BSF foils infiltration attempt in Kathua district of J&K

An infiltration attempt from across the international border was foiled by security forces on Tuesday in Kathua district of Jammu & Kashmir.

There was suspected movement of infiltrators near Zeroline on International Border in Bobiya forward Border Out-post in Hiranagar tehsil during midnight, a senior Border Security Force officer told sources.

Alert troops of BSF challenged them and opened fire following which they returned to the Pakistani side, he said.

During search conducted in the area on Tuesday morning, blood stains were found in the area, he said.

The infiltration bid took place in the ‘most-vulnerable’ Via Tarnah nallah area in Hiranagar sector of Kathua district.

BSF has put border guards along IB on high alert to foil the infiltrations.

Source: http://www.niticentral.com/2014/06/03/jk-bsf-foils-infiltration-attempt-in-kathua-district-230173.html

Intel wing for the CRPF: Not the Right Move

“In today's changed circumstances, CRPF needs to have its own intelligence wing.”

“We are in the process of forming an intelligence wing. The work is going on.”

Unless stated otherwise, the above two innocuous statements would appear to be parts of the same speech. However, while the first is a quote from a December 2005 media interview by Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)’s the then Director General (DG) J K Sinha, the second is an extract from the organisation’s DG K Vijay Kumar’ statement in April 2011. CRPF DGs apart from Mr. Sinha and Mr. Kumar, each of them, during their tenure, making similar statements regarding the ‘necessity’ of and ‘progress’ towards achieving the goal of setting up a ‘home-grown’ intelligence wing. However, such protracted yearning notwithstanding, the formation of such a wing is unlikely to augment the CRPF capacities in any significant manner, will merely add to the multiple agencies that roughly do similar work and more importantly, militate against the spirit of an efficient national security architecture.

Even prior to being designated as the country’s lead counter-insurgency (COIN) force, following the 1998 Kargil war, the CRPF, India’s largest Central Armed Police Force (CAPF), performed COIN duties in Jammu & Kashmir and the Northeast. The intensification of left-wing extremism, which took CRPF’s 60 battalions to unknown territories, positioned them against barely identifiable enemies and called for a drastic modification in its war fighting approach, made the task even harder. CRPF were soon to discover that the flow and quality of ground level intelligence provided by the existing agencies are clearly short of its operational requirements.

This assessment prodded the CRPF to make the first ever proposal to the MHA for an internal intelligence wing in 2005. The then Home Minister Shivraj Patil’s approval notwithstanding, the Finance Ministry shut down the proposal citing financial crunch. It further questioned the rationale of such an effort when each of the states of the country has its own intelligence wing. The CRPF, however, went on to select about 10 personnel from each of its battalions to gather intelligence locally. This wing, without official designation, consisted of about 1250 personnel. Speaking in September 2006, the then DG J K Sinha even hinted that the wing will be made operational the same month. Fresh opposition kicked in and the plan never took off.

However, the CRPF did not dismantle its unofficial intelligence wing and continued to deploy these personnel in conflict theatres. At least on one reported occasion, two such CRPF personnel gathering ground level intelligence were killed by the militants in Kashmir in May 2008. The existing wing appeared to have undergone a minor expansion in the following years. According to an August 2010 media report the CRPF further trained 30-40 of its men for eight months in intensive intelligence gathering and deployed them in the Naxal-hit areas and other theatres of operation.

The ongoing demand for an intelligence wing by the CRPF, thus, amounts to institutionalising and expanding the existing wing within the organisation. An official recognition would translate into dedicated money and resources for the existing motley wing, in addition to and not a subtraction from the CRPF’s annual budget (2010-11) of Rs. 7827.32 crore.    

   

At one level, it is difficult to disagree with the CRPF’s assessment of the ground level intelligence gathering institutions, especially in the Naxal hit states. The expansion of the Naxal influence in India rides heavily on a highly successful effort on part of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) to disrupt the existing intelligence gathering set up. Not just that an enveloping atmosphere of fear has drastically confined the police personnel to the relative safety of the police stations and limited their intelligence gathering capacities, the Maoist systematic campaign against the ‘police informers’ has further discouraged the voluntary submission of information by previously willing civilian population. Of the 190 civilians killed by the Naxals this year (till 14 June), 72 were branded as police informers. Such killings, mostly following a process in conviction in Kangaroo courts, is a mere continuation of the trend, which saw the death of 211 and 323 such ‘police informers’ in 2009 and 2010 respectively. In addition, the CPI-Maoist continues to destroy telephone exchanges and towers disrupting security force communication. As a result, intelligence flow from the ground to the security forces has either become non-existent, or at best, sketchy and unreliable.

