SSB observes Raising Day in Guwahati

Guwahati: Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), Frontier Headquarter Guwahati celebrated 11th Raising Day recently at Reserve Battalion, Sonapur.

Chief guest Anil Negi, Inspector General SSB, FTR Guwahati, addressed the gathering and lauded the role of SSB as a Border Guarding Force. He said that the FTR Guwahati is mandated to guard the Indo- Bhutan Border has attained significant vigour in the national and security scenario through devotion and dedication and professionalism towards the task, a press release said.

SSB Frontier Guwahati and SSB as a whole have proved its credential in the National Security grid. During last 7 years, SSB achieved significant results to counter anti- national elements, destruction of various forest products and wildlife.

It may mention that SSB Frontier Guwahati has also played a significant role to enforce the sense of security and to save the life of property of the citizen of the country by successfully countering the evil designs of the anti-national elements.

SSB Frontier Guwahati although not directly involved in counter- insurgency but keeping in mind its national responsibility it contributes significantly and could able to apprehend 124 insurgents and other antinational elements and also recovered large numbers of arms and ammunition.

Source:- http://news.guwahationline.in/SSB-observes-Raising-Day-in-Guwahati-168965#sthash.xH0y5FMq.dpuf

Intel wing for the CRPF: Not the Right Move

“In today's changed circumstances, CRPF needs to have its own intelligence wing.”

“We are in the process of forming an intelligence wing. The work is going on.”

Unless stated otherwise, the above two innocuous statements would appear to be parts of the same speech. However, while the first is a quote from a December 2005 media interview by Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)’s the then Director General (DG) J K Sinha, the second is an extract from the organisation’s DG K Vijay Kumar’ statement in April 2011. CRPF DGs apart from Mr. Sinha and Mr. Kumar, each of them, during their tenure, making similar statements regarding the ‘necessity’ of and ‘progress’ towards achieving the goal of setting up a ‘home-grown’ intelligence wing. However, such protracted yearning notwithstanding, the formation of such a wing is unlikely to augment the CRPF capacities in any significant manner, will merely add to the multiple agencies that roughly do similar work and more importantly, militate against the spirit of an efficient national security architecture.

Even prior to being designated as the country’s lead counter-insurgency (COIN) force, following the 1998 Kargil war, the CRPF, India’s largest Central Armed Police Force (CAPF), performed COIN duties in Jammu & Kashmir and the Northeast. The intensification of left-wing extremism, which took CRPF’s 60 battalions to unknown territories, positioned them against barely identifiable enemies and called for a drastic modification in its war fighting approach, made the task even harder. CRPF were soon to discover that the flow and quality of ground level intelligence provided by the existing agencies are clearly short of its operational requirements.

This assessment prodded the CRPF to make the first ever proposal to the MHA for an internal intelligence wing in 2005. The then Home Minister Shivraj Patil’s approval notwithstanding, the Finance Ministry shut down the proposal citing financial crunch. It further questioned the rationale of such an effort when each of the states of the country has its own intelligence wing. The CRPF, however, went on to select about 10 personnel from each of its battalions to gather intelligence locally. This wing, without official designation, consisted of about 1250 personnel. Speaking in September 2006, the then DG J K Sinha even hinted that the wing will be made operational the same month. Fresh opposition kicked in and the plan never took off.

However, the CRPF did not dismantle its unofficial intelligence wing and continued to deploy these personnel in conflict theatres. At least on one reported occasion, two such CRPF personnel gathering ground level intelligence were killed by the militants in Kashmir in May 2008. The existing wing appeared to have undergone a minor expansion in the following years. According to an August 2010 media report the CRPF further trained 30-40 of its men for eight months in intensive intelligence gathering and deployed them in the Naxal-hit areas and other theatres of operation.

