such CRPF personnel gathering ground level intelligence were killed by the militants in Kashmir in May 2008. The existing wing appeared to have undergone a minor expansion in the following years. According to an August 2010 media report the CRPF further trained 30-40 of its men for eight months in intensive intelligence gathering and deployed them in the Naxal-hit areas and other theatres of operation.

The ongoing demand for an intelligence wing by the CRPF, thus, amounts to institutionalising and expanding the existing wing within the organisation. An official recognition would translate into dedicated money and resources for the existing motley wing, in addition to and not a subtraction from the CRPF’s annual budget (2010-11) of Rs. 7827.32 crore.    

   

At one level, it is difficult to disagree with the CRPF’s assessment of the ground level intelligence gathering institutions, especially in the Naxal hit states. The expansion of the Naxal influence in India rides heavily on a highly successful effort on part of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) to disrupt the existing intelligence gathering set up. Not just that an enveloping atmosphere of fear has drastically confined the police personnel to the relative safety of the police stations and limited their intelligence gathering capacities, the Maoist systematic campaign against the ‘police informers’ has further discouraged the voluntary submission of information by previously willing civilian population. Of the 190 civilians killed by the Naxals this year (till 14 June), 72 were branded as police informers. Such killings, mostly following a process in conviction in Kangaroo courts, is a mere continuation of the trend, which saw the death of 211 and 323 such ‘police informers’ in 2009 and 2010 respectively. In addition, the CPI-Maoist continues to destroy telephone exchanges and towers disrupting security force communication. As a result, intelligence flow from the ground to the security forces has either become non-existent, or at best, sketchy and unreliable.

Of late, fatalities among the CRPF personnel have risen steadily. The organisation lost 67 personnel in 2008 and 70 personnel in 2009 during its country-wide deployments. The figure almost skyrocketed in 2010, when over 150 of its personnel got killed in the Naxal theatres alone. The ill-informed media narratives notwithstanding, not all killed personnel could have been saved with good intelligence.

The pressure to limit the body bags has mounted on the CRPF authorities and in turn, it is ending up in accentuating its yearning for an exclusive intelligence wing. The spats certain CRPF officials have had with state police officials in Chhattisgarh over availability (or the lack of it) of precise intelligence inputs, has further pushed the organisation to be self-reliant in matters of collecting ground level intelligence.

However, setting up this new wing may not be a solution at all to the organisation’s woes.

Firstly, it is difficult to understand how exactly the new wing will create a new set or subset of data and information, which is qualitatively better than those generated by the existing agencies. Although the senior CRPF officials locate their failure thus far to set up the intelligence wing in the objections raised by the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is described to be antagonistic to its creation, one is not sure if the CRPF’s Intel wing, with its limited manpower and resources, will be able to compete with the IB at all.  

Secondly, the new wing, like any other intelligence gathering agencies, cannot be for the exclusive use of the CRPF and the organisation will have to share the data and information it generates with others. As a result, it will merely end up in being a parallel entity- the third agency in most states where the IB and the Police collect intelligence, fourth agency in some where the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) too is present and the fifth agency in few of the rest where the Military Intelligence (MI) too operates. The ongoing task of establishing synergy among the different agencies and facilitating seamless integration of intelligence, under the evolving counter-terrorism architecture, will certainly not get any easier by adding one more entity to the already crowded scene.

Thirdly, going by the logic of making the security agencies self-reliant, the IB and the RAW should have their armed wings, the National Security Guard (NSG) commandos should have their intelligence wing and perhaps the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) also should seek an armed wing for itself. The problem of augmenting the quality of intelligence generated and ensuring their flow to the forces who need them can be achieved by investing more on infrastructure generating technical intelligence (TECHINT) and also the Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Towards that direction, the IB’s budget needs to be raised and the huge vacancies in its field level personnel needs to be filled up rather than allocating fresh resources for the CRPF’s proposed intelligence wing.

Fourthly, answer to operational woes in the conflict theatres including the states affected by Naxal activities is police modernisation, of which improving intelligence gathering is a critical component. The COIN mechanism centred on grand war designs promotes a culture of centralisation at the cost of weakening the police stations and making them irrelevant. This trend needs to be reversed. Policies to revive policing and intelligence gathering need to factor in the critical need of improving the quality of police personnel at the lowest level of the system.