Of late, fatalities among the CRPF personnel have risen steadily. The organisation lost 67 personnel in 2008 and 70 personnel in 2009 during its country-wide deployments. The figure almost skyrocketed in 2010, when over 150 of its personnel got killed in the Naxal theatres alone. The ill-informed media narratives notwithstanding, not all killed personnel could have been saved with good intelligence.

The pressure to limit the body bags has mounted on the CRPF authorities and in turn, it is ending up in accentuating its yearning for an exclusive intelligence wing. The spats certain CRPF officials have had with state police officials in Chhattisgarh over availability (or the lack of it) of precise intelligence inputs, has further pushed the organisation to be self-reliant in matters of collecting ground level intelligence.

However, setting up this new wing may not be a solution at all to the organisation’s woes.

Firstly, it is difficult to understand how exactly the new wing will create a new set or subset of data and information, which is qualitatively better than those generated by the existing agencies. Although the senior CRPF officials locate their failure thus far to set up the intelligence wing in the objections raised by the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is described to be antagonistic to its creation, one is not sure if the CRPF’s Intel wing, with its limited manpower and resources, will be able to compete with the IB at all.  

Secondly, the new wing, like any other intelligence gathering agencies, cannot be for the exclusive use of the CRPF and the organisation will have to share the data and information it generates with others. As a result, it will merely end up in being a parallel entity- the third agency in most states where the IB and the Police collect intelligence, fourth agency in some where the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) too is present and the fifth agency in few of the rest where the Military Intelligence (MI) too operates. The ongoing task of establishing synergy among the different agencies and facilitating seamless integration of intelligence, under the evolving counter-terrorism architecture, will certainly not get any easier by adding one more entity to the already crowded scene.

Thirdly, going by the logic of making the security agencies self-reliant, the IB and the RAW should have their armed wings, the National Security Guard (NSG) commandos should have their intelligence wing and perhaps the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) also should seek an armed wing for itself. The problem of augmenting the quality of intelligence generated and ensuring their flow to the forces who need them can be achieved by investing more on infrastructure generating technical intelligence (TECHINT) and also the Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Towards that direction, the IB’s budget needs to be raised and the huge vacancies in its field level personnel needs to be filled up rather than allocating fresh resources for the CRPF’s proposed intelligence wing.

Fourthly, answer to operational woes in the conflict theatres including the states affected by Naxal activities is police modernisation, of which improving intelligence gathering is a critical component. The COIN mechanism centred on grand war designs promotes a culture of centralisation at the cost of weakening the police stations and making them irrelevant. This trend needs to be reversed. Policies to revive policing and intelligence gathering need to factor in the critical need of improving the quality of police personnel at the lowest level of the system.

In short, remedy to the problem of inadequately performing institutions cannot be creation of new institutions, but enabling the existing organisations to perform.

By Bibhu Prasad Routray in www.claws.in

BSF detects another portion of secret tunnel

Jammu, May 2: Border Security Force has detected another portion of `secret tunnel’ unearthed on India-Pak border in Samba district, in 2012.

Director General BSF Devender Kumar Pathak, currently on a three day visit to Jammu frontier was briefed by local commanders soon after a portion of the caved in cross border tunnel was detected by the BSF jawans on Friday in Samba sector, a local news gathering agency JKNI reported.

DG BSF, who took review of the prevailing security situation along the International border also visited some of the Border outposts in Kathua district and interacted with BSF jawans to boost their morale.

According to official sources, BSF jawans tasked with the job of cleaning sarkanda in the forward areas along the IB detected portion of the cross border tunnel close to the zero line in Samba sector on Friday morning.

The local commanders immediately informed the frontier headquarters and rushed to the spot to take stock of the situation.

After carrying out necessary ground work the BSF authorities in the area claimed there was no need to raise an alarm as the portion of the cross border tunnel existed along the same axis of the tunnel detected in July 2012.