The ongoing demand for an intelligence wing by the CRPF, thus, amounts to institutionalising and expanding the existing wing within the organisation. An official recognition would translate into dedicated money and resources for the existing motley wing, in addition to and not a subtraction from the CRPF’s annual budget (2010-11) of Rs. 7827.32 crore.    

   

At one level, it is difficult to disagree with the CRPF’s assessment of the ground level intelligence gathering institutions, especially in the Naxal hit states. The expansion of the Naxal influence in India rides heavily on a highly successful effort on part of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) to disrupt the existing intelligence gathering set up. Not just that an enveloping atmosphere of fear has drastically confined the police personnel to the relative safety of the police stations and limited their intelligence gathering capacities, the Maoist systematic campaign against the ‘police informers’ has further discouraged the voluntary submission of information by previously willing civilian population. Of the 190 civilians killed by the Naxals this year (till 14 June), 72 were branded as police informers. Such killings, mostly following a process in conviction in Kangaroo courts, is a mere continuation of the trend, which saw the death of 211 and 323 such ‘police informers’ in 2009 and 2010 respectively. In addition, the CPI-Maoist continues to destroy telephone exchanges and towers disrupting security force communication. As a result, intelligence flow from the ground to the security forces has either become non-existent, or at best, sketchy and unreliable.

Of late, fatalities among the CRPF personnel have risen steadily. The organisation lost 67 personnel in 2008 and 70 personnel in 2009 during its country-wide deployments. The figure almost skyrocketed in 2010, when over 150 of its personnel got killed in the Naxal theatres alone. The ill-informed media narratives notwithstanding, not all killed personnel could have been saved with good intelligence.

The pressure to limit the body bags has mounted on the CRPF authorities and in turn, it is ending up in accentuating its yearning for an exclusive intelligence wing. The spats certain CRPF officials have had with state police officials in Chhattisgarh over availability (or the lack of it) of precise intelligence inputs, has further pushed the organisation to be self-reliant in matters of collecting ground level intelligence.

However, setting up this new wing may not be a solution at all to the organisation’s woes.

Firstly, it is difficult to understand how exactly the new wing will create a new set or subset of data and information, which is qualitatively better than those generated by the existing agencies. Although the senior CRPF officials locate their failure thus far to set up the intelligence wing in the objections raised by the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is described to be antagonistic to its creation, one is not sure if the CRPF’s Intel wing, with its limited manpower and resources, will be able to compete with the IB at all.  

Secondly, the new wing, like any other intelligence gathering agencies, cannot be for the exclusive use of the CRPF and the organisation will have to share the data and information it generates with others. As a result, it will merely end up in being a parallel entity- the third agency in most states where the IB and the Police collect intelligence, fourth agency in some where the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) too is present and the fifth agency in few of the rest where the Military Intelligence (MI) too operates. The ongoing task of establishing synergy among the different agencies and facilitating seamless integration of intelligence, under the evolving counter-terrorism architecture, will certainly not get any easier by adding one more entity to the already crowded scene.

Thirdly, going by the logic of making the security agencies self-reliant, the IB and the RAW should have their armed wings, the National Security Guard (NSG) commandos should have their intelligence wing and perhaps the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) also should seek an armed wing for itself. The problem of augmenting the quality of intelligence generated and ensuring their flow to the forces who need them can be achieved by investing more on infrastructure generating technical intelligence (TECHINT) and also the Human Intelligence (HUMINT). Towards that direction, the IB’s budget needs to be raised and the huge vacancies in its field level personnel needs to be filled up rather than allocating fresh resources for the CRPF’s proposed intelligence wing.

Fourthly, answer to operational woes in the conflict theatres including the states affected by Naxal activities is police modernisation, of which improving intelligence gathering is a critical component. The COIN mechanism centred on grand war designs promotes a culture of centralisation at the cost of weakening the police stations and making them irrelevant. This trend needs to be reversed. Policies to revive policing and intelligence gathering need to factor in the critical need of improving the quality of police personnel at the lowest level of the system.