In short, remedy to the problem of inadequately performing institutions cannot be creation of new institutions, but enabling the existing organisations to perform.

By Bibhu Prasad Routray in www.claws.in

PARAMILITARY CHIEFS SEEK TO BREAK MHA BONDS

With “weak” leadership at the helm of affairs, the Director Generals of paramilitary forces, all from the Indian Police Service, have sought to unshackle themselves from the Union Home Ministry.

In a sign of a brewing revolt, the DGs complained that the mechanism of reviewing the functioning of paramilitary forces by the Home Secretary was “not working properly” and decided to seek a meeting with him to discuss new and pending issues. Technically, the Ministry Of Home Affairs (MHA) is not only the administrative Ministry of the paramilitary forces but also the cadre- controlling authority for IPS officers.

According to the minutes of a recently-held meeting of the DGs of the forces at the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) Directorate here, the paramilitary bosses have objected to the standard operating procedure (SOP) of MHA that stipulates attachment of personnel by the Ministry. Arguing for a review of the SOP, the DGs agreed that they “should not be routinely asked by the MHA to submit the number of personnel attached etc, as the DGs and the Supreme Commander of the Force are well aware of the requirement of the Force.” According to Constitutional provisions, the President of India is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Union.

“The responsibility of equipping the force within the sanctioned budget should be that of the DG and “no unnecessary approvals, like in case of modernisation plan, may be taken from the MHA. The DG should have total powers to utilise the allocated budget without extraneous requirement of approvals and sanctions,” says one of the agenda points discussed at the meeting and agreed by top paramilitary brass.

The meeting was chaired by ITBP DG Subhash Goswami and attended by the chief of Sashastra Seema Bal Arun Chaudhary and Arvind Ranjan who once headed the elite National Security Guards and is the chief of the Central Industrial Security Force now.  

The DGs also contended that the modernisation plan of the paramilitary forces was “not taking off the way it should, for want of finalisation of qualitative requirements by the MHA and lack of understanding of the requirements of the Force.” The chiefs have sought appointment of an IPS officer (as against the present IAS official) as Joint Secretary (Police Modernisation) in the Union Home Ministry.

The paramilitary bosses have also resolved to raise the issue of postings and transfers of specialist doctors with post-graduate qualifications at the Composite Hospitals by the Union Home Ministry. The DG of ITBP has already sent a DO letter to the Union Home Secretary seeking review of the Ministry’s order (dated December 7, 2011) claiming posting and transfer of specialist doctors by the MHA “would lead to depriving personnel in far flung areas of specialist treatment, dilution of command and unnecessary strengthening of Composite Hospitals at locations where superior medical assistance is already available.” The Ministry subsequently turned down the request.

The forces are now collecting information relating to mobility/organisation, personnel, provisioning/police modernisation/medical, Welfare and Rehabilitation Board (WARB), welfare and morale of the troops for collation before taking these issues up with the Union Home Secretary. The IPS officials at the top, however, did not deliberate on pressing concerns of the paramilitary forces, including significant attrition of the officers and men on account of premature retirement due to spiraling number of cases relating to voluntary retirement and resignations, a senior paramilitary official said.

The cadre officials are also enraged over the proposal for creation of the post of Joint Secretary (Police Modernisation) to be headed by an IPS officer and not an Inspector-General rank officer. Serving cadre officers of three paramilitary forces have already petitioned the Delhi High Court seeking grant of “organized service” status and non-functional financial upgradation, lack of which is considered to be the key reasons for wastage of trained personnel.

A senior paramilitary official who did not wish to be identified said it is high time the aggrandizing aspirations of IPS officials were suitably curtailed and appointment of cadre officials as DGs should be made at least on a rotational basis. At present, only IPS officials on deputation are entitled to become DG.

Paramilitary insiders said the Ministry is sitting over files of crucial proposals for over two years including the arming policy of the Forces. The Ministry, sources said, returns files of the paramilitary forces on “flimsy” grounds and approvals are not granted to proposals for years together.