The BSF had earlier detected a 20-25 ft deep, 400 metre long tunnel near Chilyari post in Samba in July 2012. Following the detection of tunnel BSF had roped in expertise of GSI to detect presence of any other tunnel in the area. GSI experts mapped the area in detail and suggested methods to plug the loop holes after carrying out exhaustive study.

Following the detection of cross border tunnel the local BSF commander has alerted his jawans to prevent any infiltration bid from across the border.

Source: http://jammu.greaterkashmir.com/news/2014/May/3/bsf-detects-another-portion-of-secret-tunnel-42.asp

BSF chief reviews situation, calls for plugging all routes

JAMMU, May 2: Border Security Force (BSF) Director General Devender Kumar Pathak today held a high level review of security preparedness along the International Border (IB) in Hiranagar and Samba sectors, where two major fidayeen attacks had taken place in September, 2013 and March, 2014 leading to the killing of 19 persons including six militants.

The BSF chief, who is on first three days visit of Jammu frontiers after taking over as the DG BSF on April 8, also reviewed Riverine Integrated Surveillance and Communication System installed by the BSF along Tarnah Nullah to plug the gaps along the unfenced Nullahs and check movement of the militants.

Official sources told the Excelsior that Mr Pathak would be visiting the BSF posts in forward areas of Rajouri district tomorrow before returning to New Delhi. He had reached BSF Headquarters at Paloura yesterday.

Sources said Mr Pathak visited extreme forward areas along Paharpur and Bobiya in Hiranagar sector of Kathua district and Pansar in Samba sector along with IG BSF, Jammu Frontiers SS Tomar and other senior BSF officers and reviewed the operational preparedness of the BSF especially the measures put in place to check infiltration attempts by the militants.

The BSF chief directed that no route should be left unplugged which could give the militants a chance to infiltrate into this side. While the entire IB has been fenced, there were some Nullahs including Tarnah Nullah, which had reportedly been used by three militants to infiltrate into this side and carry out attack along the National Highway followed by Janglote Army camp.

Sources said Pathak hailed the BSF efforts in maintaining strict vigil on the International Border but wanted them to plug the gaps, if any, on the border to ensure that there was no fresh fidayeen attack after infiltration from the border.

The BSF officers briefed Mr Pathak that they had been maintaining round the clock vigil along the borders and have also prepared Riverine Integrated Surveillance and Communication System for the unplugged Nullahs to check infiltration from there. The BSF chief reviewed the System installed on the Nullahs and reportedly favoured that it should cover all Nullahs, leading to the International Border so that no scope was left for infiltration from the IB and for the militants to carry out strikes on the Highway or other places.

Sources said the BSF officers also apprised the chief about movement of militants on Pakistan side of the IB and their attempts to infiltrate into Jammu, which the BSF has regularly thwarted through constant vigil on the borders.

At Paharpur, Bobiya and Pansar forward areas, the BSF chief inter-acted with field commanders of the BSF to acquaint himself with the situation on the border and steps taken to check infiltration attempts, sources said, adding the BSF chief also reviewed operational preparedness of the Force.

The BSF chief’s visit to Tarnah Nullah gained importance as it was believed that three militants, who had struck at Tarnah in Hiranagar tehsil of Kathua district along Jammu-Pathankot National Highway on March 28 had infiltrated from this route. After the militant attack, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah had posted a strong worded tweet asking the BSF to plug the gaps effectively to ensure that there was no fidayeen attack in future.

The militants had appeared at Tarnah Bridge on the Highway and killed a civilian travelling in Bolero before hijacking the vehicle and taking it to Janglote Army camp in Kathua. They had also killed the Bolero driver. In the encounter with the Army, one Army jawan was killed while troops had eliminated all three fidayeens.

Prior to this, three fidayeens had appeared at border village of Hariya Chak at Hiranagar on September 26, 2013, hijacked a load carrier and struck at Hiranagar police station killing four cops and two civilians. Later, they had hijacked a truck parked in the police station and struck at 16 Cavalry Unit Army camp at Mehsar, Samba, where they killed four Army soldiers including a Lieutenant Colonel before being eliminated by the troops.