In short, remedy to the problem of inadequately performing institutions cannot be creation of new institutions, but enabling the existing organisations to perform.

By Bibhu Prasad Routray in www.claws.in

China: LAC impasse and Army-ITBP spat

First the facts

- Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) has five battalions deployed in Eastern Ladakh including those on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

-The DIG Headquarter controlling these forces is located at Srinagar, 258 air km and 418 road km from Leh. Zoji La, on the Himalayan Range, and located on the main highway from Srinagar to Leh, is closed to road traffic from November to end May.

- Considering the separation of the Headquarter from the units, an adhoc Headquarter is functional under the Deputy at Leh – a compromise solution at best, considering the division of resources.

- ITBP communications are based, primarily, on High Frequency radio, which is most vulnerable to interception and being jammed when required particularly in an operational situation.

- The role of ITBP amplifies the tasks of the Force as – to guard the Northern borders and prevent violations and encroachments, prevent smuggling, unauthorized movement of goods, weapons, personnel and such like non-traditional threats in the border areas.

- ITBP does not have its own integral intelligence setup so essential in an operational situation.

- Thus the orientation of the force is essentially towards “policing” tasks.

The Ground Realties.

- The Army has Infantry and Mechanized forces suitably located with robust combat support and controlling headquarters well forward and within easy reach of the LAC.

- India’s perception of the LAC is undemarcated on ground but has been identified along suitable geographical and relief features.

- India and China have unilaterally delineated the LAC on their respective maps but have not shared the same with each other. As a result, each assumes the others perception from the activities that both carry out to dominate up to their respective perceptions.

- Consequently, common areas claimed by both arise, and are contested for by the militaries. Often termed, inappropriately, as “no-man’s land”.  India generally terms it as “no-man’s land” which is not paid heed to by China, thus putting India at a disadvantage. India should modify term to “Both-man’s Land”, so that India does not restrain its troops from operating in that area.

- Very evidently, the LAC is a “LIVE” boundary, and should be manned accordingly. The PLA platoon strength that camped in Depsang was no group of local herdsmen or Yak smugglers or in any way could be construed as non-traditional threat. Therefore if required more than a “Police “force response.

- The Chinese Border Defence Units deployed and garrisoned along the entire LAC are directly under the PLA, which is surely not mere “policing” duties.

- The Army has a comprehensive (in as much there is) intelligence setup and has wherewithal for intelligence gathering and substantial surveillance resources.

- The Army has a secure radio and static line communication network with adequate redundancies built-in for exercising optimal operational command and control.

- The Army has a well-structured tiered establishment for force build up and undertakes an emergent or graduated operational response at the place of its own choosing right across the entire LAC. Provided the field commanders are not constrained at the tactical level, due to a politically cautious stance.

Operational Milieu.

- Army and ITBP posts are often co-located but operating independently. Command and control is exercised along two parallel verticals with informal personality based lateral inter-action.

- Domination of LAC by patrolling by both Army and ITBP, is a wasteful duplication of effort.

- Inter-communication between Army and ITBP is adhoc and is mainly provided from Army resources. ITBP’s integral radio equipment is incompatible with equipment currently in use by the Army. Consequently the ITBP personnel are required to be trained on it. Given the nature of the high altitude of the region there is frequent movement of such personnel making the whole exercise temporary and fragmented. 

- New raisings in ITBP units a unilateral undertaking by MHA and ITBP without heed to the overall security fallout along the LAC by this augmentation.

Consequences.

- With a Police force deployed on the LAC, the Chinese will interpret it as a tacit acceptance of the Indian Government that the LAC is not a “LIVE” border that needs to be guarded by military forces. A benign approach to the whole India-China Boundary question.

- To accept ITBP as the first responder to a conventional tactical situation without requisite integral support with heavier weapons and combat support in the form of dedicated artillery or air support is wilfully making them “cannon fodder” by powers that be.