Source:http://www.dailypioneer.com/todays-newspaper/paramilitary-chiefs-seek-to-break-mha-bonds.html

With growing homeland security concerns, MHA procurements have become crucial

The growing concerns for the homeland security in the recent times not only foresee the challenges that the country is about to face, but also encourages the government to increase the resources manifold in this sector. The demand for modernisation of the police forces and the security equipment has gone up dramatically in the recent times, especially after the terror attacks in Mumbai and New Delhi. 

Some journals estimate the investments into the private security industry to be around USD 12.3 billion while the total estimate that country is planning to spend stands close to USD 30 billion by the year 2016. The major segment of this investment, however, is set to flow into the modernisation of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) and a part of it flows to the state polices organisations. Various other sectors like airport security, surveillance projects, integrated security systems etc are also rapidly increasing their footprints in the Indian homeland security matrix.

The ministry of home affairs is now planning to buy and wet-lease helicopters to assist its forces as the entire fleet of Dhruv helicopters has been grounded after several mishaps. “We have authorised wet leasing of helicopters. We are also looking to buy some helicopters. This is a long-term project for which money must be made available”, home minister Chidambaram said while presenting the monthly report card in February. Mi-17 helicopters of the Indian Air Force will help the paramilitary and the police forces till the alternative arrangements are made. The new helicopters will be mainly utilised for the anti-Maoist operations, in addition to some non-combatant functions like transporting essential goods, transporting injured personnel, etc. 

Funds amounting to Rs 397.42 crore were sanctioned for the purchase of arms and ammunition and equipment for the CAPFs, states the MHA monthly report. Ammunition and the equipment include hand-held laser range finder, different types of vehicles, SUV mounted communication jammer, Passive Night Vision (PSV) weapon sight etc. The report also allocates funds to procure high-end equipment for the comfort of the policemen such as the jungle shoes, helmets, and the uniforms that suits the operations in extreme weather. 

Recent sanctions by the MHA for the force modernisation, proves the fact that the ministry is indeed very focussed on the internal security concerns. Sanction amounting to Rs 61,98 crore has been given to BSF for procurement of 16,791 Digital VHF/UHF handheld radio sets. Besides, sanction amounting to Rs 2,35 crore was accorded to NSG for 30 km tactical optical fiber cable with terminal equipment. Also, sanction worth Rs 5,12 crore was accorded to ITBP for 22 high altitude shelters and Rs 20,67 crore was also accorded to ITBP for implementation of wide area network (WAN). Sanction was given for creation of 468 posts for the Integrated Intelligence Wing in CRPF. 

Procurement Variables
In the current scenario, the requirement for the modern equipment is huge — ranging from the surveillance equipment for the border guarding roles, to the internal security operations in the most difficult terrains. There is a requirement also for the UAV for some aerial surveillance operations. 

The procurement process for the different central police organisations are need based, and varies depending on the size of the contract. Generally, it is done through the ‘rate contracts’ of the DGS&D (Directorate general supplies and disposal) or the direct tenders by the respective forces if it is under the financial competency of the concerned DG of the CPMF.

Prior to December 2006, procurement of all items which were beyond the financial competency of the concerned DG was done centrally by MHA procurement wing based on the requirement projected by the concerned CPMFs. But after 2006, one of the Central Para Military Force (CPMF) has being made nodal agency by MHA which will initiate the action for the procurement of the items listed under them.

For example, the nodal agency for the procurement of weaponry is NSG. CRPF is the nodal agency for the communication equipment and BSF is for the surveillance equipment. Instances like the procurement of the vehicles etc, where the requirement is common to all the CPMFs, the MHA could make one of the force as the nodal agency (generally the force with the largest user of that vehicle or the force with the maximum requirement) and initiate the procurement process through it.

Nodal agencies will make the QRs (Qualitative Requirements)/ specifications of the security related items that are to be procured as per the MHA directives. These QRs made by the nodal agencies are discussed in the standing technical evaluation committee meetings comprising of different technical experts and invariably headed by a senior ranking officer of CPMFs. One member of the BPR&D/ DRDO is also associated to incorporate their technical opinion. The final draft of the QR is then sent to the MHA for the final approval. MHA then vets/ approves the QRs.

During the procurement process, if ballistic or any other trial (such as in the case of BP vehicles/jackets etc) of the subject item is required, then MHA/respective CPMFs may obtain the views of BPR&D/CFSL to sort-out any kind of confusion relating to the trial procedure. The indenting CPMFs may also request the association of technical representatives of BPR&D/CFSL.