A total of 19 persons including six militants were killed in the two attacks.

Though the BSF had maintained that the militants, who struck at Hiranagar police station and Mehsar Army camp on September 26 hadn’t infiltrated from the International Border, there were few takers of this version. However, after the Chief Minister’s strong worded statement after March 28 terror attack, the BSF maintained silence on route taken by three militants to reach the Highway.

Sources said even the BSF was puzzled about infiltration by the militants as it had virtually sealed the entire International Border and was even manning the Nullahs.

Meanwhile, another portion of underground tunnel, which the BSF and civilians had detected at Chechwal and Chilariyan forward villages in Samba sector in July, 2012, was detected today in the same area after the land caved in at small place.

BSF officers reached the spot but it was found that there was no new tunnel but it was part of the old tunnel, which had been detected about 540 meters deep inside the Indian territory from the IB in July 2012, which had been constructed by the Rangers and the militants to push infiltrators, weaponry and narcotics into this side.

BSF had cordoned off the area to detect further route of the tunnel though it was confirmed that the tunnel was an old one and not new. The BSF had already closed the exit route of the tunnel on the Indian side when it was detected in 2012.

Source: http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/bsf-chief-reviews-situation-calls-for-plugging-all-routes/

Internal Security- What Election Manifestos of Cong, BJP Promise To Do

With manifestos of both BJP and Congress out in the open, it would be interesting to take stock of where the major parties stand so far as key national issues go. As part of a series of articles on election manifesto, this one would concentrate on the issues of internal security. Incidentally internal security today has become one of the biggest challenges for India.

What Congress Manifesto Says

The Congress Manifesto states, ‘Left Wing Extremism will be dealt with a firm hand. We will strengthen our security forces deployed in LWE affected areas by augmenting equipment, infrastructure and manpower, while also pursuing a development agenda to empower locals.'

Sadly, even when this article was being written, a CRPF Deputy Commandant bled to death in Bihar after getting severely injured in an explosion, conducted by Maoists. For six hours, the CRPF officer did not get any medical help in spite of profusely bleeding and eventually died.

This incident is just one of several such instances which keep on happening day in and day out in the Maoist prone areas. Almost every year over the last one decade, there have been several major instances of ambushes and sabotage leading to death of thousands of civilians and police personnel. This includes the gruesome massacre of 76 CRPF personnel in Chhattisgarh in 2010 and derailing of Gyaneshwari Express by Maoists in Bengal in which more than 150 people had died.

The UPA have for most of the period remained completely clueless as to how to deal with the menace of Maoist. Lack of cohesive national policy on the issue of dealing with Maoist menace has also been a major problem.

The Congress Manifesto likewise, remains silent on the issue of escalation of terror attacks in J&K as well instances of cross border ambushes on Indian outposts by Pakistani Army personnel. It is also silent on how it plans to prevent the recurrence of 26/11 kind of terror attacks.

Further, the manifesto does not mention anything about how it plans to stop the rise of indigenous radical extremist groups including the likes of Indian Mujahideen and SIMI. The issue of too many acquittals in terror related cases, communalising terrorism cases and confusing statements by ministers have not helped the cause of fight against terrorism.

The Reality Check

While Congress promises to augment the equipment and manpower of Central Police Forces deployed in Maoist areas, the shocking fact is that over the last one year or so, there has been drastic reduction in the allocations made to Central Police Forces for purchase of weapons and equipment. Reports state that during the financial year 2013-14, while the Central Police Forces like ITBP, CRPF, CISF, BSF and NSG had sought Rs 2,360 crores from the Home Ministry for purchase of critical equipment, they were actually provided a pittance for the same.

While CRPF had sought Rs 873 crore for purchase of critical equipment, it was provided a mere Rs 20 crore. Likewise, BSF, which had sought Rs 694 crore for purchase of critical weapons, it too got a mere Rs 20 crore. The same is the case with Assam Rifles which had sought Rs 309 crore but got a mere Rs 28 crore. Further, NSG, which plays such a critical role in safeguarding the nation from major terror attacks, had asked for Rs 118 crore for purchase of modern weapons but was allocated a mere Rs 86 lakhs.