- Constraining the tactical initiative of tactical field commanders by a policy of restraint and reticence will always allow the PLA to wrest the initiative in battle.

- Any form of pre-emption or “cold start” by the Army is not feasible in these circumstances. Indian Army will only be fire fighting to save its glorious image.

- The Army is the Nations “punch”. It should be asserting its strength through fire power and guts not “military diplomacy”. The Nation has to speak from a position of strength. The Army gives it this strength. It needs to be recognized.

The Revamping Necessary.

- Place all ITBP forces deployed along the LAC under the Army for operational control.

- Induction of new equipment into the Force, should as a policy, be cleared by the Army from the technical and logistic compatibility point of view.

Conclusion.

- MHA’s reluctance to place the ITBP under the Army is indicative of the underlying resistance of the IPS lobby to serve under any commander from the Army. IPS as seen from the factual ground realities considers itself as an “administrative cadre” akin to IAS. They loathe the notion of leading from the front as field commanders. The direct entry ITBP young officers endorse the requirement of operating under the Army.

- What is of paramount importance is National Security Interests. This cannot be hijacked by some blatant parochial group interest. The matter is too serious to be left to the whims or fancy of the bureaucracy. If the MHA cannot decide then let the people decide whose security is the Government of India’s responsibility.

By Lt Gen JS Bajwa in Indian Defence Review

Securing India

India emerged as an independent country 67 yrs ago after successfully ending the colonial era and gave itself a democratic constitution. The strategy and structure of governance was in line with the democratic ethos that the Indian national State is known for centuries. We know that the management theory of strategy that follows the structure and structure must always be suited to execute the strategy.

In following this maxim India gave to itself a democratic setup, periodical elections and also expert agencies to take care of its emergent challenges to work because of its historical experiences, especially its emergence as a nation with an inimical neighbour called Pakistan and its emergence as one of the key factors in the international politics because of its huge population and potentiality to alter the international politics. India’s role as a regional player in power politics in the subcontinent and also in Asia started immediately after its independence with the first Prime Minister being an External Affair Minister Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru took lot of interest in Asian Unity and he was one of the main artist of the Panchseel Principles.

It used to be said during those days that India’s non-alignment is nothing but an international explanation of Gandhian principle of non-violence. Be that is it may, non alignment movement suited in the cold war arena for three region Asia, Africa and Europe namely Yugoslavia, Egypt and India playing key roles for nearly a decade and half after India’s independence. Even though India fought Chinese war in 1962, with Pakistan another war in 1965 and Bangladesh liberation war in 1971. The Challenges to national security emerged much more serious in 1980s and still continue to be there. The following can be delineated as the most important challenges to national security.

>> The national security challenges from anti India elements abroad including terrorist organizations like L.eT, Jaish-i-Mohd etc.

>>The cyber criminals.

>>The economical offenders.

>>The inimical agencies of foreign states.

>> The insurgent groups of North East.

>> The separatists groups of Kashmir and some North East separatist groups

>> The Left Wing Extremist elements in the Central India and southern India

>> The local communal groups including the Rabbit communal organizations like banned SIMI and its later avtar as Indian Mujahideen.

>>The Indian Mafiosi, which is there in almost all the emerging cities of India including areas which are known for commercial and political importance.

>> The bureaucratic politicians’ mafia nexus as has been evidently pointed out by the N N Vohra committee in a report.

Thus the 10 above challenges to National Security are very serious in nature and they play a vital role in different parts of the country both in time and space relational matters. While there is no point in offering volumes of explanation, historically there, emergent trends etc were all these ten challenges.

I would like to focus on here on two aspects namely 1) Left Wing Extremism and 2) Cyber Criminals as the key challenges to the national security of India and international Security of India also because of two simple reasons (1) The left wing extremism is older than India’s independence in its challenge to Indian States or the State in India and the (2) India being an emerging economy cyber criminals and cyber terrorism is a natural challenge as it is happening elsewhere in the world. While the rest of eight challenges can be handled by an improvement in governance and strict adherence to principles of effective criminal justice system. These two challenges to the national or internal security require lot of innovative thinking and equally innovative implementation of those policies.