By Dilip Kumar Mekala in forceindia.net

MHA TO HIRE OVER 100 TRAINS FOR FERRYING FORCES

New Delhi: The Home Ministry will use the services of more than 100 trains to transport paramilitary forces for deployment during the upcoming Lok Sabha elections. In this mammoth exercise, the trains will be used for the speedy movement of forces from one state to another according to election schedule and security considerations. Nearly, two lakh central paramilitary personnel, in addition to state police forces, are expected to be deployed.

Just 800 helmets for 85,000 jawans

How red tape is endangering the lives of CRPF men fighting the Maoist insurgency

The Maoist insurgency boiling out of India's tribal heartland has been called the greatest threat to the nation by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. 

But that's about it, as Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel leading the drive to counter the Maoist rebels remain handicapped by a severe shortage of basic life-saving gear like bulletproof helmets. 

The CRPF, the main force responsible for tackling the Maoist insurgency, has only 800 such helmets against the sanctioned 50,000, highly placed sources told Mail Today.

The March 3 attack at Sukma in Chhattisgarh, in which 15 security personnel, including 11 from the CRPF, were gunned down, is a chilling reminder of this criminal neglect: sources said most of the deaths were caused by bullet injuries to the head. 

Officials who have served on the ground said head injuries are one of the most common causes of death. "It's the head which is exposed when a soldier takes his position and tries to fire at the enemy in combat," said one officer.

The Sukma bloodbath has finally roused the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) from its slumber. The ministry has decided to fast-track the acquisition of bulletproof helmets for the CRPF. 

"In the wake of the recent attack and keeping in mind the threat perception ahead of the Lok Sabha polls, the matter has been expedited and soon the required number of bulletproof helmets will be provided to the CRPF," said an MHA official. 

Sources said that after the recent attack in Chhattisgarh, the CRPF reiterated its concerns to Home Secretary Anil Goswami. The force was assured that the bulletproof helmets would be provided "soon".

While the standard operating procedures of the Army clearly state that every soldier in insurgency- hit areas will be provided with a bulletproof helmet, the rules are different for jawans fighting the biggest insurgency in the country. In fact, sources said CRPF personnel fighting Maoists deep inside jungles are more vulnerable as compared to their counterparts taking on militants in Jammu and Kashmir or insurgents in the North-east. 

A plan to push the rebels to the backfoot ahead of the elections seems to have failed with Maoists killing over 20 security personnel in the past three weeks in Chhattisgarh. Six personnel were killed in an attack in Dantewada district on February 28. MHA officials concede that "red tape and bureaucratic lethargy" are responsible but can't help pinning part of the blame on paramilitary forces. 

"They often send a list of big demands and it is realised later that the equipment sought is not being put to use. As a flip side to this, some genuine and most basic requirements are ignored," said an official. The CRPF, with a strength of nearly 2.9 lakh, has the greatest presence in states affected by Maoist violence, with 85,000 to 90,000 personnel serving in the red zone alone. 

Statistics also show that personnel are more vulnerable in Maoist zones than anywhere else in the country. The number of security personnel killed between 2011 and 2013 was 371 in states hit by Maoist violence.

The total number of incidents of violence in the red zone was 4,311. High intensity conflict hit zones like Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, and Manipur seem safer than Maoist bastions in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh or Orissa, where the majority of killings of security personnel killings have occurred. 

The total death toll in all insurgency-hit areas during 2011-13 has been 239 and the number of incidents of violence stood at 3,123. The sources said besides bulletproof helmets, other basic requirements like jungle boots have not been provided for the past three years. There are also other problems like a financial crunch faced by paramilitary forces like the CRPF. As part of the police modernisation plan, the CRPF was allocated Rs918 crore for 2012-13 and 2013-14 but got only Rs20 crore. 

To make matters worse, states affected by Naxalite violence owe a whopping `7,163 crore to CRPF, which accounts for 60 per cent of the total amount of Rs11,930 crore that states have to pay to the force for internal security duties.

This is more than the total amount of Rs10,932 crore sanctioned for seven paramilitary forces under the police modernisation plan for a period of five years from 2012 to 2017, but the government has been reluctant to release the money.