Against this backdrop, the Congress pledge to equip India's Central Police Forces with modern weapons, actually is hard to believe. The manifesto also remains silent on what Congress plans to do with the issue of a large number of Central Police Personnel quitting jobs because of pathetic work condition, indifference of senior officers, lack of timely leave and lack of even basic amenities. More than 60,000 Central Police personnel have taken voluntary retirement from Central Police Forces in the last six years.

The Congress manifesto also remains silent on the issue of cross border illegal infiltrations from Bangladesh and how it plans to contain it.

What BJP Manifesto States

The BJP manifesto on the other hand makes promises of reviving ‘the anti-terror mechanism that has been dismantled by the Congress, strengthen the role of NIA and put a system in place for swift and fair trial of terror related cases.' This is a clear indication that BJP, if voted to power would bring into place a POTA (Prevention of Terrorist Acts) kind of strong anti-terror law and change the architecture for speedy trial in terror related cases.

The BJP manifesto also pledges to insulate the intelligence agencies from political interference. This is perhaps one of the most important things that is needed to be done, given the rampant and most blatant misuse of intelligence agencies, especially the Central Intelligence Bureau, has happened in India.

The Ishrat Jahan case has been striking example where CBI and IB came at loggerheads with each other and eventually IB Director Asif Ibrahim even went to extent of stating that charge sheeting IB officers in the Ishrat Jahan case would have severe impact on the morale of IB officers and can severely impact counter-terror operations.

However, how BJP plans to insulate IB from political interference and witch-hunting, would be interesting to see. The best way forward would be to make it a constitutional body though a statutory act of parliament much on the lines of CAG and Election Commission. It would be even better if NIA, NSG, IB and a few other agencies are integrated into one cohesive counter-terror, intelligence gathering and national security agency.

A special mention as also been mentioned in the manifesto for protecting migrant workers as well as for introduction of NCC at universities and strengthen Civil Defence for community defence, civil defence and disaster management. For a country which is so much prone to natural disasters and terrorism, development of community defence and disaster management skills is a much needed programme.

On the issue of Border Management, the BJP manifesto pledges to introduce punitive measures to check illegal migrations, which today has become one of the most critical internal security issues. It also pledges to deal with cross border terrorism with a firm hand.

However, on the issue of addressing grievances of the Central Police Forces, nothing specific has been mentioned in the BJP manifesto as well. Ideally, if BJP comes to power, it has to solve the systemic issues of the Central Police Forces on a war footing without which the war against Maoists and cross border terrorism as well as illegal infiltrations, cannot be fought.

Source: http://news.oneindia.in/feature/internal-security-what-election-manifestos-of-cong-bjp-promise-to-do-lse-1427205.html

IPS Officers vs Army Officers

Some believe that army and IPS cannot be compared. We should not forget the fact that IPS is modeled based on Army. In fact, pre-independence, many Army officers worked as IGs and SPs in provinces and districts. Even today, due to historical reasons, shoulder epaulets of both these services are same.

1. Recruitment:

While IPS officers are recruited along with 15+ other civil services through a common entrance exam, Army officers are recruited through separate Army SSB. It is a sad fact that very few people give first preference to IPS. IAS/IFS and now even IRS, IA&AS etc. are preferred when compared to IPS, which they consider as a dirty job. They have their own reasons for not preferring IPS. Frequent transfers, political pressure, threat to life, irregular working hours, no/less holidays, work-life balance etc. are some reasons commonly quoted. People who apply for Army SSB are sure about joining army, whereas, in IPS around 20 probationers leave during training or within first 2 years of service after clearing civil service exam and getting IAS/IFS/IRS. In army SSB no. of intake is less against the sanctioned seats. Quality of candidates is the commonly cited reason for not filling up the seats, so there are lot of vacancies in Army. Advertisements like "Do you have it in you? An extraordinary life. A life full of adventure, honour and glory. Where you are one among a million, and one in a million" etc. are needed to attract youth into Indian Army. But in IPS all seats get filled, but many children come to SVPNPA to study for their next attempt in civil service exams. Vacancies in IPS are due to attritions during initial probation days. But there are few candidates give IPS as their first preference in CSE due to genuine interest and love for the profession and their countrymen. We should not generalise these issues.