Left Wing Extremism also known as Naxalism and Maoism in different parts of the country started in 1940s with the first uprising of the people on massive scale in the Telangana region of Nizam’s independent State in South India and it continued for nearly 6-7 years and with the intervention of Indian Army and Police under the leadership of Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel this was controlled and along with this the Rajak Kanoon and which is counter to this which has launched by Nizam Government was also caressed.

However, the seeds of Left Wing Extremism movement can be taken back to 1920s in the forest and tribal regions of Coastal Andhra and Telangana when Alluri Sitarama Raju who was a revolutionary led the tribal movement in the southern part of India. Similarly in the northern part of India we have Birsa Munda movement and the tribal uprising in the Chota Nagpur belt which has also got elements of tribal rights which later assumed the role of the naxal movements in 1960s and maoist movement in 1980s, 90s and now maoist movement is serious challenge from 21st Sept 2004 onwards with the clubbing of South India People War Group and North India MCC.

Thus Left Wing Extremism is an old problem which has got various challenges like the tribal issues, the land distribution issues, the crop issues, the land-man relationship issues, the governance issues, the compensation issues, the mineral policies, the industrialization issues, the extraction of national resources issues and the corruption issues specially in the light of recent scams that emerged in the Coal Sector and the other mine resources like Bauxite mining etc.

The second most important challenge which requires attention is cyber security and cyber terrorism. With increasing emphasis on e-governance there is every possibility that entire systems and processes of banking, finance, administration, security related issues can be put to a risk if you don’t have adequate measures of security in meeting the challenges to the cyber space in India.

While India has been using the cyber space related technology and has been in the forefront in using the information communication technology revolution for its administration and also indulging both in private and public sector in tremendous application of its research and project consultancy work, it is a remarkable journey that today 1/3 of Indian population is internet linked; mobile telephony and almost three-fourth of active population are in possession of a Cell phone connection.

Thus the information communication technologies made the communication an all India phenomenal which reduce the cost and today one can possess a cell phone with lifelong free SMS and with very little amount that is required for the outgoing calls. While information and communication technology empower the Indians who are living in rural areas and tribal areas in accessible areas, there is always a possibility of an attack on the privacy, as well as fundamental rights of these groups and also to spread communal venom and confuse the people through SMS and web-site uploading, you-tube transmissions.

A recent example will explain this better. The North-East population in Bangalore were frightened by the illegal activities of an ultra-right organization in parts of Karnataka which resulted in huge amount of exchange of SMSs and opinion in cyber space which resulted in mass exodus of North-East population who are working and studying and contribute to the economy of Karnataka in the Bangalore- Mysore region. Later on it took lot of efforts by the government both at Karnataka and all India level to remove the communication effects and to establish the normalcy and to bring back the concept of faith to the north-east population so that they can return back to their place of work namely Bangalore.

Thus the cyber space has got both potentiality to vitiate the environment and also at the same time if it used correctly to detect and to anticipate and to totally neutralize various challenges. One example is of yesterday’s origin where in the chief of the Indian Mujahidin was arrested from abroad as a follow up action of the arrest of the Yasin Bhatkal which was involved in multiple blast incidents in different parts of the country.

To conclude, India has got the talent to naturalize various challenges to its internal and national security. It is suicidal if there is complacency and a self-congratulatory syndrome of staying in comfort zones and expecting others to do the dirty work as Chankya rightly pointed out It is important that the state should treat its citizens as its own children and nurture them to the concept of security because it is ruler’s primary job is to reassure the ruled or the citizens of his concern for them through action and not through propaganda.

By Dr B N Ramesh, Director/IG, CRPF Academy, Gurgaon in http://egov.eletsonline.com/2014/04/securing-india/