One of the immediate fallouts of the September 7 explosion
at the Delhi High Court was a change in guard. A decision was taken to replace
the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC), which was guarding the premises until
the blast, with the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), thus adding yet again
to the plethora of responsibilities assigned to this force. This is also an
example of the country’s policy on the bourgeoning population of paramilitary
forces, who have been pushed from one area of responsibility to the other,
without much thought.
The narrative on the paramilitary forces (now called the
Central Armed Police Forces, CAPFs) is indeed one of rapid numerical growth as
well as of enormously expanded responsibilities. The CAPFs, with a strength of
780,000 personnel, now resemble a second army for the country. And this number
is projected to grow, probably to overcome the Indian Army numbering about 1.1
million, in few years. The CAPF organisations will remain the largest
government employers for many years to come.
While such astounding growth is a necessity for the country
in some measure, what is baffling is the blurring of the functional
distinctiveness among the forces. Traditional responsibilities of these forces
organised under seven different names range from acting as border guarding
forces to protecting law and order by fighting rioters, insurgents and
terrorists. While none of these original duties have lost their relevance,
today to distinguish the forces on the basis of their responsibilities is
indeed a difficult task.
Post-Kargil war, the CRPF was recommended to be the primary
counter-insurgency (COIN) force. However, almost after a decade of such
recommendation, it continues to be the Chalte Raho Pyare Force (translating
into Carry on Marching Force), a loose reference to its assumption of
mind-boggling array of duties. The same fate has befallen on the rest of the
CAPFs as well. The Border Security Force (BSF), whose role is “security of
India’s border and matters connected therewith”, operates on election duties,
riot control in states that are far removed from the Indo-Pak and
Indo-Bangladesh borders.
The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) personnel, supposed to
be guarding the Indo-Tibetan border, are deployed to protect Indian mission in
Afghanistan that gives the personnel about five times their normal salary.
Post-1998 Mumbai attack, the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel
are available for deployment to protect private installations, in return for a
payment. This is in addition to their deployments for VIP security, disaster
management and also as a Formed Police Unit of the UN at Haiti. Personnel of
the National Security Guards, an elite counter-terrorism commando force, are
also deployed in VIP protection. The list goes on.
The internal security challenges and the perennial demand
for forces for routine law and order duties has led the home ministry to gloss
over the specific duties for which these forces were raised. The 80 battalions
of Central forces deployed in the Naxal theatres include the BSF, the ITBP, the
CISF, the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) apart from the CRPF.
Whereas such deployment can be justified on the ground of
shortages of forces required to assist the state police forces, what remain
inexcusable are the political decisions to misuse even the CAPFs, passing out
after advanced COIN training. And both the Central and state governments have
been guilty of this. Earlier this year, New Delhi deployed the personnel of the
Combat Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA), a 10-battalion-strong force
within the CRPF raised specifically for carrying out anti-Naxal duties, in
poll-bound and Congress-ruled Assam. Almost in the same vein, a large number of
CRPF personnel, after being trained by counter-insurgency and jungle warfare
schools, are deployed for VIP protection duties, constituting a complete waste
of their talent and training.
As the home ministry’s decades-long modernisation programme
for the CAPFs focuses on augmenting the capacity of the forces, won’t it be a
better idea to simply merge the CAPF organisations under one head? Why maintain
seven different organisations if the CAPFs, irrespective of the colour of their
badges, are to carry out similar duties? If need be, there can be only two
different divisions among the CAPFs—one, for COIN duties, and the other for the
rest. It will take care of the competition for resources among the different
CAPF organisations; address the problem of coordination among them; allow
better rotation of forces between stressful and not so stressful duties; and
consolidate seven modernisation plans into one. If we accept that the Indian
Army is doing well under just one supreme command, why not bring the CAPFs
under a similar arrangement?
By Bibhu Prasad Routray in www.claws.in
The writer, currently Visiting Research Fellow at RSIS,
Singapore, served as a Deputy Director in the National Security Council
Secretariat