 2. Probation:

Medical tests for joining army are tougher than IPS because IPS is considered a civil service, so most of them get selected. Because of the fact that the children have cleared a tough exam, there is a sympathy among trainers in SVPNPA and the result is that no one will get rejected at the end of IPS probation. But in Army, many unfit probationers get weeded out. Training is almost same for both but is somewhat liberal in IPS when compared to army. IPS officers' training period of 2 years is counted into service as no. of years in experience and they start earning salary from the starting month from their respective states. Where as in Army, a probationer is not confirmed until the end of the training of 1-1.5 years and receives only a stipend. Physically fit and bright IPS probationers do exist, but as I already said, these issues cannot be generalised.

3. Service:

After probation an IPS officer will become an Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) responsible of a subdivision. After 2 years he will automatically become a Superintendent of Police (SP) in charge of a district. After 18 years of service he will become a DIG, then after 5 years he will become an IG and then ADGP and finally DGP. All young IPS probationers are potential DGPs!!! In army an officer's promotion is not time-bound. He should attend interviews, write exams, should have good remarks in Annual Confidential Reports in order to climb the ladder of Lt-Capt.-Maj-Lt.Col-Col.-Brig.-Maj.Gen.-Lt.Gen.-Gen. There are sincere officers in IPS who prove their mettle by doing the given duty to them, but there are stories of IPS officers jockeying to create a new post for them only because of the fact that they have completed a no. of years of service and it’s time for their promotion.

4. Leadership:

Army officers should be in the forefront, leading the men they command. Statistics of war casualties show that many commissioned officers are martyred. There is a general perception that IPS officers are good at sitting in AC room and planning only on papers. This might be true, but there are many officers in IPS (like Dr. NC Asthana, K.Vijay Kumar, C. Sylendra Babu etc. to name a few) who do the dirty job of leading from the front. But in most cases dangerous jobs are left to directly recruited Assistant Commandants or Deputy Superintendents.

5. Reputation:

Army officers have a good image and respect among public when compared to their IPS counterparts. We should understand that Army officers do not get the same respect (that they get in India's heartland) in NE states and J&K, where AFSPA is implemented. We should understand that external aggressors are the main enemy for army, whereas police is acting against internal aggressors (who are their countrymen), so police cannot use the same force as that of the army, while dealing with the crimes. Checking suspicious vehicles/persons/places is a normal preventive work, but this is seen as an infringement of privacy. Normal day-to-day policing work itself damages the image of police. Army man shoots to kill, whereas a Police man shoots only to deter. Even though police has done terrible mistakes here and there, our country is still intact and stable, and the credit for this should be given to police leadership. We should also be proud of our Army for upholding the territorial integrity of our country.

6. Corruption:

In this area also Army wins over IPS. In army, recruitment and procurement/provisioning are the only possible areas where army officers can even think of making some quick buck. Whereas in IPS, all kind of work involves dealing with the public, and officers might be offered bribe right from the first day of joining the duty. Both IPS and army officers, are born and brought up in the same society/environment, but the organisation they join makes the difference. Generalization will surely demoralize the honest officers in both Olive green and Khaki uniforms.

7. Patriotism:

Patriotism, discipline, sacrifice, camaraderie are very good attributes that are present in Indian Army and it is worth emulating these qualities in other organisations too. But there is a general perception among armed forces that they are more patriotic and they love their country a lot than others, because they have joined military and they are ready to do supreme sacrifices in the line of duty. Recently an army officer wrote in an online forum that at least 5 years of military service should be made compulsory for IPS officers (who claim that they also want to serve their country) before taking CSE, because a lot of vacancy exists in armed forces. We should understand that vacancies exist in other organisations also. Engineers, scientists, teachers, lawyers, agriculturists, business men, bankers and even politicians are very important for a nation’s development.

8. Other service trivia:

Use of khaki as police uniforms which are traditionally worn by soldiers, use of same shoulder epaulets, ceremonial batons, georgette patches, head bands, star plates and rank flags in official vehicles by both army officers and IPS officers, giving gallantry awards like ashok chakra, kirti chakra etc. (which are traditionally seen by armed forces as theirs) for police officer , use of the word "jawan", "commando" etc. by media to denote CPMFs, use of similar disruptive pattern camouflage uniforms by CPMFs etc. irks armed forces. But we should understand that colour of uniforms show the uniqueness of the organisation to which a person belongs, uniform should connect a person to tradition and history that his organisation inherits. Similarly, most of the decorations in the Indian Army uniforms are adopted from British system, for instance, crown was replaced by state emblem, and other decorations like crossed sword and baton etc. remained unchanged in shoulder epaulets. IPS (formerly Imperial Police) got branched off from Indian Army they also share the same tradition and history. There should not be any problem in using Camouflage/disruptive pattern uniforms (given the fact there are no copyright restrictions) by CPMFs if the working conditions demands, because they also do the same work as armed forces. Terms like jawan etc. cannot be monopolised. Guarding territorial frontiers is a great service. Income tax and customs/central excise officers guard economic frontiers.

ISRO/DRDO/DAE/CSIR/ICAR/ICMR engineers and scientists provide security to this country by using science as a weapon. Energy security and food security are also equally important. In my opinion each and every profession is equally important. Taking pride in one's work is a good thing, but it should not be at the contempt of other work. No service should be belittled, instead we should analyse the issues and think about possible reforms.

Possible Reforms:

For all the aforementioned issues, IPS officers alone cannot be blamed.As many as eight police reforms commissions have been formed and and these commissions had IPS officers as their members and they tried to address some of the issues that are pestering police leadership. None of the reforms were fully implemented. Police being a state subject, we can't expect anything other than this. Central govt. too failed to comply with some of the Supreme Court judgements regarding police reforms.

 I'll list here some of the reforms. While some are my own ideas, others are taken from the internet and Police reforms commission reports.

(i) Separate exams for IPS:

IPS cannot be claimed as a pure civil service. IPS officers have to work in quasi-military settings in CPMFs. Indian Forest Service (IFoS) is doing a good job by having a separate exam for their recruitment. By keeping separate exams, only interested candidates will apply, and this will also to some extent end the problem of flocking of 20+ IPS probationers into various other civil services every year. Recruitment can also be modelled based on Army SSB (a judicious mix of written exams, interviews and physical exams) without diluting the toughness/quality of exams. Sympathy of trainers towards the probationers will also reduce to a great extent. Rejections every year at the end of probation will reduce the complacency effect.

This issue of separate exams was taken up by few IPS officers a few years back, but it was vehemently opposed by retired and senior IPS officers. They are of opinion that this move will reduce the status of IPS over IAS. It is a well-known fact that a turf war is going on b/w IAS and IPS. In no way this move will reduce the status of IPS.

(ii) Merit based promotions:

Right from 1997, almost all police reforms commissions talk about this. These commissions had IPS officers as members and even senior and retired IPS officers are batting for this reform. According to this, at each stage of promotion, if an IPS officer completes certain no. of years of service, he should be sent again to SVPNPA, where he/she will take a course. At the end of the course, written examinations, interviews, physical tests will be conducted and performance of the officers in their states/organisations and annual confidential reports will be reviewed and promotions are given according to the merit. There are also incentives for officers who clear the course in first attempt. For repeated attempts officers will have to pay from their own pocket. There is also a provision that, if an officer fails in 3 consecutive tests, he should be compulsorily retired from the service. Who should be blamed for not implementing this?

(iii) Reforms in Central Deputation:

IPS officers in SP rank are allowed to go to Central organisations like SVPNPA, NEPA, BPR&D, NICFS, CBI, IB, NCRB, DPWC etc. whereas officers of and above DIG rank are allowed to go to CPMFs like BSF, ITBP, CRPF, CISF, AR, SSB, NSG and other organisations like NCB, DRI etc. There is a growing concern among cadre officers of CPMFs that an "outsider" is coming to command them, and also there is a general perception among cadre officers of CPMFs that these IPS officers come to central deputation for having good time and to take rest after tense and busy law and order work in their parent cadre. In my opinion, physically and mentally fit IPS officers in SP rank should also be sent to CPMFs like BSF, ITBP, CRPF, CISF, AR, SSB, NSG as assistant/deputy/joint commandants after some stringent physical and psychological tests. The skills that the IPS officers acquire in these organisations will not only be of great help to them for the rest of their career but will also help in capacity building of the state cadre to which they belong.

Source:http://indiandefence.com/threads/ips-officers-vs-army-officers